The goal of this research is to exhaustively collect information on all cyber attacks in the last decade so that we can delineate the patterns of cyberwar as reflected by evidence. Much talk about the concept of cyberwar and the changing dynamic of future conflict is founded on the study of spectacular flights of imagination of what could be. Our theory is that deterrence and regionalism should be expected in cyber conflict, counterintuitive to conventional wisdom. We find here that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber attacks among rivals does not match up to popular perception. Only 20 of 124 active rivals engaged in cyber conflict between 2001 and 2011. The attacks that were uncovered were limited in terms of magnitude and frequency. The coming era of cyberwar should continue to exhibit these patterns despite fears mentioned by media pundits and government agencies. Cyberwar is a reality, but it is a little used tactic that has not changed the shape of international interactions.

Much discussion of the concept of cyberwar, cyber conflict, and the changing dynamic of future security interactions is founded upon the study of what could be, conjured through spectacular flights of the imagination. The goal of this research article is to exhaustively collect information on cyber interactions between rival states in the last decade so that we can delineate the patterns of cyber conflict as reflected by evidence at the international level. The field of cyber security needs a clear return to social science in order to be able to definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures, and theory. To that end we provide a dataset of cyber incidents and cyber disputes that spans from 2001 to 2011. Our data include 110 cyber incidents and 45 cyber disputes. Further, we test our theory of cyber conflict which argues that restraint and regionalism should be expected, counter-intuitive to conventional wisdom. We find here that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals does not match with popular perception; 20 of 126 active rivals engaged in cyber conflict. The interactions that are uncovered are limited in terms of magnitude and frequency suggesting cyber restraint. Further, most of the cyber disputes that are uncovered are regional in tone, defying the unbounded nature of cyberpower. The coming era of cyber conflict may continue to exhibit these patterns despite fears mentioned in the discourse by the media and cyber security professionals.

Analysts suggest that the rise of the cyber domain of combat has led to a revolution in military affairs and have greatly changed how society interacts with the Internet. The structure and content of interactions on the battlefield have supposedly changed in light of this development. In the rush to note the changing face of conflict, few scholars have actually examined the impact of cyber conflict on foreign policy relationships. Here we use weekly events data to examine exactly what happens between countries when cyber conflict is utilized as a foreign policy choice. Using a previously constructed data set of cyber actions, we measure conflict and cooperation after a cyber operation to understand the true impact of this new way to arm a state and society. We find that only one method of cyber malice, denial of service, and one tactical goal, seeking a change in behavior in the opposing side, impacts conflict-cooperation dynamics between states.

Tallinn University Press, 2019

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the role of cyber in a larger context. The cyber interventions conducted against the states carry an offensive nature and contribute to the violent and non-violent confrontations in different ways. This topic is essential to examine, as the threat of Cyberattacks and hacking incidents are becoming more and more frequent nowadays. They can cause many intangible and physical damages to the states and their populations. The research will be based on the evaluation of the three cases. Through the given examples, it is possible to formulate the advantages and the limits while measuring the value of a new domain. Notably, such benefits as the problem of attribution; avoidance of retaliation might outweigh the costs for the adversary. Cyberattacks are an effective contribution to other powers possessed by the state. Their effective conduction with other conventional actions can result in the state's empowerment. The author will use qualitative research methods: comparative case study, process tracing, and document analysis to estimate the consequences and highlight the significance of the given challenge. Moreover, the author will focus on "the theory of Cyberpower" to strengthen the arguments of the paper and contribute to the research of cyber phenomenon in the IR discipline.

