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James Fieser

University of Tennessee Martin, History and Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Papers by James Fieser

David Hume's Essays and Treatises: The Final Revision

David Hume's "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects" is his authorized collection of published... more David Hume's "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects" is his authorized collection of published philosophical writings, which he often referred to as simply “my philosophy.” The collection first appeared in 1753 and was revised by him in ten later editions, the last of which appeared posthumously in 1777. This essay discusses history and evolving contents of that collection.

Alexander Crombie's Natural Theology

In the decades before Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859), there was a decisive intelle... more In the decades before Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859), there was a decisive intellectual clash between religious and purely secular accounts of the world’s origin. In 1829, Alexander Crombie (1762-1840) entered the debate with his two-volume Natural Theology, which defends a religious explanation. General defences of natural religion – such as William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) – were common by this time. However, Crombie took a unique approach to the subject. Rather than simply amass scientific examples of natural design, much of Crombie’s work is an assault on materialistic and atheistic systems – most notably those of David Hume, Baron d’Holbach, William Drummond, William Herschel, Pierre-Simon Laplace and Erasmus Darwin. Examining the details of these systems, Crombie attempted to show their logical flaws and scientific errors.

James Gregory on Free Will

The issue free will and determinism is one of the oldest controversies in philosophy. During the ... more The issue free will and determinism is one of the oldest controversies in philosophy. During the second half of the 18th century, the two dominant advocates of determinism – or necessitarianism as it was then called – were David Hume and Joseph Priestley. Defenders of free will – then called liberty – typically targeted Hume or Priestley, attempting to show the absurdity of their views. In 1792 Edinburgh physician James Gregory (1753-1821) published his two-volume Philosophical and Literary Essays in which he specifically attacks Hume’s conception of necessity. Approaching the issue as a scientist as well as a philosopher, Gregory argued that if human actions were causally necessitated, then our actions would obey the same kind of causal laws that we observe in the physical world. However, Gregory continues, human actions simply do not parallel physical causes as Hume supposes. Thus, we must reject Humean necessity and embrace liberty.

The Eighteenth-Century British Reviews of Hume's Writings

This essay takes on two tasks. First it updates the standard list of eighteenth-century British ... more This essay takes on two tasks. First it updates the standard list of eighteenth-century British reviews of Hume's writings by providing references to additional reviews which do not appear in the Hume literature. To Jessop's list of eighteen British reviews, thirteen new reviews are listed for first edition publications of Hume's writings, and eight new reviews are listed for eighteenth-century abridgments and collections containing Hume's writings. Second, this essay presents a history of the early British review journals and a discussion of the scholarly merits of the Hume reviews.

The Logic of Natural Law in Aquinas's Treatise on Law

Against recent commentators such as Armstrong, D'Arcy, Copleston, O'Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I... more Against recent commentators such as Armstrong, D'Arcy, Copleston, O'Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I argue that the logic referred to by Thomas in his "Treatise on Law" should not be understood metaphorically. Instead, it involves a chain of syllogisms, beginning with the synderesis principle, followed by primary, secondary, and tertiary principles, and ends with a practical syllogism. In showing this, I attack the view that the synderesis principle, "good ought to be done and evil avoided," is tautological. Second, I show the syllogistic relation between this and the more subordinate moral principles. Finally, I argue that the practical syllogism also involves a logical deduction, where the minor premise is a propositional attitude of perception, and the conclusion is an action which expresses a proposition. What emerges is a more precise account of how actions are related to natural law.

The Correlativity of Duties and Rights

The correlativity of duties and rights states that one person's duty entails another person's rig... more The correlativity of duties and rights states that one person's duty entails another person's rights. The correlativity thesis is often criticized with three counter instances where the relation seems not to hold: duties of obedience, duties of charity, and duties to collective entities. I defend the correlativity thesis by addressing these counter instances. Obedience is resolved since it stems from the need to develop habits which do not lead to the infringement of future persons' rights. Duties of charity entail corresponding rights to charity insofar as these duties and rights are graduated according to social proximity. Duties toward species preservation entail corresponding rights to token members, graduated according to the endangerment of the species as a whole.

