HORIZON. STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY, 8(2) 2019, pp. 409-441, 2019

Th e problem of passive constitution in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is worthy of particular attention, since it is passive constitution, rather than active conscious constitution, which can be considered to be one of the focal points of 20th century philosophy. Thematisation of the sphere of passivity is related to resolving the problem of intersubjectivity. The elaboration of the problem of intersubjectivity is not so much a response to an externally cast reproach ‘in solipsism’ as an internal theme of phenomenology itself. Husserl aspired to establish phenomenological science as being of universal significance to everybody, but in order to make this discipline significant, i.e. in order to make it necessary for everyone else, it was primarily necessary to prove the existence of these other Selves or of the transcendental subjects. I will elaborate on the history of the consideration which Husserl gave to the problem of intersubjectivity, in order to clarify how his attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity, based on the activity of the Self, led to an egocentric model, and in turn how the need to overcome this model led to the thematisation of the genesis of subjectivity, and the detection of passivity as the very basis of such genesis. According to my working hypothesis, it was largely the demand for thematisation of the genesis of the sense of ‘the Other’ which infl uenced the modification of the phenomenological method. Finally, I will turn to the concept of primary subjectivity, or Ur-Ich, in order to bring into focus the methodological signifi cance of distinguishing the proto-Self for the substantiation of intersubjectivity, since only in its ‘context’ does the ultimate level of the foundation of the individual Self appear to be not merely a deeper level of consciousness, or the history of a universal subject, but the absolute subjectivity, as a fi eld of intersubjective interaction in which the individual subject is awakened (individualized) to self-constitution in the world. Only then can we reconsider the constitution of the individual Self as being primarily passive, as being permeated by the primordial passive, independent from the Self, aiming for the co-constitution of the intersubjective world.

Husserl Studies, 2009

Addressing Walter Hopp’s original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phenomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations he criticizes the First Investigation as having been “one-sidedly” noetically directed and as having thus neglected the noematic aspects of meaning (XVIII 13–14). Also, in an addendum to the Fifth Investigation he notes that in the transition from the First Edition to the Second he has learned to broaden the concept of “phenomenological content” to include not only the “real” (reell) contents (noetic, subjective) of consciousness but also the “intentional” (noematic, objective) (XIX/1 411). The fact that, in gradually moving from consciousness (noesis) to what consciousness is of (noema), Husserl struggled with this distinction is an indication of the immensity of the perplexing problems and potential solutions that Hopp has led the phenomenology of knowledge into by introducing his useful notions of agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. Like Husserl, he has focused mainly and mostly on the noetic issues; like Husserl as well, I will try to move step by step from the noetic area into the noematic. I conclude that Hopp’s approach has the potential to become seminal.

Husserl's lifelong interest and vocation was to found an unshakeable basis for sciences and philosophy in general. This motive can be traced back to his Philosophy of Arithmetic and pursued up until his last posthumous book, namely The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. His tireless endeavour culminated in a transcendental phenomenology which he thought it would be the ultimate foundation for the apodictic establishment of sciences and philosophy. Moreover, he thought that it would bring about the promise of the philosophy as a rigorous science which can play the role of a first philosophy with respect to objective sciences. But with the advent of transcendental phenomenology, one of the most stubborn and vital problems becomes the relation of this transcendental phenomenology with the previous so-called psychological phenomenology, which still works within the natural attitude. Husserl himself was aware of the difficulties of a sufficient elucidation of the way one can access the transcendental realm without falling back to the natural attitude. Consequently, he tried many ways of preparing fruitful introductions to transcendental phenomenology. My attempt in this paper is to shed light on his evolutionary attempt to present transcendental reduction in the different stages of his work and finally arrive at an obscurity which does not finally find its proper solution in Husserl's phenomenology. As I assume, this obscurity remains not only within the edifice of Husserl's phenomenology, but continues to influence the further reception of his phenomenology which was vacillating between Husserlian conception of phenomenology and Heideggerian conception.

