Papers by Eduardo Rivera Lopez
Criminal Law and Philosophy
Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un... more Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.This document offers a proposal for the elaboration of a triage guideline in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This proposal includes recommendations on the procedural norms and substantive norms that should govern the allocation and reallocation of therapeutic resources in conditions of extreme scarcity.Aquest document ofereix una proposta des de la perspectiva de la bioètica per a l'elaboració d'un protocol de triatge en el context de la pandèmia de COVID-19. L'esmentada proposta inclou recomanacions sobre les normes procedimentals i normes substantives que han de regir l'assignació i reassignació de recursos...
In this critical note it is argued that one of the crucial arguments of the recent judgment by th... more In this critical note it is argued that one of the crucial arguments of the recent judgment by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Artavia Murillo fails and shows a common conceptual confusion in legal argumentation. The Court considers that the word “conception” in paragraph 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights must be understood as “implantation,” and not, as claimed by one part of the doctrine and the minority opinion in this case, as “ fertilization.” The normative consequence of this interpretation is that preimplantation embryos (for example, embryos in vitro) do not enjoy the legal protections established by the Convention, that is, the protection (in general) of a right to life. The main argument for this interpretation is that a preimplantation embryo is not viable unless it is implanted in the uterus. The argument is fallacious, since it attempts to support a normative conclusion on scientific, empirical premises alone.
Rechtstheorie, 1994
L'A. etudie la theorie libertaire deontologique de R. Nozick qui rejette les principes distri... more L'A. etudie la theorie libertaire deontologique de R. Nozick qui rejette les principes distributifs defendus par les theories liberales egalitaires, affirmant la necessite d'une redistribution des droits de propriete. L'A. critique la tentative de G. Pincione de generaliser la theorie de Nozick jusqu'a l'assimiler a un autre principe de redistribution des droits
El articulo de David Martinez abarca tanto cuestiones de analisis conceptual como normativas, y s... more El articulo de David Martinez abarca tanto cuestiones de analisis conceptual como normativas, y se refiere tanto al discurso moral como al juridico, asi como a la relacion entre ambos. En esta nota, me centrare en la parte normativa referida, especificamente, a los dilemas morales (no juridicos). En relacion con este aspecto especifico, Martinez distingue dos tipos de dilemas morales y sugiere una misma via para solucionar ambos. En general, segun Martinez, un dilema moral es “toda situacion de conflicto Eduardo Rivera Lopez Dilemas morales, discrecionalidad y azar1 Discusiones 8
Fil: Rivera Lopez, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas; A... more Fil: Rivera Lopez, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2017
Several distinct arguments conclude that terminally ill patients have a right to a medically assi... more Several distinct arguments conclude that terminally ill patients have a right to a medically assisted death; two are especially influential: the autonomy argument and the non-harm argument. Both have proven convincing to many, but not to those who view the duty not to kill as an (almost) absolute constraint. Some philosophers see the source of such a constraint in general (deontological) moral principles, other in the nature of the medical profession. My aim in this paper is not to add one further argument in favour of medically assisted death. Rather, I want to shed light on a kind of reason that, to my mind, has not been previously highlighted or defended, and that might shake the principled conviction that doctors are never allowed to actively assist their patients to die. Specifically, my purpose is to show that doctors (as members of the medical profession) have a special duty to provide medically assisted death to consenting terminally ill patients, because (and insofar as) they have been participants in the process leading to the situation in which a patient can reasonably ask to die. In some specific ways (to be explained), they are involved in the tragic fate of those patients and, therefore, are not morally allowed to straightforwardly refuse to assist them to die.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2015
Thomas Nagel famously distinguishes four kinds of moral luck (in which factorsbeyond our control ... more Thomas Nagel famously distinguishes four kinds of moral luck (in which factorsbeyond our control nevertheless have bearing on our moral responsibility).Threeof these are antecedent to our actions: constitutive luck (our character traits), remote causal conditions (being born in a certain time and place, for example), and circumstantial luck (the circumstances in which we act). The remaining kind of moral luck, resultant luck, concerns the results of our actions: the fact that our negligent or intentional actions produce a particular outcome or not often depends on whether some uncontrollable facts occur. Many think that resultant moral luck does not exist, because we cannot be blamed more or less depending on facts that are entirely beyond our control. The problem with this argument is that the other three kinds of moral luck (though I will focus specifically on circumstantial luck) have exactly the same feature: our responsibility also depends on whether certain (antecedent) uncontrollable facts hold. However, rejecting all kinds of moral luck is, as we will see, a bold and implausible move. My goal is to take some initial steps in defense of the motto: circumstantial (and all other kinds of antecedent) moral luck, Yes; resultant moral luck, No. My argument does not amount to proof that resultant moral luck does not exist. I merely try to show that rejecting resultant luck while accepting circumstantial luck is not necessarily inconsistent or unmotivated.Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2014