T. Minárik et al. (eds), 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, 2019, 2019

Anonymity is considered to be a key characteristic of cyber conflict. Indeed, existing accounts in the literature focus on the advantages of the non-disclosure of cyber attacks. Such focus inspires the expectation that countries would opt to maintain covertness. This hypothesis is rejected in an empirical investigation we conducted on victims’ strategies during cyber conflict: in numerous cases, victim states choose to publicly reveal the fact that they had been attacked. These counterintuitive findings are important empirically, but even more so theoretically. They motivate an investigation into the decision to forsake covertness. What does actually motivate states to move into the international arena and publicly expose a cyber attack? The goal of this paper is to understand why and under which geopolitical circumstances countries choose to give up the advantages of anonymity. Whether they wish to Name and Shame opponents for ignoring international norms or whether they try to avoid public humiliation, victims of cyber attacks occasionally reveal the fact that they had been attacked. There is tension between such motivations and the will to protect intelligence sources and the incentives to prevent escalation if an attack is revealed, even more so if the attacker is exposed. Indeed, we find that sunk costs, counterescalation risks and the need to signal resolve—while critical in motivating victims to keep cyber attacks secret—may not suffice under such specific circumstances. By focusing on the victim’s side, we draw inspiration from data on real-world cyber attacks in order to place cyber operations in the larger context of secrecy and covert actions in the international arena. In so doing, the aim is to advance the use of empirical data for understanding the dynamics of cyber conflict and the decision-making process of states operating in this increasingly complex domain.

Journal of Information Technology & Politics Vol. 12 No. 4 (2015), 399-401

King's College London, 2024

In recent years, the threat of cyber warfare has emerged as a significant concern, targeting not only government entities but also civilian companies and critical infrastructure. Unlike traditional warfare, the insidious nature of cyberattacks instils fear and disrupts economies without warning. Despite this growing threat, there remains a noticeable gap in cybersecurity awareness and preparedness among civilian entities. This research aims to comprehensively evaluate the impact of cyber warfare on these sectors, focusing on periods of geopolitical tension to identify correlations and vulnerabilities. The study will employ an observational exploratory and longitudinal approach, analysing both quantitative and qualitative data to reveal patterns and trends. Furthermore, it will examine common attack vectors and their impacts, providing a detailed assessment of the methods used by cyber attackers and the resulting damages[3]. The research seeks to underscore the urgent need for robust cybersecurity measures and propose actionable recommendations for governments and companies to effectively mitigate these risks and foster greater resilience against evolving cyber threats. This study aspires to advance national security and protect civilian infrastructures through improved cybersecurity strategies and policy development.

This paper applies the existing theories of asymmetric conflict warfare to answer the question why Cyberspace Operations in dynamics of asymmetric warfare conflict can be successful. Analysing how cyberspace operation in asymmetric conflict; the assessment of the winner could not be viewed from the position of the weak or the strong. These dynamics of asymmetric conflict are compatible with the actors in cyberspace operations war whether state actors or non-state actors. Relative power and realist international relations theory state from Thucydides, "the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must". In war, generally strong actors have the ability to act according to what they need, but in fact the results could be different in practice. The broad spectrum of asymmetric warfare, as Thorton states "sometimes the weak can avoid doing what they must, and the powerful cannot always do what they will". Recent cyber war cases show that state actor has a role, which certainly also has cyber power. The use of cyberspace in asymmetric conflict also makes cyber war have different expected effect. In the past Arreguin-Toft has proposed strategic interaction theory which have expected effect model for predict asymmetric conflict outcomes. In this paper, the model will developed for predict cyber war outcomes. This research will explore the influence of Cyberspace Operations to asymmetric conflict outcomes. Cyberspace Operations as part of Information Operation (IO) support in this paper identified as multiplier power, where IO has concept existed before as force multiplier. The success of Russia’s massive cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 are some examples of operations shown by "the strong". Even though these operations were not comprehensive, but it they could provide a systemic impact to the target states and brought successfully to the mission carried out by the attacker state. In conclusion, this paper proposes a new model from the influence of Cyberspace Operations to asymmetric conflict called FDAFirman-Dadang-Arwin model, which was developed fromon the strategic interaction theory proposed by Ivan Arreguin-Toft

International Relations theory has endured two failures in the last half century. No International Relations theorist foresaw the end of the Cold War. Likewise with the rise of Cyber War. Whilst the Internet is acknowledged as having the CIA as its parent, no one predicted that it would become a theatre for conflict. Cyber War is here and its impact on our lives will only increase in time. It is only a matter of time before a completely cyber conflict is waged. Yet no theory on Cyber War exists…until now.