13rd Annual Conference of the International Society of Military Sciences (ISMS2021), Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, 11-14 October 2021 (Session Session 2E (Working Group 1 - War Studies and Working Group 9 - Military Education) Understanding and Teaching Hybrid Warfare), Oct 13, 2021
The nature of conflict has changed dramatically over the last few decades. Hybrid warfare — also ... more The nature of conflict has changed dramatically over the last few decades. Hybrid warfare — also known as grey zone conflict or low-intensity conflict — is a reality and political and military leaders must be ready to confront and deter it. Hybrid warfare is the effort to achieve strategic objectives without using significant force. There is no common definition of the term and therefore it is correspondingly ambiguous. It is an amorphous definition for an amorphous strategy. While it is a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes overt and covert use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian, conventional and unconventional. However, the term is so broad that it includes a set of tactics, techniques, technologies and methods. Hybrid warfare is an umbrella concept that can include, inter alia, information and disinformation operations, deception, troop movements, cyberattacks, sabotage and other non-military tactics or a combination of all these means. It can also include actual force. Hybrid warfare can be considered a form of comprehensive warfare, a strategy, not merely a set of tactics and techniques. This array of military activities may fall under the broad definition of hybrid warfare, that is not new, but is boosted by technological advance. Furthermore, hybrid warfare is low risk, low cost and provides an adversary the opportunity to cloud, throwing doubt on who is responsible for these "gray zone" actions. Hybrid warfare operations, for which it is difficult to attribute responsibility and which are not specifically regulated by international law, fall below the threshold of armed conflict and are convenient to be used to destabilize a government or to try to legitimize (unlawful) actions. Covert operations and support to proxies, such as independentists and secessionists, are facilitated by the nature of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare blurs the lines between peace and war and is therefore questioned whether it should be considered below the threshold of armed conflict. Some hybrid warfare operations are convenient because are located in a twilight zone between peace and war and below the threshold of war and therefore they should not trigger a conventional/kinetic military response. Nevertheless, at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the allies recognized that international law applies in cyberspace and that the impact of cyberattacks could be as harmful as a conventional attack. As a result, cyberdefense was recognized as part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the allies took further action to recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations just like the "classic" domains of air, land and sea. At the NATO summit held in Brussels in 2021, the allies reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter: "an attack on one is an attack on all". This doctrinal position is of no small importance. The question is whether hybrid warfare should be considered an armed attack or use of force that, under treaty and customary international law, could trigger a military response or whether it falls below the threshold of damage and destruction resulting from a kinetic attack. This work addresses aims to shed light on the constistency of the emerging doctrine on hybrid warfare with current international (humanitarian) lawand its possible application.
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lata. Trudno również przewidywać͕ czy po ponad dwóch latach funkcjonowania
w warunkach ogólnoświatowej pandemii jesteśmy lepiej przygotowani na
wyzwania i zagrożenia z nią związane.
Pomimo tego, że wirus nie zniknął i pojawiają się jego nowe mutacje, problemy
z nim związane zeszły obecnie na dalszy plan. Od 24 lutego 2022 roku głównym
tematem pojawiającym się w mediach na całym świecie jest wojna w Ukrainie.
ůĂznacznej większości była ona zaskoczeniem. Nawet jeśli nie jej początek, to
skala. Ta wojna różni się od wojen, których pamięć ciągle istnieje w świadomości
społeczeństw Europy. Jak pisze A
El conflicto ruso-ucraniano muestra los límites y las debilidades de la Unión Europea. Además, el conflicto pone de manifiesto las incoherencias entre los principios de la UE y las políticas aplicadas por la Unión. No es solo el autoproclamado papel del “actor global” que la UE se impuso a sí misma lo que se cuestiona, sino también el papel de defensora de los derechos humanos fundamentales que argumenta defender. Por último, el conflicto advierte de los riesgos de una adhesión apresurada de Ucrania a la UE.
lata. Trudno również przewidywać͕ czy po ponad dwóch latach funkcjonowania
w warunkach ogólnoświatowej pandemii jesteśmy lepiej przygotowani na
wyzwania i zagrożenia z nią związane.
