RUSSIA INVADED UKRAINE ON 24.02.2022: AID RECEIVED FROM EU, USA ETC till 31.03.2023

BACKGROUND

 On 24 February 2022, Russia launched military action in Ukraine, with forces crossing into the country from Belarus in the north, Russia in the east, and Crimea in the south. After failing to take the capital, Kyiv, fighting is now focused in south and eastern Ukraine. Russia’s military actions have forced many Ukrainians to leave the county and resulted in significant damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and public services, creating a substantial level of humanitarian need. The events of 2022 and 2023 have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis that has been ongoing in eastern Ukraine since 2014. In that year, Russia annexed Crimea. Two regions in the Donbas, controlled by Russian-backed separatist forces, also declared independence.  The briefing describes the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, the number of displaced people, and what aid the UK and others have pledged from 2022. For updates on the military situation in Ukraine, sanctions, and other geopolitical aspects of these events, visit the Commons Library’s Conflict in Ukraine page.

 Humanitarian needs

 The crisis in eastern Ukraine since 2014 saw the country’s humanitarian needs grow. To January 2021, over 3,000 civilians were killed and the UN estimated around 2.9 million people were in need of humanitarian aid (eg, to access food, shelter, or health services) (February 2022).  Between February 2022 and January 2023, a further 7,110 civilian deaths have been reported, and the number in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to 17.7 million—around 40% of Ukraine’s 44 million population. In June 2022, the World Bank, EU, and Ukrainian Government estimated the costs of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine then amounted to US$349 billion. The World Bank also projected Ukraine’s economy would shrink by a third in 2022 due to the conflict, and the population share with income below the national poverty line would increase to 60% in 2022, up from 18% in 2021. Many people have been displaced. Around 8 million refugees have left Ukraine, and an additional 5.9 million are displaced within the country. This is a fast-moving situation.

Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022-23

 While Poland has seen the highest number of recorded border crossings from Ukraine since February 2022 (around 9.3 million), it no longer hosts the highest number of refugees. Russia hosts the highest number, at 2.8 million and Poland, the second, at 1.5 million. Around 160,000 Ukrainians have also arrived in the UK under Government visa schemes. The UK has pledged aid and loan guarantees. From 2010 to 2020, the UK provided a total of around £204 million in bilateral aid (that is, aid given for a specific programme or purpose) to Ukraine. Several tranches of funding have been pledged by the UK since February 2022. Section 4.3 provides a full list, but includes £220 million to provide humanitarian assistance, medical supplies, and other necessities to the Ukrainian population and for refugees in neighboring countries in 2022/23,  A three-year £100 million package of aid, primarily to support the part of Ukraine’s economy that is most vulnerable to Russia, namely energy,  US$100 million (£74 million) for the Ukrainian Government’s budget to support public sector salaries, social protection, and core services. This forms part of a World Bank scheme.

 In April 2022, the Chair of the International Development Committee, Sarah Champion MP, criticized the pace at which UK humanitarian aid had been delivered. As of November 2022, around £174 million of the £220 million had been spent (79%). No commitments have been announced for 2023. The UK is also willing to guarantee lending to Ukraine from multilateral development banks, including the World Bank. As of July 2022, it said it had guaranteed US$950 million (£720 million) in World Bank lending and was ready to provide a further guarantee of US$525 million (£429 million). Support from the G7 and international bodies G7 members include the UK, Germany, and Japan. At the G7 summit in June, members pledged to collectively mobilize US$29.5 billion in budget support for Ukraine (£24 billion), and US$2.8 billion in humanitarian aid (£2.3 billion). The World Bank has mobilized US$18 billion to provide loans and financing for Ukrainian public sector salaries and pensions. The UK’s £74 million pledge for Ukraine forms part of this. The International Monetary Fund has also approved US$2.7 billion in emergency financing (around £2.3 billion).

Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022-23

1 Ukraine from 2014 to February 2022

Russia's Actions to 2022

From April 2014 to January 2021, 3,077 civilians were killed, and the total number of injured civilians was estimated to be over 7,000.UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2020 to 31 January 2021 (PDF), March 2021, para 28. Section 1 sources accessed February 2022.

2 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Ukraine

3 ACAPS, Ukraine

4 UNHCR, Refugee Statistics 2021

5 UNHCR, IDPs

 Humanitarian needs and access

 As of 11 February 2022, the UN assisted 1.8 million people with humanitarian assistance. However, 2.9 million were already estimated to be in humanitarian need. Humanitarian needs included difficulties in accessing water, markets, work, and health services, and shortages of medical personnel.

Forced displacement

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded in August 2021:

• 734,000 internally displaced people (IDPs)

• 35,875 stateless persons

• 162,000 others of concern (eg, having humanitarian needs).4

 Ukraine’s Government provides a higher figure of IDPs, at 1.5 million displaced since 2014.5

Ukraine: UK aid and humanitarian situation 2022-23

 Terminology on forced displacement

• Internally displaced persons (IDPs): Those who have been forced to leave their homes but have not crossed an international border.

• Refugees: Have been forced to leave their homes and have crossed an international border.

• Stateless people: Those with an undetermined nationality or who are not considered nationals of any state. They generally are people holding expired Soviet passports, homeless people, prisoners, and Roma.

 Humanitarian needs

The crisis in eastern Ukraine since 2014 saw the country’s humanitarian needs grow. To January 2021, over 3,000 civilians were killed and the UN estimated around 2.9 million people were in need of humanitarian aid (e.g, to access food, shelter, or health services) (February 2022). Between February 2022 and January 2023, a further 7,110 civilian deaths have been reported, and the number in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to 17.7 million—around 40% of Ukraine’s 44 million population. In June 2022, the World Bank, EU, and Ukrainian Government estimated the costs of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine then amounted to US$349 billion. The World Bank also projected Ukraine’s economy would shrink by a third in 2022 due to the conflict, and the population share with income below the national poverty line would increase to 60% in 2022, up from 18% in 2021.

Many people have been displaced

Around 8 million refugees have left Ukraine, and an additional 5.9 million are displaced within the country. This is a fast-moving situation, and this briefing should be read as correct at the time of publication. While Poland has seen the highest number of recorded border crossings from Ukraine since February 2022 (around 9.3 million), it no longer hosts the highest number of refugees. Russia hosts the highest number, at 2.8 million, and Poland, the second, at 1.5 million. Around 160,000 Ukrainians have also arrived in the UK under Government visa schemes.

 The UK has pledged aid and loan guarantees

 From 2010 to 2020, the UK provided a total of around £204 million in bilateral aid (that is, aid given for a specific program or purpose) to Ukraine. Several tranches of funding have been pledged by the UK since February 2022. Section 4.3 provides a full list, but includes £220 million to provide humanitarian assistance, medical supplies, and other necessities to the Ukrainian population and for refugees in neighboring countries in 2022/23. A three-year £100 million package of aid, primarily to support the part of Ukraine’s economy that is most vulnerable to Russia, namely energy. US$100 million (£74 million) for the Ukrainian Government’s budget to support public sector salaries, social protection, and core services. This forms part of a World Bank scheme.  

 In April 2022, the Chair of the International Development Committee, Sarah Champion MP, criticized the pace at which UK humanitarian aid had been delivered. As of November 2022, around £174 million of the £220 million had been spent (79%). No commitments have been announced for 2023. The UK is also willing to guarantee lending to Ukraine from multilateral development banks, including the World Bank. As of July 2022, it said it had guaranteed US$950 million (£720 million) in World Bank lending and was ready to provide a further guarantee of US$525 million (£429 million).

