South Africa's proposed nuclear build plan: an analysis of the potential socioeconomic risks

Paper presented at an international seminar on Global Governance, Nuclear Policies and the Insertion of Brazil, hosted by the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 3-4 September 2015

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSIDER Part 1: Introduction Part 2: A Guide to Candidate Designs Part 3: South Africa’s Potential New Sites for New Build

A fr ic a n perspe ct iv e s . G lo b a l i n s i g h t s .

2020

Africa has rich energy resources but continues to remain an energy poor continent. The industrialization potential of the continent and its rapidly growing population have caused a sharp increase in demand for electricity. South Africa and Nigeria are the biggest economies in Africa with large appetites for energy. South Africa, using its vastly developed and industrial economy, produces about 50 GWe of electricity, the highest of any African country. In contrast, Nigeria produces far less for a population four times the size of its African economic rival, South Africa. Without solving the energy deficit, neither economic growth nor sustainable development and improvement of citizens' welfare will be possible. An effective way to solve the energy shortage may be the introduction of nuclear power plants. Nuclear power is not only able to overcome the electricity deficit in African countries, but can also contribute to a soft transition from environmentally polluting fossil-fuelled power plants to carbon-free technologies. However, for various reasons, there is strong opposition to nuclear energy development in these countries. This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the construction of nuclear power plants in Africa is the optimal solution to the continent's acute energy deficit.

1987

As with the exploitation of her uranium resources, South Africa’s capability in fundamental nuclear research was gained in the 1950s and 1960s mainly with British and American help. The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) was established in 1949 as a result of the passage of the South African Atomic Energy Act of 1948; and during this time there was a very close relationship between the AEB, the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA, formerly the Ministry of Supply). The USAEC and UKAEA relied on the AEB for a large share of the supply of uranium needed for the American and British weapons programmes. Thus the USAEC and the UKAEA felt obliged to cooperate in the development of South Africa’s capability in nuclear science and technology. As we saw in Chapter 2, Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace initiative could in part be viewed as a formal recognition of the importance of the uranium-supplying countries. An agreement for nuclear cooperatio...

Nuclear Trends South Africa , 2024

Nuclear Trends South Africa is my newsletter on the evolving South Africa nuclear landscape as the country considers it nuclear future. This is the second issue, published on 17 November 2024.

Politikon, 1978

This article focusses on South Africa's position regarding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; an issue which was pushed into prominence by the Russian allegation in August 1977 that the Republic was on the verge of testing a nuclear device. The Soviet Union's objective was to embarrass the Western powers during the Lagos Conference on Apartheid, as well as to bring them in disrepute among African countries during the sessions of various United Nations bodies where South Africa's nuclear potential was discussed. Subsequent reaction from especially the United States shows that the Carter Administration will use continued nuclear cooperation with the Republic as a lever to press for political change and to secure South Africa's adherence to the NPT. The Republic has however steadfastly declined to sign the NPT. although it has made clear on several occasions that it will not allow its uranium sales to be used to increase the number of nuclear-weapon states. South Africa's refusal to sign the NPT does not necessarily reflect any desire to acquire nuclear weapons, but rather a fear that the application of "safeguards" might be economically harmful to the Republic's uranium mining industry, while the development of a new enrichment process has finally raised real concerns about possible commercial espionage. It would seem very unlikely that South Africa has in actual fact produced a nuclear device, but it would also seem imperative for the Republic neither to surrender nor to exercise the nuclear option-especially seen in the light of the peculiar politico-economic and military-strategic position it finds itself in in the international arena. South Africa's high-level nuclear technology is seen as a valuable diplomatic and strategic bargaining counter with the super powers, as well as with Black Africa. The Republic is in potential conflict with African states over its racial policies, and should its present superiority in conventional weapons be eroded by UN mandatory arms embargoes, South African strategists may begin to consider a nuclear deterrent not only as feasible, but indeed as absolutely essential. Presently, however, it is difficult to see the military value of nuclear weapons for a state whose main threat takes the form of insurgency promoted from beyond its borders. •This is the text of a talk given to the Transkei Branch of the SAIIA in Umtata on 16 November, 1977, and is based on short comments made at the Institute's monthly meeting on current international developments on

International Security, 2002

This paper analyses the question why the South African government intends to procure nuclear energy technology, despite affordable and accessible fossil and renewable energy alternatives. We analyse the social shaping of nuclear energy technology based on the statements of political actors in the public media. We combine a discourse network analysis with qualitative analysis to establish the coalitions in support and opposition of the programme. The central arguments in the debate are cost, safety, job creation, the appropriateness of nuclear energy, emissions reductions, transparency, risks for corruption, and geopolitical influences. The analysis concludes that the nuclear programme is not primarily about generating electricity, as it creates tangible benefits for the coalition of supporters.