Pomimo tego, że wirus nie zniknął i pojawiają się jego nowe mutacje, problemy
z nim związane zeszły obecnie na dalszy plan. Od 24 lutego 2022 roku głównym
tematem pojawiającym się w mediach na całym świecie jest wojna w Ukrainie.
ůĂznacznej większości była ona zaskoczeniem. Nawet jeśli nie jej początek, to
skala. Ta wojna różni się od wojen, których pamięć ciągle istnieje w świadomości
społeczeństw Europy. Jak pisze A
El conflicto ruso-ucraniano muestra los límites y las debilidades de la Unión Europea. Además, el conflicto pone de manifiesto las incoherencias entre los principios de la UE y las políticas aplicadas por la Unión. No es solo el autoproclamado papel del “actor global” que la UE se impuso a sí misma lo que se cuestiona, sino también el papel de defensora de los derechos humanos fundamentales que argumenta defender. Por último, el conflicto advierte de los riesgos de una adhesión apresurada de Ucrania a la UE.
Marco Marsili, giornalista, politologo e docente di giornalismo presso l’Università degli Studi dell’Insubria a Varese, spiega la storia di WikiLeaks e del suo leader Julian Assange, e guida il lettore attraverso la comprensione dei dispacci inviati a Washington dall’ambasciatore a Roma Mel Sembler (2001-2005) e dal suo successore Ronald Spogli (2005 - 2009). Ne Il Clown. Il meglio di Wikileaks sull'anomalia italiana (Mimesis Entropie, Milano, 2011, 10 euro) Berlusconi viene definito un leader “incapace, vanitoso e inefficace come moderno leader europeo”, intento a spendere le sue energie in feste notturne, le quali non gli permetterebbero di riposarsi abbastanza.
Critiche per una politica estera inefficace e ondivaga, basata sui rapporti personali di Berlusconi, anche con dittatori come Gheddafi o il leader bielorusso Lukashenko. Il rapporto tra Silvio Berlusconi e Vladimir Putin è oggetto di una attenta osservazione da parte dei diplomatici statunitensi. La loro relazione viene giudicata di natura confidenziale, anche a causa dello scambio di “regali generosi”, e foriera di redditizi contratti energetici tra Eni e il colosso russo dell’energia Gazprom. La descrizione data di Berlusconi è che “sembra essere il portavoce di Putin in Europa”. Gli Usa cercano, tuttavia, di avvantaggiare le forniture di aziende americane in vista della realizzazione del nuovo programma nucleare varato da Berlusconi (poi abbandonato in seguito al referendum) e spingono per l’inclusione delle strutture marittime italiane nel progetto Megaporti.
Forti critiche anche per l’abolizione dell’Alto commissario anticorruzione, decisa dal Cavaliere nel 2008, appena tornato a Palazzo Chigi, e sulla vicenda Alitalia: “Ha inventato una legge ad personam per ottenere un risultato politico. È una lezione per chi vuole investire in Italia”. Per mantenere le promesse fatte in campagna elettorale, di mantenere il vettore (che stava per essere acquistato dalla cordata Air France-Klm) in mani italiane, Berlusconi ne ha favorito la cessione a Cai. “La nuova linea area avrà un monopolio di fatto delle rotte interne italiane e i debiti e i passivi dell’Alitalia passeranno ora a una bad company avviata alla liquidazione ma tuttora di proprietà del governo” scrive l’Ambasciata Usa a Roma. Spogli ricorda come, nonostante il ministro dell’Interno Maroni si fosse detto contrario al salvataggio, “Berlusconi ha utilizzato le sue conoscenze personali e politiche per convincere un gruppo di imprenditori a impegnarsi nel ‘salvataggio’ della compagnia aerea e nel mantenere la compagnia di bandiera italiana”, favorendo la creazione di un gruppo di 16 investitori (definiti “compari” del premier) che hanno seguito il piano d’acquisto elaborato da Intesa Sanpaolo. Per venire in aiuto della cordata di amici, che hanno consentito al premier di fare bella figura, mantenendo la promessa fatta in campagna elettorale, il governo ha modificato la legge fallimentare, in modo da consentire alla società di essere divisa in due, con i passivi e i debiti per un miliardo di euro che restano nella “bad company” di responsabilità del governo italiano. Sul Carroccio un dispaccio relativo ad un colloquio tra il ministro Roberto Calderoli, il segretario della Lega Lombarda, Giancarlo Giorgetti, e il console generale di Milano, svela i piani del movimento per “diventare forza egemone nel Nord”, le speranze dello stesso Giorgetti di poter “alla fine succedere a Bossi come capo del partito”.
