1987

As with the exploitation of her uranium resources, South Africa’s capability in fundamental nuclear research was gained in the 1950s and 1960s mainly with British and American help. The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) was established in 1949 as a result of the passage of the South African Atomic Energy Act of 1948; and during this time there was a very close relationship between the AEB, the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA, formerly the Ministry of Supply). The USAEC and UKAEA relied on the AEB for a large share of the supply of uranium needed for the American and British weapons programmes. Thus the USAEC and the UKAEA felt obliged to cooperate in the development of South Africa’s capability in nuclear science and technology. As we saw in Chapter 2, Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace initiative could in part be viewed as a formal recognition of the importance of the uranium-supplying countries. An agreement for nuclear cooperatio...

2021

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International History Review, 2018

The 1970s is often argued to be the era marking the beginning of the overall transformation of the international system and the nuclear order, following the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entering into force in 1970. South Africa challenged this nuclear order from the outset. In addition to regarding the NPT as inherently discriminatory and hypocritical in allowing a difference between nuclear weapon 'haves' and 'have-nots', the South African apartheid regime felt threatened by Soviet expansionism into Southern Africa. Facing international condemnation and isolation due to its repressive domestic politics of racial segregation, and gripped in a war against Soviet-and Cuban-backed forces in Angola, the apartheid regime was quick to move from a decision to build one peaceful nuclear explosive device in 1974, to a formal decision in 1978 to design and develop a secret strategic nuclear deterrent. Using knowledge and skills acquired during a period of techno-nationalism and Western collaboration during the 1960s, South Africa was able to cross this threshold in a relatively short space of time, thereby signaling a clear departure from the nuclear non-proliferation regime that the five nuclear powers of the NPT were trying to establish.

2003

Politikon, 1978

This article focusses on South Africa's position regarding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; an issue which was pushed into prominence by the Russian allegation in August 1977 that the Republic was on the verge of testing a nuclear device. The Soviet Union's objective was to embarrass the Western powers during the Lagos Conference on Apartheid, as well as to bring them in disrepute among African countries during the sessions of various United Nations bodies where South Africa's nuclear potential was discussed. Subsequent reaction from especially the United States shows that the Carter Administration will use continued nuclear cooperation with the Republic as a lever to press for political change and to secure South Africa's adherence to the NPT. The Republic has however steadfastly declined to sign the NPT. although it has made clear on several occasions that it will not allow its uranium sales to be used to increase the number of nuclear-weapon states. South Africa's refusal to sign the NPT does not necessarily reflect any desire to acquire nuclear weapons, but rather a fear that the application of "safeguards" might be economically harmful to the Republic's uranium mining industry, while the development of a new enrichment process has finally raised real concerns about possible commercial espionage. It would seem very unlikely that South Africa has in actual fact produced a nuclear device, but it would also seem imperative for the Republic neither to surrender nor to exercise the nuclear option-especially seen in the light of the peculiar politico-economic and military-strategic position it finds itself in in the international arena. South Africa's high-level nuclear technology is seen as a valuable diplomatic and strategic bargaining counter with the super powers, as well as with Black Africa. The Republic is in potential conflict with African states over its racial policies, and should its present superiority in conventional weapons be eroded by UN mandatory arms embargoes, South African strategists may begin to consider a nuclear deterrent not only as feasible, but indeed as absolutely essential. Presently, however, it is difficult to see the military value of nuclear weapons for a state whose main threat takes the form of insurgency promoted from beyond its borders. •This is the text of a talk given to the Transkei Branch of the SAIIA in Umtata on 16 November, 1977, and is based on short comments made at the Institute's monthly meeting on current international developments on

The phrase 'proliferation concern' tags its subjectcircumstances, a government, a policy, a capabilityas a threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is applied as a discursive tool in the increasingly powerful nuclear security discourse, reinforced by successive US presidents to frame an understanding of nuclear relations in the language of US interests and national security. This article investigates the evolution of this discourse and what the phrase 'proliferation concern' means in nuclear arms control parlance and practice from the point of view of non-nuclear weapon states, especially the emerging powers. Emerging powers (like Brazil, Turkey and South Africa) struggle with the hype around nuclear security that is used to restrict rights to civilian nuclear technology while endlessly postponing nuclear disarmament. For these states, the discourse brings about 'disarmament concerns'. The article uses the South African case study to illustrate the problematic nature of this discourse.

Nuclear Trends South Africa , 2024

Nuclear Trends South Africa is my newsletter on the evolving South Africa nuclear landscape as the country considers it nuclear future. This is the second issue, published on 17 November 2024.

Many factors are identified as causes of nuclear proliferation, but three stands out among them. These comprise the international and domestic political environment, technical capabilities and motivation. This article explores, on the one hand, the conditions that are conducive for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whilst also suggesting strategies that can effectively address the problem. The authors use the South African episode as a case study. They identify the role of technology and motivations in the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme and claim that the possession of technological capability is not a sufficient cause of nuclear proliferation. Rather, the presence of strong motivations in conjunction with sufficient technical capability leads to nuclear proliferation.

The study looks at the growing interest of African governments in adopting nuclear energy technology. Detailed studies of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are included, with briefer treatments of the interest in Ghana and elsewhere.