Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. She is also Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Instituteand an inaugural Wilson Center China Fellow.

Mastro continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM. For her contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, she won the Individual Reservist of the Year Award in 2016. She has received numerous other awards for her military service and contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, including the 2020 and 2018 Meritorious Service Medal, the 2017 Air Force recognition Ribbon.

Mastro is an international security expert with a focus on Chinese military and security policy issues, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. Her research addresses critical questions at the intersection of interstate conflict, great power relations, and the challenge of rising powers. She leverages process tracing, qualitative historical analysis, and the case study method with the goal of conducting policy-relevant research. In 2017, the National Bureau of Asian Research awarded her the Ellis Joffe Prize for PLA Studies.

Mastro has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security. Her book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, (Cornell University Press, 2019) won the 2020 American Political Science Association International Security Section Best Book by an Untenured Faculty Member. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University.

Follow her commentary on Twitter @osmastro and her website at orianaskylarmastro.com.

Research interests: Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, coercive diplomacy, international security

PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS

“A Conversation with Oriana Skylar Mastro on U.S. Policy in the Taiwan Strait,” GTI Insights Season 2, Episode 8 (Washington, DC: Global Taiwan Institute, May 2021).

In Season 2, Episode 8 of GTI Insights, GTI Program Associate Marshall Reid interviews Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. In a timely and engaging interview, she shares her perspectives on the current state of the cross-Strait relationship, Chinese foreign policy and decision-making, and the future of U.S. deterrence in East Asia.

Listen to this episode on our website, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Breaker, Google Podcasts, Overcast, Pocket Casts, RadioPublic, and Anchor.

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Oriana Mastro and Ryan Hass on China (Conversation 6)

Mastro: Good morning from here in Sydney. I’m Oriana Skylar Mastro. I’m a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a senior non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. I’m here with Ryan Haas, who is the Michael H. Armacost Chair and senior fellow in the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution.

So happy to chat with you this morning for me afternoon for you, Ryan.

Hass: It’s great to be in touch with you and use this platform to cross continents.

Mastro: Exactly. Well, I have a question for you and I’m so glad we have this opportunity. You know, late last year Chinese mouthpiece were declaring that the United States was a declining power. But now President Biden has been telling the world that America is back.

What do you anticipate China to do in response to these changing circumstances? Are they changing their position? We know, you know, I think it was in the 90s, they also thought the U.S. was in decline and the multipolar order was on the rise and then they had to make some changes.

So what are they thinking about now?

Hass: Yeah, it’s a great question, Oriana, and I think that the first couple months of the by Administration have challenged the preferred narrative of the Chinese that the United States is in terminal decline.

I mean we’ve seen the United States improve its handling of COVID. President Biden declared that America will become the arsenal of vaccines in the world.

The U.S. Economy is poised to be the leading growth engine of the world economy this year.

The United States is making progress repairing its alliance relationships. We’re going to see that on display tomorrow with South Korean President Moon visit to Washington following shortly on the heels of Prime Minister Suga’s visit to Washington a few weeks ago. â€¦ … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: Wilson Center China Fellowship, April 2021).

What are China’s intentions in the South China Sea? In this article I present an analytical framework for understanding intentions based on two components: 1) distinguishing between intentions about the process and those about the outcome and 2) incorporating information from discourse, behavior, and capabilities. Through applying the framework, I argue that China wants to establish de facto control over the South China Sea, meaning sovereignty over the disputed islands and the ability to dictate the rules of behavior in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests. I conclude with a list of recommended measures the United States can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea. … … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Dangerous Double Game in North Korea: Biden Must Force Beijing to Cooperate Fully With Washington or Pivot to Obvious Obstruction,” Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2021.

A new administration in Washington faces a familiar problem: North Korea is once again testing missiles, including ballistic missiles, in contravention of a UN Security Council resolution. Rather than retread dead-end paths, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has pledged to think anew on North Korea, and it has already distinguished itself from its predecessor by signaling that it will consult with U.S. allies and partners to formulate a strong response to Pyongyang that does not rule out diplomacy.