Parte della corrispondenza riguarda l’allora ministro della Difesa Ignazio La Russa, che non esita a mostrarsi più che accondiscendente nei confronti dell’alleato statunitense. “Si è descritto letteralmente come filoamericano” si legge in un dispaccio. “Ha fatto riferimento al suo coinvolgimento nell’ala giovanile del Movimento sociale italiano come esempio dei suoi sentimenti filoamericani. Ha detto che il movimento era diviso in due campi: uno filopalestinese e l’altro filoamericano (e filoisraeliano). Si è definito esponente di vertice del secondo”. La sua proposta di aprire per 30 giorni le basi per l’addestramento dei giovani, viene bollata dall’ambasciatore come odorante “un po’ di fascismo”.
I dispacci diffusi da WikiLeaks dimostrano inequivocabilmente la mancanza di autonomia politica del governo Berlusconi in politica estera, e l’asservimento del premier, interessato solo alle sue vicende processuali e alla sua immagine, alla volontà dei governanti stranieri, a discapito dell’interesse nazionale. Ne esce un’immagine di un esecutivo incapace ed inefficiente, mosso solo da interessi personali, sia di natura politica che economica o giudiziaria.
Selezionare nella marea di informazione del web sta diventando il vero valore aggiunto della professione. Trovare news davvero utili e favorirne la diffusione è una delle sfide più difficili per chi vuole esercitare questa professione in un momento storico di grandi cambiamenti: le barriere di accesso, tanto per cominciare, sono sempre più basse e chiunque può fare informazione attraverso il suo blog o caricare un servizio video. La crisi attuale di molte imprese editoriali e la dilagante sfiducia dei lettori verso la stampa sono altri segnali evidenti di un settore al bivio.
È vero che la rivoluzione digitale apre nuovi scenari molto interessanti: la lenta erosione del potere di una casta, lo spirito di collaborazione e condivisione delle notizie, la partecipazione dei lettori e il boom del citizen journalism, gli straordinari sviluppi delle tecnologie di connessione (si parla già di web 3.0!) e il sempre più facile accesso ai servizi. Non ultimo la prospettiva di nuove figure professionali. Ma la rete pone anche delle
problematiche di non facile soluzione: quanto è neutrale il web? Chi controlla l’accesso? Chi garantisce la sicurezza? Come combattere il digital divide?
Problematiche che Marco Marsili, docente di Teorie e tecniche del linguaggio giornalistico presso l’Università degli Studi dell’Insubria,
direttore responsabile de "La Voce d’Italia" (uno dei più importanti quotidiani indipendente on line), prospetta già nelle prime pagine di introduzione, per poi affrontare in ogni capitolo tutti i diversi aspetti del giornalismo di oggi. Giornalismo inteso come processo, come lavoro e come industria. Ne esce un vero manuale non solo per chi fa questa professione o vi aspira, ma utile per coloro che vogliono capire di più dell’ecosistema delle telecomunicazioni, dei modelli di produzione e fruizione delle news, dei rapporti tra politica e informazione, degli interessi nascosti, delle distorsioni degli aiuti statali, delle problematiche aperte e delle false ideologie che circolano nell’era del web 2.0.
Ogni capitolo presenta in genere qualche elemento storico che rende più completa la lettura del presente e meno azzardata – anzi, sempre circostanziata e molto argomentata - di qualche ipotesi di sviluppo futuro. Si comincia dalla stampa: un focus sul panorama editoriale italiano e internazionale, il passaggio dalla carta al web, lo stato di salute dei giornali (non certamente buono), i rapporti tra informazione e politica. La chiarezza sulle dinamiche di potere presenti dietro i giornali non serve a innescare una sterile polemica, piuttosto aiuta a capire perché una
testata fa determinate scelte e non altre, e quali sono le conseguenze di avere in Italia solo editori il cui core business non è mai l’impresa editoriale: costruzioni, motori, moda, tutto ma non i giornali.