Callicott and the Metaphysical Foundation of Eco-Centric Morality

The theory of eco-centric morality states that the environment and its many eco-systems are entit... more The theory of eco-centric morality states that the environment and its many eco-systems are entitled to a direct moral standing, and not simply a standing derivative from human interests. J. Baird Callicott has offered two possible metaphysical foundations for eco-centrism which attempt to show that inherent goodness can apply to environmental collections and not just to individual agents. I argue that Callicott's first theory fails since it relies on a problematic theory of moral sentiment. I argue that his second theory also fails since it rests on an unsupported parallel between the break down of the subject-object dichotomy suggested by quantum theory and an alleged actualization of morality upon the interaction of environmental collections with consciousness. Finally, I argue that Callicott overrates the need for a metaphysical grounding of inherent value, and that the metaphysical question has little bearing on the normative issue of eco-centrism.

Evolutionary Ethics and the Naturalistic Fallacy: Spencer and Moore

In Chapter 2 of Principia Ethica, Moore presents two criticisms of Spencer's evolutionary ethics.... more In Chapter 2 of Principia Ethica, Moore presents two criticisms of Spencer's evolutionary ethics. The first is that Spencer wrongly uses the terms "more evolved" (a natural term), and "higher" and "better" (ethical terms) as though they were equivalent, and thereby commits the naturalistic fallacy. The second is that since Spencer believes that pleasure is the same as goodness, then he is once again committing the naturalistic fallacy. It will be argued here that both of Moore's attacks fail since he misunderstood Spencer's meanings of the terms "higher" and "good." In light of Moore's failure, it is suggested that the naturalistic fallacy must be qualified so it does not reduce simply to an allegation that an ethical theory denies moral realism.

Do Businesses have a Moral Obligation Beyond what the Law Requires?

The tendency in current discussions of business ethics is to maintain that businesses are under o... more The tendency in current discussions of business ethics is to maintain that businesses are under obligation to be moral beyond what the law requires. This position is disputed. I begin by criticizing the view that morality in business can be derived from the profit motivation. The problem with this approach is that it either confines morality to what at that time will yield a profit, or it wrongly assumes that consumers will insist on moral business practices. Next, the position is attacked that there are specific business-related moral obligations beyond what the law requires. This position fails because such supra-legal obligations appear optional to the business person, and it is unreasonable to expect businesses to perform duties which appear optional. Finally, it is argued that business-related moral obligations are restricted to the moral norms which are already contained in the law. This view can be supported either by a legal positivist and contractarian theory of moral obligation, or by a criterion of moral obligation which entails that a moral principle must have majority endorsement within a cultural context. It is noted in conclusion that business ethics should not be viewed as a quest for independent moral principles, but instead should be seen as part of a pre-legislative or pre-regulatory dialog.

An Argument Against Eco-Centric Environmentalism

By examining several versions of eco-centrism, I argue that environmental eco-centrism fails as a... more By examining several versions of eco-centrism, I argue that environmental eco-centrism fails as a normative principle. Consequentialist versions fail since they cannot generate traditional moral principles and may in fact be inconsistent with traditional morality. Eco-centrism will therefore only make sense as a nonconsequentialist principle, particularly as a prima facie duty-based principle. However, duty-based eco-centrism also fails since the list of environmental duties it recommends will be the same as the list recommended on a purely anthropocentric approach. In short, eco-centrism is irrelevant to the process of both arriving at our environmental duties, and resolving conflicts with human duties.

Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion and his Early Critics

Hume's 18th century critics of Hume recognized his use of literary devices in his religious writi... more Hume's 18th century critics of Hume recognized his use of literary devices in his religious writings. Indeed, the early commentaries on Hume's religious writings are dominated by attempts to identify and decode Hume's concealed religious views. Little work has been done in Hume scholarship to understand the nature and scope of this aspect of his early critics. The purpose of the present essay is to resurrect the discussions of the "Natural History" and the Dialogues in which Hume's 18th century critics attempt to uncover his concealed meanings. I begin by discussing the limited value of 18th century anecdotes about Hume's personal religious views. After examaning Hume's general strategy of concealment in his religious writings, I catalog and interpret individual passages from Hume's critics which acknowledge Hume's technique of concealment. I conclude by noting that their overall assessment of Hume's concealed religious views was more skeptical than the assessment of many contemporary commentators.

Is Hume a Moral Skeptic

I approach the issue of Hume's moral skepticism by seeing how his moral theory compares to a cont... more I approach the issue of Hume's moral skepticism by seeing how his moral theory compares to a contemporary standard of moral skepticism. Using J.L. Mackie's analysis of moral skepticism as a point of reference, I will argue that, as a normative theory, Hume's account of morality is not at all skeptical since he is offering a relatively optimistic consequentialist theory of right and wrong action. As a metaethical theory, however, I will argue that Hume is a weak metaethical skeptic insofar as he denies that morality is independent of the existence and character of human beings. He should not be considered a thorough or strong metaethical skeptic, though, since he advances a moral theory which is firmly grounded in human instinct.

The Rise and Fall of James Beattie’s Common Sense Theory of Truth

In a 1766 letter, Beattie states his intention to write a book on the nature of truth with this c... more In a 1766 letter, Beattie states his intention to write a book on the nature of truth with this central thesis: "that as we know nothing of the eternal relations of things, that to us is and must be truth, which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood, which we feel that we must disbelieve." In more contemporary wording, his bold point is that we must reject the correspondence theory of truth (i.e., that true statements are those that correspond with reality) since we do not have access to the world of facts. Instead, we must adopt a common sense standard of truth, which bases truth upon an instinctive conviction of foundational concepts. He states this thesis prominently in the first edition of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) -- in wording very similar to that in the letter. However, in his final revision of the Essay in 1776, he deleted the relevant sentences, thereby diluting -- if not destroying -- the book’s most innovative point. Why did he do this? He was apparently swayed by harsh criticisms of his thesis, particularly by Joseph Priestley. I discuss Beattie's claim, the attacks, and suggest ways in which a common sense standard of truth might be viable.

Hume’s Wide View of the Virtues: An Analysis of his Early Critics

Hume mentions around 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virt... more Hume mentions around 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virtues and have clear moral significance, such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Others on his list, though, are character traits whose moral significance is not immediately obvious, such as wit, good manners, and dialogue. Mid-18th century critics of Hume’s moral theory argued that his notion of virtue was too broad and that he should have distinguished between genuine moral virtues, on the one hand, and mere intellectual abilities on the other. According to the critics, grouping the two together devalues the true virtues. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of the virtues was controversial, and we know from his letters that he read at least a couple of these critiques. He nevertheless vigorously defended his position. Contemporary Hume scholarship has neither discussed the nature of these 18th century criticisms nor given adequate attention to the success or failure of Hume’s position. I address these issues here.

Beattie's Lost Letter to the London Review

The last issue of the London Review contains an editorial response to a letter they received from... more The last issue of the London Review contains an editorial response to a letter they received from James Beattie. The context of the London Review response indicates that Beattie's letter was to have been printed in that journal. Strangely, however, the letter never appeared. Enough detail is provided in the London Review's response to reconstruct the thrust of Beattie's letter: Beattie contends that, contrary to the London Review's accusations, he did not abuse Hume in the Essay, and that Hume's criticisms of Beattie's poetic writings were based on prejudice. The letter is important since it represents Beattie's only attempt at a public defense of his treatment of Hume, and an explanation of Hume's unfavorable reaction to his poetical writings. After presenting the London Review's "Answer," I will discuss the nature of the conflict between Beattie and the London Review, and reconstruct the key points in Beattie's letter. It will be helpful to begin with background on the London Review itself.

Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors

Hume Studies, 1992

Many aspects of Hume's taxonomy of the passions in the Treatise follow traditional classification... more Many aspects of Hume's taxonomy of the passions in the Treatise follow traditional classifications. I first sketch the traditional Stoic and Thomistic accounts of the passions. I then argue that Hume's account is traditional insofar as he grounds all passions in a class of eight primitive passions, four of which parallel the Stoic account. Hume also appears indebted to Hutcheson's explanation of the calm-violent distinction between passions. The uniqueness of Hume's theory consists in his account of the indirect passions. Finally, I criticize the interpretations of Hume's classification offered by Kemp Smith, Ardal, and Loeb, and suggest what I believe is the most textually sound classification.

Hume's Radical Skepticism: A Developmental Interpretation

Hume Studies, 1989

Hume is a radical skeptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition insofar he held that fundamental aspects of... more Hume is a radical skeptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition insofar he held that fundamental aspects of the human understanding are embedded with contradictions. What are these contradictions, and when do they arise? Hume's position on this changed over time. I show that in the main text of the Treatise, Hume exposes contradictions in areas involving external objects and causality, but denies that contradictions arise with morality. For morality, according to Hume, morality involves only the world of mental events (as opposed to the world of external objects), and at first he believed that the world of mental events was free from contradiction. However, in his discussion of “the self” in the Appendix to the Treatise, he changes his position and asserts that contradictions arise even within the world of mental events. In the conclusion to his second Enquiry, he extends this radical skepticism by exposing a contradiction specifically with morality.

Hume's Distinction between Natural and Artificial Virtues

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 1997

Hume does not provide a single systematic analysis of the distinction between natural and artific... more Hume does not provide a single systematic analysis of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In contrast to traditional discussions of this subject, this essay argues that the primary distinction between natural and artificial virtues lies in the motivational factors of the moral agent. Natural virtues are instinctive character traits of the agent which give rise to passions, which in turn motivate the will to action. Artificial virtues are intentions which hold out an artificially instilled prospect of pleasure or pain; these evoke passions which in turn motivate willful actions.

Books by James Fieser

A Bibliography of Hume's Writings and Early Responses

This document contains two separate bibliographies. The first is a “Bibliography of Hume’s Writin... more This document contains two separate bibliographies. The first is a “Bibliography of Hume’s Writings” that I constructed for my own benefit while preparing the Early Responses to Hume series. The second is “A Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume,” which is taken directly from the final pages of Early Responses to Hume’s Life and Reputation (2005).

Early Responses to Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Stewart: Part 2

This is the second of a two-volume set of critical reactions to the four major common sense philo... more

David Hume's Essays and Treatises: The Final Revision

David Hume's "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects" is his authorized collection of published... more David Hume's "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects" is his authorized collection of published philosophical writings, which he often referred to as simply “my philosophy.” The collection first appeared in 1753 and was revised by him in ten later editions, the last of which appeared posthumously in 1777. This essay discusses history and evolving contents of that collection.

Alexander Crombie's Natural Theology

In the decades before Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859), there was a decisive intelle... more In the decades before Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859), there was a decisive intellectual clash between religious and purely secular accounts of the world’s origin. In 1829, Alexander Crombie (1762-1840) entered the debate with his two-volume Natural Theology, which defends a religious explanation. General defences of natural religion – such as William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) – were common by this time. However, Crombie took a unique approach to the subject. Rather than simply amass scientific examples of natural design, much of Crombie’s work is an assault on materialistic and atheistic systems – most notably those of David Hume, Baron d’Holbach, William Drummond, William Herschel, Pierre-Simon Laplace and Erasmus Darwin. Examining the details of these systems, Crombie attempted to show their logical flaws and scientific errors.