 Support from the G7 and international bodies

 G7 members include the UK, Germany, and Japan. At the G7 summit in June, members pledged to collectively mobilize US$29.5 billion in budget support for Ukraine (£24 billion), and US$2.8 billion in humanitarian aid (£2.3 billion). The World Bank has mobilized US$18 billion to provide loans and financing for Ukrainian public sector salaries and pensions. The UK’s £74 million pledge for Ukraine forms part of this. The International Monetary Fund has also approved US$2.7 billion in emergency financing (around £2.3 billion).

 DECLARATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE UK - UKRAINE DECLARATION OF UNITY dated 08.02.2023 at Londo

 The UK and Ukraine are united in a shared belief that nations should be sovereign, democratic, and free. Russia’s unprovoked attacks on Ukraine since 2014, and its full-scale invasion last year, have brutally assaulted Ukraine and its citizens. They are an attack on Europe’s security and the rights of people to determine their own future. They threaten our freedom. Our countries stand side by side in the face of this aggression. We are the closest of friends, and the most committed of partners. Inspired by the heroism and resilience of the Ukrainian people, we have come together as never before. We share a common purpose. President Putin believed his forces would be welcomed with open arms, that Ukrainians would not fight, and that Western support would crumble. He has been proved wrong on all counts. The ingenuity, courage, and determination of the Ukrainian people have been remarkable. The UK reaffirms its unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its recognized borders, as well as Ukraine’s right to pursue its own security arrangements, including future membership of NATO. Ukraine’s armed forces are defending not only their territory but also the UN Charter, our shared values, and core principles of international law. Our countries firmly reject Russia’s claim to a ‘zone of influence’ and attempt to change borders by force. We share values on sovereignty and self-determination. We share the determination that atrocities committed by Russia must never happen again. The UK’s military, humanitarian, and economic support to Ukraine since the invasion has reached nearly £4bn. The UK is proud to be the largest supplier of military aid to Ukraine after the United States, with support of £2.3bn in 2022. Since 2015, the UK has been training the Ukrainian Armed Forces through Operation ORBITAL. We were the first European country to provide lethal aid. The UK has continued to lead the way in support of Ukraine to defend itself including anti-tank weapons and tanks. Our military support to Ukraine is enduring. UK support will continue to contribute across all three domains; Land, Air, and Sea. The UK remains committed to providing humanitarian aid to those in greatest need, supporting Ukraine’s budget and economy, and helping restore Ukraine’s energy grid and other civilian infrastructure attacked by illegal Russian airstrikes. The UK has now sanctioned over 1,200 Russian individuals and over 120 entities since the invasion, the most extensive sanctions ever imposed against a major economy. 2 Our countries are determined to pursue victory against Russia’s invasion and a just and sustainable peace. Ukraine has a right to defend itself. Together, we will build Ukrainian armed forces that are able to defend their country and deter attacks. The UK is working with Ukraine to help develop their longer-term force structures and capabilities, to reverse Russian gains, and build towards a deterrence force of the future. In 2023 the UK will train at least double the number of Ukrainian forces trained in 2022, and provide at least £2.3bn in military aid, including more advanced capabilities. Ahead of the Vilnius Summit, we will work with Allies to deepen Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO, and to accelerate Ukraine’s transition to NATO standards. Together with our closest partners, we will pursue long-term security commitments that will support Ukraine to defend itself and deter future Russian aggression. We will introduce new measures against key sectors of the Russian economy and those in Russia and outside who are supporting or profiting from the war. We will also take determined action with partners to tackle all forms of sanctions circumvention. We will work together to help Ukraine’s grain reach world markets. This will include seeking the continuation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and ‘Grain from Ukraine’, which are aimed at ensuring food security for the world’s most vulnerable people. We will also work together in international organizations to defend the principles in the UN Charter. We will step up our efforts with partners to tackle Russian disinformation across the world and deprive Russia of a platform for its propaganda. Europe will not be secure until Ukraine’s sovereignty is restored and there is a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law and the UN Charter. The UK, therefore, welcomes President Zelenskyy’s ‘ten-point Peace Formula’ and supports the principles in it. The UK is ready to play a leading role in taking forward concrete steps to implement the peace plan. We will pursue joint initiatives to create the foundations for a just and lasting peace, including by stepping up our work to hold to account those responsible for war crimes, atrocities, and aggression - including the political and military leadership of Russia. The UK has joined the Core Group of countries working jointly to ensure that Russian leaders responsible for aggression are held to account. Our countries will seek to ensure that Ukraine’s future is secure and prosperous. The UK welcomes recent progress made by Ukraine on reform, as well as President Zelenskyy’s commitment to de-oligarchizing and strengthening public institutions. We will accelerate work to implement the 2020 UK-Ukraine Political, Free Trade & Strategic Agreement. This envisages preferential treatment of a range of goods and services and sets out that our relationship is built on shared values, democratic principles, human rights, fundamental freedoms, open economies, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption. 3 Ukraine and the UK will work to bring together the international community in support of a just and lasting peace. We will co-host the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on 21-22 June. We will build a modern, resilient Ukrainian economy that strengthens the rule of law, tackles corruption, and promotes reform. The UK will seek to facilitate the access by Ukraine to UK private finance, insurance, tech, and other expertise. We will also ensure, consistent with our legal systems, that Russia has no access to the assets we have frozen or immobilized until it ends, once and for all, its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will pursue all lawful routes to ensure that Russian assets are made available in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction, in line with international law. We are confident, that together with our allies and partners, we will defeat Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion, and build a stronger Ukraine where peace and prosperity will prevail. Signed at London 8 February 2023 Signed for and behalf of the Government Signed for and behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Ukraine Name: Name: The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP His Excellency Volodymyr Zelenskyy Designation: Designation: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom President of Ukraine of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