L’approccio è lo stesso anche per gli altri capitoli sulla pubblicità on line, le reti dell’informazione e del sapere (documentatissima la sezione dedicata alla banda larga), il giornalismo on line in tutte le sue articolazioni (tecnogiornalismo, tv su web, cellulari, peer to peer, video, social network…), la proprietà intellettuale e la privacy fino al funzionamento dei motori di ricerca. Tanti i nodi che via via emergono, a partire dalla crisi della stampa, la mancanza di indipendenza e pluralismo, la partita del digitale terrestre, il freno del monopolio allo sviluppo delle infrastrutture per la connessione veloce a Internet, il problema del rispetto della privacy da parte delle piattaforme di behavoural targeting.
Pagina dopo pagina il lettore si sente così più accorto e consapevole delle straordinarie opportunità che la rete offre per fare informazione ma anche dei suoi problemi, delle questioni chiave che bisognerebbe affrontare per realizzare un sistema editoriale più solido, capace di produrre informazione di qualità. “Collaborazione, organizzazione e innovazione costituiscono i presupposti irrinunciabili sui quali deve essere fondata
qualsiasi iniziativa che voglia avere una qualche possibilità di successo”, dice in sintesi l’autore. Come agire in questa direzione, però, non è di così semplice evidenza.
Proprio di fronte a un quadro così completo sembra ancora più difficile rispondere a quelle domande iniziali poste dall'autore: come sta cambiando il giornalismo con la rete? Chi sopravviverà a questa rivoluzione digitale? E soprattutto quali forme sta assumendo il giornalismo in un mondo di contenuti gratuiti dove il problema è disporre di un budget sufficiente a garantire la ricerca di fonti attendibili, l’accuratezza dei contenuti, il giusto compenso del collaboratore, la sopravvivenza di una testata?
Certamente Marsili offre “una messe rilevante di dati e di chiavi interpretative”, spiega Gamaleri nella prefazione, aiutandoci a formare “le griglie mentali che ci consentono di cogliere il cambiamento”, perché la più grande sfida per l’uomo è sempre stata quella di “padroneggiare la trasformazione che egli stesso ha messo in movimento”.
This thesis investigates the connection between terrorism and fundamental human rights. The question that guided this dissertation is the potential consequence of arbitrary and politically-driven definitions of terrorism over counter-terrorism policy and fundamental human rights. The thesis moves from a historical framing of the concept of terrorism that changes with time. There are many definitions of the term, and there is no common definition with legal value. The current debate on terrorism is linked almost exclusively with non-state actors, which implies that state and terrorism have no linkage, even if there are evidences of these ties.
The thesis scrutinizes the instrumentalization of terrorism, starting from an analysis of the concept based on three pillars: historical, theoretical-conceptual and legal (in the light of international law and human rights law). Then an empirical analysis based on these tools through the use of political and legal mechanisms to obtain a political output was conducted. To answer the starting question, the research moved from a historical-documentary analysis, then took into consideration the literature, and focused on how the states use the justification of the fight against international terrorism to restrict fundamental human rights.
After the theoretical-conceptual and legal analysis, the research focuses on the legal aspects of the War on Terror and security policies. Large part of the empyrical research is dedicated to scrutinize the case of Turkey after the 2016 coup d'état attempt, to review some rulings of the European Courts, and to examine some prominent 'terrorist' organizations.
While this topic presents a serious challenge, it does open much room for possible explorations of new fields of research without necessitating a fixed point of departure – or arrival. The thesis ends suggesting some future research directions.
I princìpi della Rivoluzione francese continuarono a diffondersi con Napoleone, seppure il condottiero corso sia stato autore di una svolta autoritaria, e la Restaurazione non riuscì ad impedirne la rivendicazione popolare, fino alla concessione di costituzioni ottriate ed al definitivo avvento delle democrazie parlamentari, che pongono la libertà di espressione tra i diritti fondamentali che lo stato ha l’obbligo di garantire.
Risalendo il fiume della storia ritroviamo sempre una contrapposizione tra diritto e forza o tra legge positiva (nomos) e legge della natura (physis), ma constatiamo che entrambe le prospettive e le pratiche del diritto sono efficaci, se è vero che gli esseri umani non hanno sino ad ora abbandonato né l’una né l’altra prospettiva argomentativa sull’origine e sul fondamento della legge. Ma da dove viene il diritto?