James Gregory on Free Will

The issue free will and determinism is one of the oldest controversies in philosophy. During the ... more The issue free will and determinism is one of the oldest controversies in philosophy. During the second half of the 18th century, the two dominant advocates of determinism – or necessitarianism as it was then called – were David Hume and Joseph Priestley. Defenders of free will – then called liberty – typically targeted Hume or Priestley, attempting to show the absurdity of their views. In 1792 Edinburgh physician James Gregory (1753-1821) published his two-volume Philosophical and Literary Essays in which he specifically attacks Hume’s conception of necessity. Approaching the issue as a scientist as well as a philosopher, Gregory argued that if human actions were causally necessitated, then our actions would obey the same kind of causal laws that we observe in the physical world. However, Gregory continues, human actions simply do not parallel physical causes as Hume supposes. Thus, we must reject Humean necessity and embrace liberty.

The Eighteenth-Century British Reviews of Hume's Writings

This essay takes on two tasks. First it updates the standard list of eighteenth-century British ... more This essay takes on two tasks. First it updates the standard list of eighteenth-century British reviews of Hume's writings by providing references to additional reviews which do not appear in the Hume literature. To Jessop's list of eighteen British reviews, thirteen new reviews are listed for first edition publications of Hume's writings, and eight new reviews are listed for eighteenth-century abridgments and collections containing Hume's writings. Second, this essay presents a history of the early British review journals and a discussion of the scholarly merits of the Hume reviews.

The Logic of Natural Law in Aquinas's Treatise on Law

Against recent commentators such as Armstrong, D'Arcy, Copleston, O'Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I... more Against recent commentators such as Armstrong, D'Arcy, Copleston, O'Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I argue that the logic referred to by Thomas in his "Treatise on Law" should not be understood metaphorically. Instead, it involves a chain of syllogisms, beginning with the synderesis principle, followed by primary, secondary, and tertiary principles, and ends with a practical syllogism. In showing this, I attack the view that the synderesis principle, "good ought to be done and evil avoided," is tautological. Second, I show the syllogistic relation between this and the more subordinate moral principles. Finally, I argue that the practical syllogism also involves a logical deduction, where the minor premise is a propositional attitude of perception, and the conclusion is an action which expresses a proposition. What emerges is a more precise account of how actions are related to natural law.

The Correlativity of Duties and Rights

The correlativity of duties and rights states that one person's duty entails another person's rig... more The correlativity of duties and rights states that one person's duty entails another person's rights. The correlativity thesis is often criticized with three counter instances where the relation seems not to hold: duties of obedience, duties of charity, and duties to collective entities. I defend the correlativity thesis by addressing these counter instances. Obedience is resolved since it stems from the need to develop habits which do not lead to the infringement of future persons' rights. Duties of charity entail corresponding rights to charity insofar as these duties and rights are graduated according to social proximity. Duties toward species preservation entail corresponding rights to token members, graduated according to the endangerment of the species as a whole.

Callicott and the Metaphysical Foundation of Eco-Centric Morality

The theory of eco-centric morality states that the environment and its many eco-systems are entit... more The theory of eco-centric morality states that the environment and its many eco-systems are entitled to a direct moral standing, and not simply a standing derivative from human interests. J. Baird Callicott has offered two possible metaphysical foundations for eco-centrism which attempt to show that inherent goodness can apply to environmental collections and not just to individual agents. I argue that Callicott's first theory fails since it relies on a problematic theory of moral sentiment. I argue that his second theory also fails since it rests on an unsupported parallel between the break down of the subject-object dichotomy suggested by quantum theory and an alleged actualization of morality upon the interaction of environmental collections with consciousness. Finally, I argue that Callicott overrates the need for a metaphysical grounding of inherent value, and that the metaphysical question has little bearing on the normative issue of eco-centrism.

Evolutionary Ethics and the Naturalistic Fallacy: Spencer and Moore

In Chapter 2 of Principia Ethica, Moore presents two criticisms of Spencer's evolutionary ethics.... more In Chapter 2 of Principia Ethica, Moore presents two criticisms of Spencer's evolutionary ethics. The first is that Spencer wrongly uses the terms "more evolved" (a natural term), and "higher" and "better" (ethical terms) as though they were equivalent, and thereby commits the naturalistic fallacy. The second is that since Spencer believes that pleasure is the same as goodness, then he is once again committing the naturalistic fallacy. It will be argued here that both of Moore's attacks fail since he misunderstood Spencer's meanings of the terms "higher" and "good." In light of Moore's failure, it is suggested that the naturalistic fallacy must be qualified so it does not reduce simply to an allegation that an ethical theory denies moral realism.