 Military support for Ukraine

 Germany provides support for Ukraine by supplying equipment and weapons, these come from supplies of the Federal Arms Forces and from deliveries from industry financed from the Federal Government’s funds for security capacity building. Federal Government supports the Ukrainian military in close coordination with its partners and allies. This list provides an overview of lethal and non-lethal German military support for Ukraine. It includes deliveries from the Federal Armed Forces, as well as supplies from German industry financed from the Federal Government’s funds for so-called security capacity building.

Funding for the security capacity-building initiative amounts to a total of 2.2 billion Euros for the year 2023 (after 2 billion Euros for 2022). The funds are to be used primarily to support Ukraine. At the same time, they will be used to finance Germany’s increased mandatory contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), which in turn goes towards reimbursing EU member states for costs incurred by them in providing support for Ukraine.   

The total value of individual licenses issued by the Federal Government for the export of military goods in the period from January 1, 2022, to April 17, 2023 amounts to 2.748.163.254 Euro. The total license value includes the goods listed above insofar as their export is subject to licensing requirements under German foreign trade laws. This is not the case for all of the goods listed above. In order to speed up the processing of certain deliveries, the Federal Government has also eased certain licensing processes, e.g. with regard to military protective goods. These deliveries are also not included in the total license value. The values stated for used material from the German Armed Forces are also based on current values which can be significantly lower than the corresponding values for new or replacement goods. The total license value includes the goods regardless of how their procurement and delivery were financed. For security reasons, the Federal Government does not provide further details until the goods have been delivered.

* Deliveries from industry stocks financed by German funds for security capacity building. Some of the deliveries require upgrades or productions are ongoing; also training measures take place.

Ukrainian resistance requires continuous aid from outside supporters, particularly the United States. So far that it has been forthcoming. However, as aid opponents increasingly call for negotiations, a political battle will be generated when currently appropriated aid runs out in the summer. Although supporters will likely prevail, there could be some shifts in policy, and the long-term is uncertain. In any case, Ukrainian demands and exhaustion of inventories will prompt some shifts in composition.

Aid is critical for Ukraine's survival.