Such a reorientation is welcome. But if the new administration really wants to move the needle on North Korea, it will need to rethink the assumptions it has inherited about China’s role there. So far, the Biden team has cleaved to the long-held view that the United States and China share a common interest in the nuclear disarmament of North Korea and that U.S. policy there must make use of Beijing’s tremendous influence over the government in Pyongyang. During his visit to Seoul last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that “Beijing has an interest, a clear self-interest, in helping â€¦ … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, “What are China’s Leaders Saying About the South China Sea?” The Lowy Interpreter, 24 February 2021.

The rhetoric weaves between cooperative and competitive, leaving the question of what – and who – to believe.

When China began three days of military exercises in the South China Sea’s Gulf of Tonkin back in January, some observers speculated that Beijing was testing the new Biden administration. Harsh words from Beijing accompanied the exercises, with China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin declaring the drills were “necessary measures to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and security.”

Even against this backdrop, China’s official position is that it remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue. And the rhetoric China employs at different times does make for a fascinating contrast. For example, China’s Foreign Ministry asserted in July 2020 that “China is not seeking to become a maritime empire” and that it “treats its neighbouring nations on an equal basis and exercises the greatest restraint.”

How then should we make sense of the mixed messages coming from Beijing? Most China experts find discourse to be informative – if not about China’s intentions, then at least about its aspirations. But which statements are indicative of China’s true position?

I argued recently in research for the Wilson Center that scholars need to evaluate the content and specificity of Chinese national discourse in addition to the position of the author or speaker involved. To that end, I analysed all public speeches made by members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party from 2013 to 2018. Xi Jinping led both of the Politburos I studied, and each had 25 members. Since some members served in both, this yields speeches by 39 unique individuals.

Ambiguity suggests the leadership wants to have maximum flexibility and avoid being boxed in by its aggressive rhetoric.

The speeches related to the South China Sea could be separated into those that mentioned cooperative themes and those with competitive themes. Cooperative themes have two subcategories, cooperation and political solutions. Competitive themes have five subcategories: sovereignty, military, freedom, tension and non-regional countries/the United States.

In what might appear good news for regional stability, China’s leaders used more cooperative discourse in public statements about the South China Sea than competitive themes. This might be taken to indicate a willingness to compromise with other claimants – a feature that is especially evident during the first year of each new Party Congress, namely 2013 and 2018.

However, one of the tenets of deriving intentions from discourse is that not all leadership statements are created equal. We need to consider personal power, accountability and reputation for honesty. This means that statements by Xi, who is described as having “more power and more personal authority than any post-Mao leader,” take precedent.

So here is the bad news. My analysis showed that Xi’s statements accounted for 42.7% of the competitive themes mentioned, even though he is only one of 39 leaders during this period. … … …

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Melissa Morgan, “Oriana Skylar Mastro Testifies on Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan to Congressional Review Commission,” Shorenstein APARC News, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 19 February 2021.

China may now be able to prevail in cross-strait contingencies even if the United States intervenes in Taiwan’s defense, Chinese security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro tells the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Changes must be made to U.S. military capabilities, not U.S. policy, she argues.

There are strong indications that the Biden administration intends to continue strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties. The Biden team invited Taiwan’s representative Bi-khim Hsiao to the presidential inauguration, supporters of Taiwan now hold senior roles in the administration, and officials have pledged “rock-solid” U.S. commitment to Taiwan, warning that PRC military pressure against Taiwan threatens regional peace and stability. But Cross-strait deterrence is arguably weaker today than at any point since the Korean War, according to Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI Center Fellow at APARC.

On February 18, 2021, Mastro testified to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission at a hearing on Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan. Her testimony on the political and strategic dynamics underpinning deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is available to watch here.

Beijing has turned to increasingly hostile and combative rhetoric and actions since the democratic election of Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. PLA air and water operations around Taiwan, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, have increased significantly in the past year, and concern is growing that the Chinese Communist Party is imminently planning to use force to compel Taiwan to accept unification with mainland China.