È possibile tentare di giustificare i diritti umani a partire da Dio, dalla Natura, dallo stato, persino dalla Storia o dalle consuetudini. Forse una più modesta argomentazione potrebbe individuare nei diritti costituzionalmente garantiti e protetti un rimedio, uno strumento di difesa nei confronti di abusi che si sono storicamente realizzati. Nulla di sacro o naturale, dunque, bensì una debole, ma imprescindibile, forma di difesa, la quale andrà a sua volta difesa contro i tentativi di utilizzarla per fini contrari a quelli per cui è stata codificata (come le più recenti dichiarazioni dei diritti non mancano di constatare).
Lo scioglimento del Pcus e la mutata situazione, hanno costretto il Pci a cambiare ragione sociale, trasformandosi in Pds, e coltivando la speranza che, dopo oltre 40 anni, in Italia fosse finalmente possibile un governo senza la Dc. Ma il crollo travolge tutti, spazzando via, con l’ausilio dei giudici del pool di «Mani pulite», i partiti di governo, e favorendo la crescita di movimenti di protesta, estranei al sistema, come la Lega di Umberto Bossi, che diviene il secondo partito al Nord, e conquista anche l’ex roccaforte socialista di Milano.
In questo contesto entra il vigore il trattato di Maastricht, probabilmente l’agente esogeno che è servito per implementare politiche economiche rigorose, volte al contenimento della spesa pubblica e del deficit, nonchè alla riduzione dell’inflazione.
A proposito degli avvenimenti di questo periodo si è parlato di fine della «Prima Repubblica». In realtà, non è avvenuto un mutamento della forma sostanziale dello Stato, tale da poterlo considerare rifondato, come avvenne con la Quinta Repubblica francese del 1958. Molti protagonisti di questo periodo sono allegramente transitati nella nuova era grazie all’aiuto di nuove formazioni politiche (in primis Forza Italia, che ha dato rifugio a numerosissimi orfani del pentapartito), altri, come Silvio Berlusconi, hanno approfittato del vuoto lasciato dalla scomparsa dei partiti tradizionali per fare il loro ingresso in politica, investendo risorse personali accumulate in attività extrapolitiche. Mutatis mutandis, è bastato cambiare il formato dei partiti per ripresentarsi agli elettori e garantirsi il mantenimento dello status quo.
Si potrebbe concludere che, mentre la «Prima Repubblica» non è mai definitivamente terminata, essendo mantenuta in vita ad opera degli stessi esponenti politici che erano in attività già prima del 1990, e grazie alle pratiche che la contraddistiguevano, la «Seconda Repubblica» non è mai nata. Più semplicemente, l’Italia vive da 15 anni in un regime «transitorio».
A nulla sono valse le istanze di rinnovamento che giungevano dai cittadini, e che trovavano riscontro nelle dichiarazioni del Presidente della Repubblica Francesco Cossiga, o nel movimento referendario di Mario Segni.
La crisi del sistema politico italiano ha anch’esso origini lontane, e per meglio comprendere la situazione attuale e la storia recente, occorre partire dal suo passato prossimo.
Come ha giustamente scritto Lucio Caracciolo nel suo Terra Incognita. Le radici geopolitiche della crisi italiana, la letteratura scientifica su questo periodo è ancora scarsa, e, tuttavia, parrebbe opportuno indagare sulle conseguenze che quegli avvenimenti straordinari hanno avuto, non solo su scala planetaria, ma, più modestamente, nel panorama italiano.
To avoid the militarization of space and celestial bodies, and to guarantee their exploration and use for peaceful purposes to all countries, in 1967 the US, the U.K. and the Soviet Union opened for signature the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which has become customary international law (White, 2000). The Outer Space Treatyforbids from placing in Earth orbit weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, or otherwise stationing them in outer space, but does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons, and thus some highly destructive attack strategies such as kinetic bombardment are still potentially allowable (Bourbonniere & Lee, 2007).
Since 1984, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body established by the UN General, has considered proposals, including draft treaties, aimed at preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. In 1998 Russia and China proposed a Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). An amended text drafted in 2014 was rejected by the US because it failed to address a series of relevant issues: it did not provide a definition of "outer space" neither of what constitutes a "weapon in outer space", and it did not ban terrestrially-based ASAT systems launched from the ground (CD, 2014; UNGA GA/DIS/3591; Plath, 2018).