Do Businesses have a Moral Obligation Beyond what the Law Requires?

The tendency in current discussions of business ethics is to maintain that businesses are under o... more The tendency in current discussions of business ethics is to maintain that businesses are under obligation to be moral beyond what the law requires. This position is disputed. I begin by criticizing the view that morality in business can be derived from the profit motivation. The problem with this approach is that it either confines morality to what at that time will yield a profit, or it wrongly assumes that consumers will insist on moral business practices. Next, the position is attacked that there are specific business-related moral obligations beyond what the law requires. This position fails because such supra-legal obligations appear optional to the business person, and it is unreasonable to expect businesses to perform duties which appear optional. Finally, it is argued that business-related moral obligations are restricted to the moral norms which are already contained in the law. This view can be supported either by a legal positivist and contractarian theory of moral obligation, or by a criterion of moral obligation which entails that a moral principle must have majority endorsement within a cultural context. It is noted in conclusion that business ethics should not be viewed as a quest for independent moral principles, but instead should be seen as part of a pre-legislative or pre-regulatory dialog.

An Argument Against Eco-Centric Environmentalism

By examining several versions of eco-centrism, I argue that environmental eco-centrism fails as a... more By examining several versions of eco-centrism, I argue that environmental eco-centrism fails as a normative principle. Consequentialist versions fail since they cannot generate traditional moral principles and may in fact be inconsistent with traditional morality. Eco-centrism will therefore only make sense as a nonconsequentialist principle, particularly as a prima facie duty-based principle. However, duty-based eco-centrism also fails since the list of environmental duties it recommends will be the same as the list recommended on a purely anthropocentric approach. In short, eco-centrism is irrelevant to the process of both arriving at our environmental duties, and resolving conflicts with human duties.

Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion and his Early Critics

Hume's 18th century critics of Hume recognized his use of literary devices in his religious writi... more Hume's 18th century critics of Hume recognized his use of literary devices in his religious writings. Indeed, the early commentaries on Hume's religious writings are dominated by attempts to identify and decode Hume's concealed religious views. Little work has been done in Hume scholarship to understand the nature and scope of this aspect of his early critics. The purpose of the present essay is to resurrect the discussions of the "Natural History" and the Dialogues in which Hume's 18th century critics attempt to uncover his concealed meanings. I begin by discussing the limited value of 18th century anecdotes about Hume's personal religious views. After examaning Hume's general strategy of concealment in his religious writings, I catalog and interpret individual passages from Hume's critics which acknowledge Hume's technique of concealment. I conclude by noting that their overall assessment of Hume's concealed religious views was more skeptical than the assessment of many contemporary commentators.

Is Hume a Moral Skeptic

I approach the issue of Hume's moral skepticism by seeing how his moral theory compares to a cont... more I approach the issue of Hume's moral skepticism by seeing how his moral theory compares to a contemporary standard of moral skepticism. Using J.L. Mackie's analysis of moral skepticism as a point of reference, I will argue that, as a normative theory, Hume's account of morality is not at all skeptical since he is offering a relatively optimistic consequentialist theory of right and wrong action. As a metaethical theory, however, I will argue that Hume is a weak metaethical skeptic insofar as he denies that morality is independent of the existence and character of human beings. He should not be considered a thorough or strong metaethical skeptic, though, since he advances a moral theory which is firmly grounded in human instinct.

