Cambridge Law Journal, 2022

The logical "slippery slope" argument is of key relevance to the ongoing debate about "assisted dying". The argument runs that if the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of beneficence justify voluntary euthanasia, then the principle of beneficence justifies non-voluntary euthanasia. Several prominent scholars of medical law and medical ethics have either rejected or at least not accepted the argument, including Gerald Dworkin and Raymond Frey; Margaret Battin; Hallvard Lillehammer; Stephen Smith; Robert Young; Emily Jackson; and Steven Daskal. This paper analyses their reasoning and finds it wanting. It concludes that the logical argument stands unrebutted and merits much greater attention.

This paper demonstrates that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not generate commitment to either non-voluntary euthanasia or euthanasia on request. This is accomplished through analysis of John Keown's and David Jones's slippery slope arguments, and rejection of their view that voluntary euthanasia requires physicians to judge patients as better off dead. Instead, voluntary euthanasia merely requires physicians to judge patients as within boundaries of appropriate deference. This paper develops two ways of understanding and defending voluntary euthanasia on this model, one focused on the independent value of patients' autonomy and the other on the evidence of well-being provided by patients' requests. Both avoid the purported slippery slopes and both are independently supported by an analogy to uncontroversial elements of medical practice. Moreover, the proposed analyses of voluntary euthanasia suggest parameters for the design of euthanasia legislation, both supporting and challenging elements of existing laws in Oregon and the Netherlands.

2022

Background: Some people request euthanasia or assisted suicide (EAS) even though they are not (severely) ill. In the Netherlands the presence of sufficient medical ground for the suffering is a strict prerequisite for EAS. The desirability of this 'medical ground'-boundary is currently questioned. Legislation has been proposed to facilitate EAS for older persons with "completed life" or "tiredness of life" in the absence of (severe) illness. Objectives: To describe the characteristics and motivations of persons whose requests for EAS in the absence of (severe) illness did not result in EAS and the decision-making process of medical professionals in these types of requests. Methods: Analysis of 237 applicant records of the Dutch Euthanasia Expertise Center. We studied both the perspectives of applicants and medical professionals. Findings: The majority of the applicants were women (73%) aged 75 years and older (79%). Applicants most often indicated physical suffering as element of suffering and reason for the request. Medical professionals indicated in 40% of the cases no or insufficient medical ground for the suffering. Conclusions: Physical suffering plays an important role in requests for EAS even for persons who are not (severely) ill. From the presence of physical suffering it does not necessarily follow that for medical professionals there is sufficient medical ground to comply with the 'medical ground'-boundary.

As a new approach to the still unsettled problem of a morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, the meanings of the notion of killing are distinguished on the levels of causality, intention, and motivation. This distinction allows a thorough analysis and refutation of arguments for the equality of killing and letting die which are often put forward in the euthanasia debate. Moreover, an investigation into the structure of the physician's action on those three levels yields substantial differences between the two ways of acting. As can be demonstrated, only a teleological notion of the organism is able to grasp the characteristic feature of active euthanasia. On this basis it is argued that an action against the organism as a whole must, on the interpersonal level, be at once directed against the patient as a person himself.

Australian Psychologist, 1998

... Attitudes towards Euthanasia A large number of studies have investigated physicians' and nurses' attitudes towards euthanasia - euthanasia being variously defined as passiveeuthanasia, active euthanasia, or physician-assisted suicide. ...

2019

One of the most challenging issues in medical ethics is a permission or prohibition of euthanasia. Is a patient with an incurable disease who has lots of pain permitted to kill oneself or ask others to do that? The main reason advanced by the opponents is the absolute prohibition of murder. Accordingly, the meaning of murder plays a key role in determining the moral judgment of euthanasia. The aim of this paper is to confirm the role of intention in moral judgment of euthanasia and eliminate the name of unjust murder from voluntary euthanasia. The Intention of an agent determines the name of the act and whether it is right or wrong. An important point that dose not taken into account in the definitions of murder, killing as well as their ethical judgment is considering the attributes of being unjust and forcible. Killing a human being is neither intrinsically good nor bad, but its ethical judgment depends on the way that happens, i.e. just or unjust. Every killing is neither bad nor unethical except unjust one which is both bad and unethical. The attribute of "unjust" has been mentioned in the definition of murder in Islamic jurisprudence, law, traditions, and Quran. Owing to this argument, on one hand, it is true to state that voluntary euthanasia is not unjust and forcible murder (the test of correct negation), and on the other hand, it is not true to say that voluntary euthanasia is unjust and forcible murder (the test of incorrect predication). It can be concluded that voluntary euthanasia is an independent title other than unjust murder and does not have its judgment.

Patient Education and Counseling, 2013

2017

Advocates o euthanasia advocate the "right to die with dignity and recently with the pressures of life in society claim "the duty to die". This article tries to analyze the link between euthanasia and suicide.

Law and Justice, 2019

It is commonly thought that the concept of euthanasia must include an element of intentional killing, along with a motivation to end suffering. But where death is brought about by an omission rather than an act, there is greater difficulty in determining intentions and moral culpability. Furthermore, the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing treatment is less clear when the ethical principles for withdrawing treatment have been misapplied. This article seeks to bring clarity to this problem by analysing examples of such cases in order to demonstrate how moral errors about withdrawing treatment, such an underappreciation of the value of human life, which leads to a mistake about what counts as 'futile treatment', or a misunderstanding of how grave the obligation to preserve life is, do not necessarily involve an intention to end life and therefore are not euthanasia in the strict sense. Particular reference is made to the cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans, where, despite the deeply flawed manner in which the High Court made its decision, the intention to end life was arguably absent from the respective judgements.