It is worth starting with the basics. Why is this aid needed? The answer is threefold. First, armies in conflict require a continuous flow of weapons and ammunition. For example, Ukraine reportedly fires 3,000 artillery rounds per day or 90,000 per month. That is equal to the entire U.S. annual production in 2021. Ukraine's peacetime stocks probably lasted only a few weeks. Second, there is the need to replace lost equipment. According to unclassified sources, Ukraine has lost 457 of the 858 tanks it began the war with, 478 of 1,184 infantry fighting vehicles, and 247 of 1,800 pieces of artillery. Finally, Ukraine has likely doubled the size of its armed forces, and all these new units need equipment and training. Aid from the United States, NATO, and other global partners has allowed Ukraine to meet all these wartime demands. Without a continuing and high level of support, Ukraine's resistance would soon falter and collapse.

U.S. aid has totaled $113 billion so far.

This has come in four packages appropriated by Congress: March ($13 billion), May ($40 billion), September ($14 billion), and December ($45 billion).

 The interest here is the military aid provided to Ukraine. That totals $50 billion and covers equipment The aid has gone for a variety of uses. What is most transferred from U.S. stocks, new equipment procured, and training?

 Future aid packages might contain jets.

Every two weeks or so the administration announces a new aid package. These packages specify how it proposes to spend the money that Congress has provided. Public attention has focused on new capabilities—Patriot in early January, then tanks in early February, and, most recently, long-range strike missiles. The political dynamics have become familiar: President Zelensky asks for a new capability, which the United States and its allies are reluctant to provide. Zelensky insists, pressure builds, and the United States relents. Russia complains about "escalation" but keeps doing what it is doing. Sometimes there is less to the announcement than meets the eye, but the political point is made.

The next major debate will be over jet aircraft. It would make more sense to upgrade Ukrainian aircraft by adapting them to use NATO subsystems and munitions and to provide additional Soviet-era aircraft from the global markets. The Ukrainian Air Force could easily assimilate these modified aircraft. However, the allure of "NATO fighters" as a "game changer" is strong. Zelensky has made the pitch repeatedly. The United Kingdom has already opened the door, agreeing to train pilots. President Biden has stated that the United States would not provide F-16s, and other officials have sensibly suggested that rebuilding the Ukrainian Air Force would be a post-conflict effort. Nevertheless, as with tanks, the pressure may become so strong that the United States feels obligated to do something. This might entail training some pilots and moving towards standing up a squadron at some undefined point in the future, much as the United Kingdom has done. This will meet the near-term political need even if it has no immediate battlefield impact.

Meanwhile, the flow of ammunition, armored vehicles, trucks, engineering supplies, and medical equipment will continue. These will have a battlefield impact. Some inventories are running low, so expect substitutions, purchases from foreign governments, and new production.

Current funding will run out by midsummer.

In December, Congress appropriated $45 billion for aid to Ukraine, which means that the administration will not need to ask Congress for more money for some time. But when?

In theory, the money covers the entire fiscal year, which runs through September 30. However, that does not seem likely. Spread over nine months (January to September), $45 billion implies spending at the rate of $5 billion per month. The previously appropriated $67 billion covered 10 months (March to December) for an average expenditure of $6.7 billion per month. If that rate of expenditure continues, the $45 billion would last 6.7 months and run out in mid-July. In asking for a lower rate of expenditure, the administration might have been hedging its bets, expecting some easing of combat intensity or even some kind of ceasefire. That could still happen, but the lack of any current movement toward negotiation or reduction in violence makes it unlikely.

 

Surging aid might provide a decisive edge but at great risk.

Many voices are recommending that the United States surge aid strengthen Ukraine for the expected spring offensive. The additional equipment might break the Russian forces and force their retreat. However, there is a great risk. First, Ukrainian forces may not be fully trained on the equipment they receive. This would lead to higher losses and wasted material. Second, aid funding would run out sooner, accelerating the date at which the administration must go to Congress for more money. Finally, if the battlefield result is not decisive, voices calling for negotiation would become stronger. If a surge does not produce victory, the argument will become, what’s the point of continuing to spend tens of billions of dollars?