The Rise and Fall of James Beattie’s Common Sense Theory of Truth

In a 1766 letter, Beattie states his intention to write a book on the nature of truth with this c... more In a 1766 letter, Beattie states his intention to write a book on the nature of truth with this central thesis: "that as we know nothing of the eternal relations of things, that to us is and must be truth, which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood, which we feel that we must disbelieve." In more contemporary wording, his bold point is that we must reject the correspondence theory of truth (i.e., that true statements are those that correspond with reality) since we do not have access to the world of facts. Instead, we must adopt a common sense standard of truth, which bases truth upon an instinctive conviction of foundational concepts. He states this thesis prominently in the first edition of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) -- in wording very similar to that in the letter. However, in his final revision of the Essay in 1776, he deleted the relevant sentences, thereby diluting -- if not destroying -- the book’s most innovative point. Why did he do this? He was apparently swayed by harsh criticisms of his thesis, particularly by Joseph Priestley. I discuss Beattie's claim, the attacks, and suggest ways in which a common sense standard of truth might be viable.

Hume’s Wide View of the Virtues: An Analysis of his Early Critics

Hume mentions around 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virt... more Hume mentions around 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virtues and have clear moral significance, such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Others on his list, though, are character traits whose moral significance is not immediately obvious, such as wit, good manners, and dialogue. Mid-18th century critics of Hume’s moral theory argued that his notion of virtue was too broad and that he should have distinguished between genuine moral virtues, on the one hand, and mere intellectual abilities on the other. According to the critics, grouping the two together devalues the true virtues. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of the virtues was controversial, and we know from his letters that he read at least a couple of these critiques. He nevertheless vigorously defended his position. Contemporary Hume scholarship has neither discussed the nature of these 18th century criticisms nor given adequate attention to the success or failure of Hume’s position. I address these issues here.

Beattie's Lost Letter to the London Review

The last issue of the London Review contains an editorial response to a letter they received from... more The last issue of the London Review contains an editorial response to a letter they received from James Beattie. The context of the London Review response indicates that Beattie's letter was to have been printed in that journal. Strangely, however, the letter never appeared. Enough detail is provided in the London Review's response to reconstruct the thrust of Beattie's letter: Beattie contends that, contrary to the London Review's accusations, he did not abuse Hume in the Essay, and that Hume's criticisms of Beattie's poetic writings were based on prejudice. The letter is important since it represents Beattie's only attempt at a public defense of his treatment of Hume, and an explanation of Hume's unfavorable reaction to his poetical writings. After presenting the London Review's "Answer," I will discuss the nature of the conflict between Beattie and the London Review, and reconstruct the key points in Beattie's letter. It will be helpful to begin with background on the London Review itself.

Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors

Hume Studies, 1992

Many aspects of Hume's taxonomy of the passions in the Treatise follow traditional classification... more Many aspects of Hume's taxonomy of the passions in the Treatise follow traditional classifications. I first sketch the traditional Stoic and Thomistic accounts of the passions. I then argue that Hume's account is traditional insofar as he grounds all passions in a class of eight primitive passions, four of which parallel the Stoic account. Hume also appears indebted to Hutcheson's explanation of the calm-violent distinction between passions. The uniqueness of Hume's theory consists in his account of the indirect passions. Finally, I criticize the interpretations of Hume's classification offered by Kemp Smith, Ardal, and Loeb, and suggest what I believe is the most textually sound classification.

Hume's Radical Skepticism: A Developmental Interpretation

Hume Studies, 1989

Hume is a radical skeptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition insofar he held that fundamental aspects of... more Hume is a radical skeptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition insofar he held that fundamental aspects of the human understanding are embedded with contradictions. What are these contradictions, and when do they arise? Hume's position on this changed over time. I show that in the main text of the Treatise, Hume exposes contradictions in areas involving external objects and causality, but denies that contradictions arise with morality. For morality, according to Hume, morality involves only the world of mental events (as opposed to the world of external objects), and at first he believed that the world of mental events was free from contradiction. However, in his discussion of “the self” in the Appendix to the Treatise, he changes his position and asserts that contradictions arise even within the world of mental events. In the conclusion to his second Enquiry, he extends this radical skepticism by exposing a contradiction specifically with morality.

