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(PDF) Against Treating Introspection as Perception-Like

Against Treating Introspection as Perception-Like

A perceptual theory of introspection is one that treats introspection as a species of perception or as a special case of perception. Additionally, a perceptual theory of introspection is one for which introspection shares at least some of the essential features of perception. However, I will show that there are certain essential features of perception that introspection lacks. Moreover, those features common to perception and introspection are insufficient to distinguish perception from belief. Thus, there is good reason to deny that introspection fits a perceptual model of introspection. A perceptual theory of introspection is one that treats introspection as a species of perception or as a special case of perception. While introspection and perception are dissimilar in certain respects, a perceptual theory of introspection will be based on certain fundamental similarities between them. What I take to be an essential feature of any perceptual theory of introspection is that it takes perception to be a basic mental state, one irreducible to some other mental state. This feature rules out treating perception as a species of belief (what Dretske has called a cognitivist theory of perception) and then likening introspection to perception on the basis that it, too, is a species of belief. This latter view of introspection would be classified as a non-perceptual theory of introspection because while it does reduce introspection to perception, it goes on to reduce perception to belief. A perceptual theory of introspection, in addition to taking perception to be a basic mental state, is one for which introspection shares at least some of the essential features of perception. I will show, however, that there are certain essential features of perception that introspection lacks. In addition, those features common to perception and introspection are insufficient to distinguish perception from belief. Thus, there is good reason to deny that introspection fits a perceptual model of introspection.