Appropriating additional aid will spark a political battle.

Support for Ukraine is highly bipartisan. The $40 billion appropriated in May, the only standalone aid bill, passed the Senate 86–11 and the House 368–57. In December, Congress added $8 billion to the $37 billion that the administration had requested. This indicates strong bipartisan support. Nevertheless, polls show that "war fatigue" is growing in the United States as it is in Europe. Opposition to aid comes from both the populist right and progressive left. Congressman Matthew Gaetz (R-FL) introduced a bill calling for the United States to "end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and [urge] all combatants to reach a peace agreement." Although the bill will go nowhere, it indicates where some Republican members are.

In October, a group of 30 Democratic progressives signed a letter urging President Biden "to make vigorous diplomatic efforts in support of a negotiated settlement and ceasefire, engage in direct talks with Russia, [and] explore prospects for a new European security arrangement acceptable to all parties." Although the group withdrew the letter quickly under White House pressure, the sentiment remains. Indeed, the notion of negotiating a peaceful settlement is attractive as a way to end the violence (a progressive concern), reduce the threat of waste and abuse (a populist concern), and keep funds inside the United States (a universal concern). However, negotiations would only produce an in-place ceasefire that would solidify Russia's control of the 18 percent of Ukraine it occupies.

In normal political times, the opponents of aid would raise their issues but lack the votes to affect policy in a major way, but these are not normal political times. As was seen in the extended voting for the speaker of the house, a small group of Republicans can have outsized influence on policy. Although aid opponents are unlikely to make this a do-or-die issue—federal spending, cultural issues, and investigations loom larger—this constitutes a major uncertainty. The populist right and progressive left could combine to force some shift in policy although a complete cessation of aid is unlikely. The administration has been adamant that its support is unequivocal and open-ended. However, recent reports indicate long-term concern about how long the high level of aid can be sustained.

Battlefield success and honest government are key determinants for support.

Both Russia and Ukraine are preparing offensives. The Russians have incorporated their mobilized personnel and increased attacks in the Donetsk area. The Ukrainians are assimilating new equipment and having troops trained in Europe. These dueling offensives will soon launch. If Ukraine can show progress on the ground, supporters will be more inclined to provide aid. In addition to the satisfaction of success, there will be the prospect of the war ending. Fears about a "forever war" undermine support for aid by making it appear that the commitment will go on indefinitely.

Donors also want to believe that the aid is well used by selfless and determined Ukrainian people. So far, that appears to be the case. No donated weapons have shown up where they do not belong, such as in the Middle East, nor have oligarchs appeared to have benefited from outside funds. To ensure this does not happen, Zelensky has publicly fired certain officials accused of corruption, and the United States has established auditing structures to ensure the appropriate use of resources. Nevertheless, before the war, the Corruption Perception Index ranked Ukraine at 122 out of 180 countries. If photos appear showing equipment discarded because of a lack of maintenance or articles describe how oligarchs diverted funds intended for the government, the bipartisan consensus will fray.

Increased oversight and an emphasis on military aid might be a potential compromise.

Although the most recent package contains $27 million for increased oversight, concerns abound that resources are inadequately safeguarded. Therefore, the new Congress may call for enhanced oversight through new organizations such as an analog to the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, hearings to focus attention on the issue, authorities to make auditing more effective, or additional resources to support the effort. It is a demand that the administration could live with even if Ukraine might find it intrusive. In an extreme case, future aid appropriations might move away from economic aid to the Ukrainian government and focus on military aid. Economic aid, though desperately needed by the Ukrainian government, is vulnerable to the charge that U.S. domestic communities need to help more. Other countries, many of which are more comfortable providing "soft" rather than lethal support, might pick up the economic aid. Conversely, military aid would directly affect the outcome of the war making it more acceptable to Congress and the U.S. public.

CONCLUSION

The bottom line is that aid will continue through the coming year, but the smooth process of the last year will become bumpy and some changes in policy may be necessary.