Drawing on her expertise in both policy and military security, Mastro explains why deterrence in Taiwan must be based on military capabilities rather than signaling through policy. … … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, â€œThe Precarious State of Cross-Strait Deterrence,” Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan,” 18 February 2021.

… … Cross-strait deterrence is arguably weaker today than at any point since the Korean War. Impressive Chinese military modernization, U.S. failure to build robust coalitions to counter Chinese regional aggression, and Xi Jinping’s personal ambition, all coalesce to create a situation in which Chinese leaders may see some aggregate benefit to using force. I support this assessment in my response to the Commission’s specific questions below.

Under what circumstances would Chinese leaders initiate a conflict over Taiwan? What actions or developments could deter or precipitate a decision by Chinese leaders to initiate conflict? Are there any true “redlines” that would prompt this decision? 

These questions allude to two different pathways to conflict. The first is the perceived need in Beijing to respond to a situation. The most realistic pathway to conflict used to be that Taipei or Washington crosses a redline that precipitates conflict. For example, if Taiwan were to declare independence, China would undoubtedly use force to reverse the decision, potentially even using the opportunity to push for ‘reunification.’ In case we needed reminding, the Chinese Ministry of Defense clearly stated on January 28, 2021, that “Taiwan independence means war.”1

But the basic argument in my testimony is that the situation has changed. The greatest threat now is that Beijing will launch a military operation to force ‘reunification,’ irrespective of Washington’s or Taipei’s policies or actions. Specifically, I believe Xi Jinping will use force to compel Taiwan to unite with the mainland once he is confident in the Chinese military’s ability to succeed in relevant joint operations, like an amphibious attack.

While military balances and outcomes of military operations are notoriously hard to assess and predict, China’s military has made significant strides in its ability to conduct joint operations in recent years. China’s massive military reform program, which Xi launched2 shortly after coming to power in 2012, plans for China’s military to be “fully modern” by 2027.3 Senior Col. Ren Guoqiang, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, has claimed that “China has basically completed the national defense and military reform of the leadership and command systems, scale, structure and force composition, which promoted the joint operations of the Chinese military to a new stage.”4 On November 7, 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) revised its strategic guidelines, for only the fifth time in its history, to incorporate this new focus on joint operations.5 Chinese military writings are replete with examples of how to contribute to joint operations capability, such as ensuring a complementary logistics system.6

Because of these reforms and the modernization of Chinese equipment, platforms, and weapons, China may now be able to prevail in cross-strait contingencies even if the U.S. intervenes in Taiwan’s defense. China’s improved anti-access/area denial capabilities and its strides in cyber and artificial intelligence also contribute to the weakening of cross-strait deterrence. In the words of Michèle Flournoy, “In the event that conflict starts, the United States can no longer expect to quickly achieve air, space, or maritime superiority.”7 As Beijing hones its spoofing and jamming technologies, it may be able to interfere with U.S. early warning systems and thereby keep U.S. forces in the dark. Worryingly, other analysts have concluded that Chinese interference with satellite signals is only likely to grow more frequent and sophisticated.8 China also possesses offensive weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles, which if deployed, could destroy U.S. bases in Western Pacific in days.9 Finally, the U.S. intelligence community warns that “China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.”10

Because of these aforementioned capabilities, many U.S. experts are concerned with a fait accompli, a scenario in which China takes Taiwan before even the most resolved United States could act decisively. Recent war games jointly conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely result in a U.S. defeat, with China completing an all-out invasion in a matter of days.11

In the end, Chinese perceptions of their likelihood of victory are more important than the reality in determining if they use force. It is not a good sign that Chinese sources express an increasing confidence that the PLA is well prepared for potential military confrontation with the United States over the Taiwan issue.12 The multiple large-scale military exercises (at least nine) conducted simultaneously in the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea, and the Bohai Gulf by the PLA in August 2020 are considered a credible demonstration of its ability to conduct complex, intense joint operations. While Chinese strategists acknowledge U.S. military superiority generally, the conventional wisdom is that China’s proximity to Taiwan, corresponding access to operational resources13 and resolute stance14 makes the local balance of power favorable to Beijing.15