Hume's Distinction between Natural and Artificial Virtues

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 1997

Hume does not provide a single systematic analysis of the distinction between natural and artific... more Hume does not provide a single systematic analysis of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In contrast to traditional discussions of this subject, this essay argues that the primary distinction between natural and artificial virtues lies in the motivational factors of the moral agent. Natural virtues are instinctive character traits of the agent which give rise to passions, which in turn motivate the will to action. Artificial virtues are intentions which hold out an artificially instilled prospect of pleasure or pain; these evoke passions which in turn motivate willful actions.

A Bibliography of Hume's Writings and Early Responses

This document contains two separate bibliographies. The first is a “Bibliography of Hume’s Writin... more This document contains two separate bibliographies. The first is a “Bibliography of Hume’s Writings” that I constructed for my own benefit while preparing the Early Responses to Hume series. The second is “A Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume,” which is taken directly from the final pages of Early Responses to Hume’s Life and Reputation (2005).

Early Responses to Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Stewart: Part 2

This is the second of a two-volume set of critical reactions to the four major common sense philo... more

A Bibliography of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy

This is a bibliography of the twelve most important Scottish philosophers associated with the com... more This is a bibliography of the twelve most important Scottish philosophers associated with the common sense school. They are, alphabetically, John Abercrombie, James Beattie, Thomas Brown, George Campbell, James Dunbar, David Fordyce, Alexander Gerard, William Hamilton, Henry Home Lord Kames, James Oswald, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart.

Early Responses to Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Stewart: Part 1

This is the first of a two-volume set of critical reactions to the four major common sense philos... more

George Tucker: Autobiography and Miscellaneous Philosophical Essays

George Tucker (1775–1861) is one of the more unique nineteenth-century American philosophers. Thi... more George Tucker (1775–1861) is one of the more unique nineteenth-century American philosophers. This is a newly-edited version of his autobiography and several of his philosophical essays that appeared in pamphlets or periodicals. A practicing attorney and Congressman from the state of Virginia, Tucker was an original thinker who expressed his views in a range of literary genres. Many of these were among the first of their kind: a biography of Thomas Jefferson, a major history of the United States, a science fiction novel about the moon, and a southern U.S. novel. He also composed several influential books in economic thought and frequently wrote on the subject of slavery. While in Congress, he published a collection of essays on philosophical and political subjects, which attracted the attention of Jefferson who subsequently appointed him as the first professor of moral philosophy at the University of Virginia. Near the end of his life he published a second collection of philosophical essays. Tucker believed that the state of philosophy in the United States was largely undeveloped and, in his various writings, he attempted to address this deficiency.

Early Responses to Hume's Moral Theory

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Essays

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part 1

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part 2

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Writings on Religion, Part 1

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Writings on Religion, Part 2

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's History, Part 1

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's History, Part 2

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Life and Reputation, Part 1

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

Early Responses to Hume's Life and Reputation, Part 2

This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version... more This PDF file is part of a 10 Volume series titled "Early Responses to Hume." The printed version of the 10-volume set is under copyright by the original publisher. The electronic version is under copyright by the author, James Fieser, and is available under Creative Commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND). The individual volumes are these:
Vol. 1: Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory
Vol. 2: Early Responses to Hume's Essays
Vols. 3 and 4: Early Responses to Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings
Vols. 5 and 6: Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Vols. 7 and 8: Early Responses to Hume’s History of England
Vols. 9 and 10: Early Hume’s Life and Reputation, with Bibliography of Early Responses to Hume and Indexes to all 10 volumes.

James Oswald: An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (1766-1772)

This is a new edition of the two-volume "An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion" (1766-1... more

James Beattie: An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770)

This is a new edition of "An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth", by Scottish philosop... more This is a new edition of "An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth", by Scottish philosopher James Beattie (1735-1803). It is the most infamous attack on the philosophy of David Hume that appeared during Hume's life. This new edition is taken from the first edition of 1770, and collated with the 1771 second edition and the 1776 edition, which was most likely the final one that Beattie revised. This new edition contains an editor's introduction and annotations throughout.