Papers by Franck Lihoreau
Symposion, 2014
It is usually agreed that the Revelation Thesis about experience – the idea that the knowledge we... more It is usually agreed that the Revelation Thesis about experience – the idea that the knowledge we gain by having an experience somehow “reveals” the essence, or nature, of this experience – only requires that we know the essence of the experience, not that we know, of this essence, that it is the essence of the experience. I contest this agreement. In the light of what I call the “Essentiality of Essence Principle”– the principle that whatever is in the essence of something is also essentially so – I argue that the Revelation Thesis does require that we know, of the essence of an experience, that it is the essence of the experience, and draw some conclusions about the plausibility of that thesis.
In Rebuschi, M.; Batt, M.; Heinzmann, G.; Lihoreau, F.; Musiol, M.; Trognon, A. (Eds.). Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics.
A major goal of post-cartesian epistemology is to respond to radical skepticism, the view that we... more A major goal of post-cartesian epistemology is to respond to radical skepticism, the view that we know (almost) nothing of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. The argument most commonly associated with this view is the so-called "argument from ignorance". It starts with the premise that we cannot exclude the possibility that we might be in such alternative worlds as those described by Descartes' Evil Genius hypothesis or by Putnam's Brain in a Vat scenario. The alleged reason for this inability is that these skeptical hypotheses are designed in such a way that if we were in the skeptical worlds they describe, we'd have exactly the same experiences, memories, beliefs, etc., as those that we actually have, so that for all we know, we might be in these worlds of mass(ive) error. From here, the skeptic's reasoning takes us to the conclusion that we do not know any (or most) of the things that we ordinarily take ourselves to know, for instance, that we have hands, that we are sitting at our desk, etc.
Logos & Episteme, 2012
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to φ sim... more In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to φ simply are evidence that one ought to φ, and suggest that "evidence" in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.
The Reasoner, 2012
I defend the assumption that an expression like "for Anna," as it occurs in a sentence like "Whal... more I defend the assumption that an expression like "for Anna," as it occurs in a sentence like "Whale meat is tasty for Anna," is a sentential operator, against two related, albeit opposite worries. The first is that in some cases the putative operator might not be selective enough. The second is that in other cases it might on the contrary be too selective. I argue that these worries have no tendency to cast doubt on the assumption of sententiality for the relevant expressions.
In C. Degremont, L. Keiff and H. Rueckert (Eds.), Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things., 2009
One of the highlights of recent informal epistemology is its growing theoretical emphasis upon va... more One of the highlights of recent informal epistemology is its growing theoretical emphasis upon various notions of context. The present paper addresses the connections between knowledge and context within a formal approach. To this end, a "contextual epistemic logic", CEL, is proposed, which consists of an extension of standard S5 epistemic modal logic with appropriate reduction axioms to deal with an extra contextual operator. We describe the axiomatics and supply both a Kripkean and a dialogical semantics for CEL. An illustration of how it may fruitfully be applied to informal epistemological matters is provided.
in D. Lukasiewicz & R. Pouivet (eds.), Scientific Knowledge and Common Knowledge, 2009
Analytic epistemology in the post-Gettier era has mainly focused on the task of providing an anal... more Analytic epistemology in the post-Gettier era has mainly focused on the task of providing an analysis, perhaps a definition, of the "common" notion of knowledge. In the last two or three decades, this project has seen a major "linguistic turn" (Ludlow 2005), through the increased reliance, in contemporary debates, on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic "evidence" about usual (uses of) linguistic constructions in terms of know, the main working assumption being that the common notion of knowledgethat is, the way we (ought to) commonly think about knowledgeis best reflected in the way we commonly talk about knowledge. A consequence is that instead of trying to spell out directly the conditions for knowledge, the focus is on trying to spell out the conditions for the truth of knowledge attributions.
Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 2008
In Lihoreau, F. (Ed.), Knowledge and Questions, 2008
Disputatio, Vol. II, No. 24,, 2008
According to David Lewis’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a s... more According to David Lewis’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing aproposition just because every possibility that this proposition might befalse is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in somecases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.
La philosophie de la connaissance, généralement associée au projet de fournir une analyse de la c... more La philosophie de la connaissance, généralement associée au projet de fournir une analyse de la connaissance et une réponse au scepticisme, a une longue histoire marquée, ces deux ou trois dernières décennies, par l'insistance croissante sur le rôle du contexte dans la connaissance et le discours sur la connaissance 1 , avec notamment l'avènement de l'approche dite "contextualiste" qui compte aujourd'hui de nombreux défenseurs, comme Cohen , DeRose [10, 11, 12], Heller [21, 22], Lewis [30, 31], Stine [43], et bien d'autres. Chacun d'eux
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Papers by Franck Lihoreau