It is a well-acknowledged fact that Husserl’s phenomenology can be adequately characterized as transcendental philosophy. Nevertheless, whether Husserl’s phenomenology and notion of the transcendental can be conceived as continuous with Kant’s critical philosophy and own transcendental program is a far more complicated issue. Since Iso Kern’s monumental work (Kern 1964), many have attempted to explain to what extent Husserl follows Kant and where exactly he has found the limits of critical philosophy In order to cut through some of the brambles in this monumental discussion, one might adopt a more modest and focused strategy by attempting to show that we cannot prima facie exclude the possibility of understanding the phenomenological use of ‘transcendental’ in its legitimate Kantian sense. To compare their uses of this term would require examining the various places where Husserl’s and Kant’s paths seem to diverge. In this paper, I will look at one such divergence, namely, Husserl’s later insistence (proper to his genetic phenomenological writings from at least 1917 onwards) on including in the field of phenomenological inquiry allegedly causal, pre-personal, cognitive mechanisms: e.g. instincts, drives, stimuli (Reize), passive associations, and the like. The inquiry into such themes seems to indicate a decided abandonment of Kantian transcendentalism and an endorsement of some hybrid form of a priori analysis and naturalistic inquiry. This evaluation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology seems prima facie valid. However, my main contention in this paper will be that Husserl’s genetic analysis—at least in part—can be understood as a way of defending a transcendental perspective in the strong sense and overcoming some of the flaws Husserl found in Kant’s critical philosophy. I will claim that Husserl’s appeal to mechanisms is transcendentally motivated: if transcendental philosophy is the inquiry into the conditions of possibility of cognition in terms of the justification of the validity of our claims to knowledge, analyzing the mechanisms involved and their transcendental role contributes to understanding what rational grounding is and how rational norms can inform our cognitive processes. This is a question that troubled Husserl ever since the Prolegomena to Pure Logic and that led him to contend one of Kant’s central methodological distinctions, the one between questions of genesis and questions of validity.

1998

Etudes phénoménologiques, 2002

Intentionality is a key-concept in Husserlian phenomenology, in which the proverbial tension between Modern tradition and the "thing-in-itself" comes to the fore. Conscious of the risk of revisiting an issue that has already been object of countless interpretations, we use it as a guideline to retrace the steps of the genesis of the Logical Investigations and phenomenology's alleged "breakthrough". Two of its elements will be examined: the "transcendence" of ideality and the "universal problem of correlation".

This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general, including articles on phenomenological method; investigations in anthropology, ethics, and theology; highly specialized research into typically Husserlian topics such as perception, image consciousness, reality, and ideality; as well as investigations into the complex relation between pure phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and cognitive science. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Preface by U. Melle PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology 1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski 2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir 3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet 4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi 5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle 6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft 7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences 8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle 9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar 10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette 11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard III Phenomenology and Consciousness 12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren 13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs 14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell 15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach 16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy 17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond 18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens 19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt 20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp PART V Reality and Ideality 21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa 22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth 23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino 24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro 25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara 26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss 27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"

Meaning and Truth (eds. Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru), pp. 91-110, 2015

In his fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl intensely scrutinizes three possible significations of the concept of consciousness. In these analyses, he also strives to clearly delineate between two types of consciousness: psychological and phenomenological. The goal of this paper is to show that the way in which the (psychical) act is conceived and defined, according to the Husserlian approach, as a lived, intentional experience plays an essential role in clarifying the distinction between the empirical-psychological level of consciousness (where the act as a lived experience manifests itself) and its eidetic or ideal level (wherein any type of objectivity is constituted as such). Moreover, I shall try to argue that the notion of act conceived in this manner had influenced and decisively determined the development of the entire Husserlian phenomenology and theory of knowledge exactly because it explains how knowledge in general is constituted from an objective point of view. Another highly relevant distinction that needs to be dealt with in this context is the difference that Husserl establishes between the descriptive and intentional contents of the act. I shall try to show that this distinction presupposes in fact a previous conceptual determination of the noema (undertaken jointly with the analysis of the noetical components of consciousness at this level), and that the way in which the relationship between these two strands of consciousness is described determines further and in a fundamental manner the development of the idea of intentionality itself.