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2020, Strategic Analysis
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1841098…
7 pages
1 file
Turkey through its military intervention has made strategic inroad in Libya, but this has heightened regional tensions and made the Libyan conflict into a potential regional flash point.
Turkey’s Strategic objectives in Libya, 2022
12 years after the unprecedented wave of revolts that spread across the Arab countries and the overthrow of numerous authoritarian regimes, which brought about a new regional hegemony. The states that experienced this paradigm shift in the core structure of their political configuration are still struggling to maintain continuous political stability and more inclusive economic development, but it seems that after the collapse of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime in Libya the scenario of a peaceful democratic transition couldn’t be realized without extreme internal bloodshed between various rival factions and external competing interventionists. Turkey is the last foreign power to intervene militarily in the Libyan conflict in early 2020 to support Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj who leads the Tripoli-based internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) against the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of the General Khalifa Haftar. Turkey’s foreign policy towards Libya is driven by long-term strategic goals within the context of a wavering international order in Africa, besides its aim to become the leading Muslim power in the world. This essay is aimed to shed the light on the long-term possible advantages of turkey’s foreign policy choices in Libya, both in the overall scheme of things -turkey’s growing influence in the regional order- and concerning economic, political, and military gains. This essay is based on the information collected by using various academic articles and books
Navigating the Regional Chessboard: Europe's Options to Address Conflicts in the MENA Region, Achim Vogt and Sarah Schmid (eds.), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December, 2020
Focusing on Turkey’s hydrocarbon resources policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, this paper highlights the ideational forces and material interests that have been shaping Ankara’s motivation in Libya. It argues that the dispute over the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean is the ultimate driving force for Turkey’s cooperation with the GNA in Libya. In addition, Turkey’s economic interests in the MENA region and the importance of material benefits for political Islam in domestic politics across the region have been influencing regional struggles over oil wealth and power.
Insight Turkey, 2020
Libya has been witnessing a long and destructive civil war since the fall of Qaddafi in 2011. While countries like the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and France have an extremely damaging role in Libya, Turkey and Qatar has been trying to focus on ending the conflict and establishing a stable democratic country. Hafter’s invasion attempt, supported by the UAE and Egypt, failed as a result of Turkey’s intervention. In this regard, it would be correct to say that the peace process and political dialogue has only become possible with Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan equation. In Libya, where tribal ties are already effective, and centralization is weak, long-term conflicts have deeply shaken social cohesion. Furthermore, international actors have remained uninterested in Libya or preferred to fuel the problem rather than solve it. All of these factors, made it difficult for Turkey to implement its plans in Libya. Nevertheless, both Libya and Turkey have achieved major gains since the be...
Quixote Globe, 2020
After Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, Libya was plunged into chaos and political instability. Since 2014, there have been two separate government-controlled regions in Libya. The first of these is the Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, based in Tripoli, which is accepted as the legitimate representative by the UN. The second is the Libyan National Army (LNA) forces under Tobruk-based general Khalifa Haftar. Haftar forces' control of oil resources in Libya is important in terms of power balances. Haftar forces are support by France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Russia. The Government of National Accord is support by Turkey, Italy and Qatar. Turkey has recognizes 17 February 2011 the Government of National Accord as Libya's sole representative. He became the rst country to appoint an ambassador to Tripoli on September 2, 2011. Turkey increased its military support to the Sarraj administration through the "Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdictions" and "Security and Military Cooperation" agreement signed with the Government of National Accord on November 27, 2019.
China International Strategy Review, 2020
Turkey's militarized involvement rendered it a critical actor for the diplomacy involving the Libyan crisis. The quick dividends from Ankara's application of hard-power assets had a dramatic impact on the course of the conflict in 2020, which surprised many observers. Despite the resolute rhetoric about further military action, an emboldened Turkey has refrained from further escalation, and appears to have settled for a de facto ceasefire regime since August 2020. This paper seeks to analyze the drivers of Turkey's initial involvement in Libya, in a way that departs from its traditional foreign policy, a key component of which was non-interference in regional disputes. Moreover, it analyzes the reasons behind Turkey's de-escalation and declining military involvement in the Libya crisis. This paper makes two interrelated arguments: first, Turkey's Libya policy showcases the recent coercive turn in its Middle East policy, which has been an outcome of overlapping developments at the leadership, domestic, and regional levels. Second, the key concept for understanding different phases of Turkey's Libya policy is escalation dominance. Changing patterns of escalation dominance shape the boundaries of Turkey's military involvement in militarized regional crises in general and the Libyan crisis in particular.
The Turkish-Libyan relations are currently witnessing an escalation from both sides regarding the nature of their bilateral relations and the pattern ruling many Libyan-Turkish foreign and internal issues.
Even though the two structures, Eurasianism and Islamists, have been in conflict over a great many things in Turkey they did, contrary to all historical odds, intersect on the issue of Libya. As one manoeuvres to divorce Turkey from the west in foreign policy, the other seeks to construct a new fortress in a competition that does not befit the religiosity of Turkey. It will be difficult to estimate the extent to which the collective nature of these two structures will exist in Turkish domestic policies, but they certainly submerged Turkey into an escapade that will profoundly and negatively impact the region.
IDSA Comment, 2020
Under President Erdoğan, Ankara has become more ambitious and is using every opportunity to intervene in regional politics.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, 2017
This article analyzes Turkey's need to make increased efforts to ameliorate relations with Libya in order to successfully advance the "African Evolution" initiatives. The study covers the AKP period since 2009, including the rebellion conducted by the Benghazi rebels up to the death of Gaddafi and the post-Gaddafi period up to now.
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