Frédéric Gilbert
I conduct my research within the Ethics, Policy and Public Engagement Program of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science (ACES), located at the Faculty of Arts, University of Tasmania, Australia.
I work in bioethics, in particular neuroethics. My current research interests concentrate on the ethical issues posed by novel invasive biomedical technologies which overlap with concerns in bionics, synthetic biology and personalised medicine. A part of my work examines the experimental use of highly invasive and irreversible biomedical materials (i.e. synthetic biosystem, additive-bio-fabricated materials, DNA modified cells, optogenetics, etc.). I also study the use of implantable brain devices for treatment of neurological and psychiatric conditions.
I have worked on the ethical issues raised by therapeutic stem calls as treatment for spinal cord injuries. Moreover, I have been working on questions connected to the impact of neuroimaging and medical imaging on the scientific and popular cultures, enhancement, the debate of equity in the allocation health care resources, concerns over mild-traumatic brain injury in sport and the discussion of neuropathologies related to dysfunctional behaviour and on neurodegenerative disease associated with lack of responsibility.
Please follow this link (https://rmdb.research.utas.edu.au/public/rmdb/q/indiv_detail_warp_trans/29229) to see the UTAS Web Access Research Portal (WARP) which lists my publications, funded projects, graduate research and supervision information.
Phone: +61 3 6226 1703
Address: Humanities Building
Sandy Bay Campus
The University of Tasmania
I work in bioethics, in particular neuroethics. My current research interests concentrate on the ethical issues posed by novel invasive biomedical technologies which overlap with concerns in bionics, synthetic biology and personalised medicine. A part of my work examines the experimental use of highly invasive and irreversible biomedical materials (i.e. synthetic biosystem, additive-bio-fabricated materials, DNA modified cells, optogenetics, etc.). I also study the use of implantable brain devices for treatment of neurological and psychiatric conditions.
I have worked on the ethical issues raised by therapeutic stem calls as treatment for spinal cord injuries. Moreover, I have been working on questions connected to the impact of neuroimaging and medical imaging on the scientific and popular cultures, enhancement, the debate of equity in the allocation health care resources, concerns over mild-traumatic brain injury in sport and the discussion of neuropathologies related to dysfunctional behaviour and on neurodegenerative disease associated with lack of responsibility.
Please follow this link (https://rmdb.research.utas.edu.au/public/rmdb/q/indiv_detail_warp_trans/29229) to see the UTAS Web Access Research Portal (WARP) which lists my publications, funded projects, graduate research and supervision information.
Phone: +61 3 6226 1703
Address: Humanities Building
Sandy Bay Campus
The University of Tasmania
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Papers by Frédéric Gilbert
Methods: We explore whether the notion of neurobiological determinism is compatible with the concept of criminal responsibility. Based on this exploration, we analyse the notions of free will, determinism and responsibility. Our central goal is to confront common philosophical arguments about free will with neurobiological evidence. We try to find whether responsibility is necessarily linked to free will, and if not, we examine whether this should imply the end of responsibility.
Results: We propose to liberate ethical debate from a traditional libertarian conception of free will, according to which a person could have decided to act differently given the same initial conditions. Our purpose is to argue that, although criminals are somehow determined by known or unknown neurobiological causes, administering the appropriate treatment to them based on their choices and decisions is still justified on consequentialist grounds.
technologies in medicine, new language is
being sought to make sense of the findings. The aim of
this paper is to explore whether the ‘‘brain-reading’’
metaphor used to convey current medical or neurobiological findings imports unintended significations
that do not necessarily reflect the genuine findings
made by physicians and neuroscientists.
Methods First, the paper surveys the ambiguities of
the readability metaphor, drawing from the history of
science and medicine, paying special attention to the
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Next, the paper
addresses more closely the issue of how metaphors
may be confusing when used in medicine in general,
and neuroscience in particular. The paper then
explores the possible misleading effects associated
with the contemporary use of the ‘‘brain-reading’’
metaphor in neuroimaging research.
Methods: We explore whether the notion of neurobiological determinism is compatible with the concept of criminal responsibility. Based on this exploration, we analyse the notions of free will, determinism and responsibility. Our central goal is to confront common philosophical arguments about free will with neurobiological evidence. We try to find whether responsibility is necessarily linked to free will, and if not, we examine whether this should imply the end of responsibility.
Results: We propose to liberate ethical debate from a traditional libertarian conception of free will, according to which a person could have decided to act differently given the same initial conditions. Our purpose is to argue that, although criminals are somehow determined by known or unknown neurobiological causes, administering the appropriate treatment to them based on their choices and decisions is still justified on consequentialist grounds.
technologies in medicine, new language is
being sought to make sense of the findings. The aim of
this paper is to explore whether the ‘‘brain-reading’’
metaphor used to convey current medical or neurobiological findings imports unintended significations
that do not necessarily reflect the genuine findings
made by physicians and neuroscientists.
Methods First, the paper surveys the ambiguities of
the readability metaphor, drawing from the history of
science and medicine, paying special attention to the
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Next, the paper
addresses more closely the issue of how metaphors
may be confusing when used in medicine in general,
and neuroscience in particular. The paper then
explores the possible misleading effects associated
with the contemporary use of the ‘‘brain-reading’’
metaphor in neuroimaging research.