The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a... more The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so-called principle of 'adversarial' litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer.This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X.We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong. 'adversarial' litigation. Let me start with some preliminary points. First, the question refers only to privately hired lawyers (I will call them 'professional lawyers'). I will assume that professional lawyers are allowed to accept or reject clients freely, at least when the withdrawal does not imply a setback to the potential client's interests. I therefore exclude from my consideration official representation or representation otherwise appointed by any authority or court. This assumption is not trivial and requires some discussion. The principle that lawyers are allowed to exercise discretion in the selection of clients is not universal. In England, for example, barristers (but not solicitors) are, prima facie, required to accept clients. 1 Some authors think that a similar requirement exists in the US (although it is not explicit in professional regulations). 2 However, there are reasons to accept professional freedom as the default standard. Most codes of professional conduct do not require accepting clients, at least if this is not harmful to the potential client. They do establish restrictions in the case of appointed lawyers, and also some constraints to the decision to terminate an ongoing lawyer-client relationship. 3 Client selection by professional lawyers, on the contrary, seems to be unregulated in most jurisdictions. 4 The assumption of professional freedom certainly constrains the scope of bs_bs_banner
Análisis Filosófico, 1997
Mi propósito en este trabajo es analizar un conjunto tradicional de distinciones y argumentos en ... more Mi propósito en este trabajo es analizar un conjunto tradicional de distinciones y argumentos en torno del problema de la aceptabilidad ética de la eutanasia. La problemática moral de la eutanasia posee, en mi opinión, diversos aspectos que, aunque están relacionados, no deberían ser confundidos. En primer lugar, tiene un aspecto ético que podríamos llamar "puro". Se trata de evaluar la corrección o incorrección moral de practicar actos de eutanasia de diferentes tipos en diferentes circunstancias generales. En segundo lugar, existe un aspecto moral de aplicación o casuístico, que consiste en evaluar, ante un caso concreto dado, y en posesión de suficiente información acerca del mismo, si se justifica o no la eutanasia, o qué tipo de eutanasia se podría justificar. En tercer lugar, tiene un aspecto que podríamos denominar "ético-jurídico", es decir, el que intenta determinar qué legislación acerca de la eutanasia se justifica moralmente. La relación entre estos tres aspectos es compleja (no es posible, a mi juicio, "derivar" conclusiones acerca del segundo y/o tercer aspecto a partir del primero). No intentaré aquí establecerla. Mi discusión se centrará exclusivamente en el primer aspecto y, por lo tanto, no haré, en general, referencias a problemas de aplicación a casos o de legislación.
Utilitas, 2008
In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in whi... more In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to cases in which (only) probabilities are different. After a brief defense of this claim, I conclude that some version of consequentialism seems more promising for offering a plausible solution to the probability case.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2006
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being bl... more Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More ...
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007
Abstract: The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welf... more Abstract: The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non-experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there ...
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
... Bertha can only prevent condition X at the expense of bringing another child into the world. ... more ... Bertha can only prevent condition X at the expense of bringing another child into the world. ... of a potential person provides us with sufficient moral reasons not to bring this person into existence. ... being, there is always an alternative World 2 with x + n number of people, in which (1 ...
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2006
The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to m... more The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to many of us. However, powerful arguments have been provided recently supporting legalisation (I consider two of those arguments: the Consequentialist Argument and the Autonomy Argument). Is our instinctive reaction against a market of organs irrational then? The aim of this paper is not to prove that legalization would be immoral, all things considered, but rather to show, first, that there are some kinds of arguments, offered in favour of legalisation, that are, in an important sense, illegitimate, and second, that even if legalisation might not be wrong all things considered, there are good reasons for our negative moral intuitions. Moreover, identifying these reasons will help highlight some features of moral decisions in nonideal situations, which in turn might be relevant to some other moral or policy choices.
968-36-9224-4. Menciona el autor que el trasplante de órganos es la transposición de órganos, tej... more 968-36-9224-4. Menciona el autor que el trasplante de órganos es la transposición de órganos, tejidos o células dentro de un mismo individuo o en uno diferente con el fin de reponer la función pérdida o deficiente de aquellos. Su práctica trae aparejado una serie ...
In this paper, I discuss exploitative transactions in bioethics. The most problematic case is wha... more In this paper, I discuss exploitative transactions in bioethics. The most problematic case is what Allan Wertheimer calls "mutually advantageous exploitation": the weak party’s (W’s) consent for the transaction is an effective and rational consent. Moreover, W does not suffer any harm by the transaction; on the contrary, the transaction benefits W. My aim in this paper is twofold. From the perspective of individual ethics, I offer a model to conceive the nature of the wrongfulness of strong party’s action. From the perspective of legal ethics, I suggest some reasons to believe that the prohibition of beneficial, exploitative, contracts is problematic and can only be justified in very exceptional cases.
Humanitas, 2003
Résumé/Abstract The article discusses one of the central aspects of the debate on the moral accep... more Résumé/Abstract The article discusses one of the central aspects of the debate on the moral acceptability of active euthanasia: the principle of autonomy. After making some comments on the concept of euthanasia and of autonomy, it presents two arguments that favor the ...
... | Ayuda. Los presupuestos morales del liberalismo. Información general. Autores:Eduardo River... more ... | Ayuda. Los presupuestos morales del liberalismo. Información general. Autores:Eduardo Rivera López; Editores: Madrid : Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1997; Año de publicación: 1997; País: España; Idioma ...
Uploads
Papers by Eduardo Rivera Lopez