The bottom line is that for the first time in Chinese history, Xi will believe that he has at his disposal a military capable of forcing unification. While many Western observers think China will be able to do so in the next five to eight years, Chinese military leaders have told me that they will be ready within a year. It is telling that, in Xi’s first order to China’s armed forces in 2021, he emphasized the importance of “full-time combat readiness” and said the PLA must be ready to “act at any second.”16

In other words, I would worry less about U.S. policy precipitating a conflict and more about putting in place the military means necessary to stop China from using force against Taiwan. As long as the United States continues to talk about, but does not make, significant changes to improve its force posture in the region, China can afford to wait until later in Xi’s tenure to make its move. This would give its military more time to conduct realistic joint exercises and perhaps even engage in real combat operations to test out their capabilities, before moving against Taiwan. I do not think Beijing will not be pushed by smaller slights such as U.S. visits or arms sales to make a move before it is ready. China has economic and diplomatic means through which to punish Taiwan, and limited military action, such as punitive missile attacks on military facilities, could be used for signaling purposes. So until Beijing is ready to take Taiwan by force, its leadership will carefully calibrate responses to U.S. or Taiwan actions so as not to escalate to war. … … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, “How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea,” The Lowy Interpreter, 17 February 2021.

Beijing’s misapplication of international law in the disputed waters is more complex than it seems on the surface.

Chinese exercises in the South China Sea last month, and the strong US response, show these disputed waters will not soon be calm. While the focus has largely been on military manoeuvres, competition in legal positions has also been heating up. Last year, both the United States and Australia risked China’s wrath by officially stating that China’s claims in the South China Sea are unlawful. Other claimants were pleased by this change of policy, but none voiced it prominently.

The issue, however, is not that China flagrantly violates international law – it is that it does so while simultaneously creating a veneer of legal legitimacy for its position.

The conventional wisdom is that China claims sovereignty over “virtually all South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters.” Its claims are “sweeping” and more expansive than those of any other rival claimant. In 2009, Dai Bingguo, then a top Chinese official, first referred to the South China Sea as a “core interest,” a term often used for Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. While China has not been specific about the extent of its claims, it uses a “nine-dash line” which “swoops down past Vietnam and the Philippines, and towards Indonesia, encompassing virtually all of the South China Sea,” to delineate its claims.

On the surface, it appears that Chinese leaders are relying on a historical argument to buttress their claims – China traces its interaction with the South China Sea back to the Western Han Dynasty. Thus, Beijing’s narrative about its claims begins as early as the 2nd century BCE, when Chinese people sailed in the South China Sea and discovered some of the region’s land features. … … …

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Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Teach What You Preach: A Comprehensive Guide to the Policy Memo as a Methods Teaching Tool,” Journal of Political Science Education, 26 January 2021.

Students and instructors alike have lamented the nature of methods instruction in political science curricula. Existing research has presented a number of innovative approaches to engage students in this important learning enterprise, from blogging and simulations to data visualization and the use of clickers. This article builds upon this literature by arguing that the policy memo is particularly suited for introducing basic methodological concepts to upper-division undergraduate students. To facilitate its use for this purpose in addition to its utility as a knowledge assessment tool, I offer a policy memo template based on over ten years of experience as a strategist and analyst in the U.S. military. The article also includes a detailed description of the basic methodological concepts that can be developed through each section of the template. Specifically, the policy memo can be used to introduce students to concepts like identifying a critical research question, defining and measuring variables, conducting a literature review, developing hypotheses, using data to assess hypotheses, evaluating the authoritativeness of sources, and devising the theoretical implications of one’s research. I present some preliminary results that support the policy memo’s inclusion as a tool of methods instruction, but the pedagogical literature – which argues for integrative, experiential, relevant, and short assignments – provides the strongest rationale for its use. … … …

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