The US refused to negotiate a Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) treaty as an international legally binding instrument in the CD, as Washington gathers that it simply mirrored the PPWT, including its failures. Therefore, the US voted against the Russian's No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (NFP) resolution (UNGA, A/C.1/72/L.53). So far, the international community failed to reach a solution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Space war is no more a science-fiction scenario; it’s an emerging reality.
Although Russia is well-known for its information capabilities—whether propaganda, disinformation, or counter-information—the Kremlin appears to have overestimated its ability to wage effective information operations or underestimated the impact of Western brainwashing on public opinion. In addition, the Ukrainian leadership has effectively managed to counter the grounds on which the Russian government has supported its "special military operation." Ukrainian President Zelensky gained the trust, sympathy, and solidarity of Western leaders, the media, and public opinion, presenting his country as the victim of an unjustified aggression. On the other hand, Russian President Putin, excluded from the public debate due to the European Union ban on Russian media, was perceived by the same audience as a gangster. Is this the whole truth, or is there something more beyond the mainstream narrative? This paper aims to offer a factual analysis and a different perspective from the mainstream narrative supported and spread by Western governments and biased media outlets.
The essay will address the China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, the China 17+1 initiative and Trade disputes between China and Europe. It will also look at questions of technology competition and critical infrastructure investment.
China's leaders announced in October 2017 that they want to assume a global leadership role. The long-term strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the major global economic, military and political challenges. Maritime policies play an important role in support of that strategy of making China a global leader. Today, Beijing is seeking to project sophisticated power globally, particularly in areas with heavy BRI activity – the plan for greater connectivity for China across both land and sea through a new Silk Road.
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road affects Europe in five main areas: maritime trade, shipbuilding, emerging growth niches in the blue economy, the global presence of the Chinese navy, and the competition for international influence. It has been calculated that the Maritime Silk Road creates more competition than cooperation opportunities in Europe-China relations.
The sea lanes of communication from China to Europe through the Malacca-Suez route are among the busiest in the world – where European interests are more immediate and bigger than on the nascent "Ice Silk Road": China-Europe maritime trade is three times larger than trade by air freight and Eurasian railways, while the last alternative – the Northern Route through the Arctic Ocean, that China dubs the "Ice Silk Road" – is only just starting to develop.
In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a "Polar Silk Road" and claimed to be a "Near-Arctic State", yet the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. Russia announced plans to connect the Northern Sea Route with China’s Maritime Silk Road – part of the BRI strategy – which would develop a new shipping channel from Asia to northern Europe, and the two counties are cooperating in developing hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic. Meanwhile, China is already developing shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean.
There are warnings about the Arctic Ocean to be transformed into 'a new South China Sea', militarized and with territorial claims. The Pentagon warned that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence – including deployment of submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attack.
This paper aims also to investigate the impact of the Chinese maritime geo-strategy over the European security.
Arctic security is a main security challenge – a global one, not only a regional one – not only for the Arctic countries, but for the whole international community, first of all the European. With Russia and China expanding their role in the area, and the difficulty of finding an undisputed governance on maritime routes and economic exploitation of resources, there is the risk of militarization of the Arctic. After briefly summarizing current and future challenges in the Arctic, this paper analyzes the limits due to a deficit of suitable instruments to maintain security in the region, especially in relation to the role of international intergovernmental organizations, and it suggests some remedies to overcome these deficiencies.
The Arctic region has become an arena for power and for competition, and Arctic nations must adapt to this new future. Offshore resources are the subject of renewed competition: Arctic region holds the greatest concentration of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas, uranium, gold, diamonds, rare earth minerals – phosphate, bauxite, iron ore, copper, and nickel – and, last but not least, fish. Arctic resources should be included in the common domain; they should be considered common goods – international or global public goods.
Nowadays, environmental and economic issues are broadly considered to be threats to security and stability. Therefore, the protection of these resources is a security issue, which involves the use of force, or military means. This is an issue that concerns the traditional domains of operations – land, sea, and air. The maritime domain – i.e. the Arctic Ocean – is predominant, due to the allocation of resources, and the operating environment. Sea routes are the ‘liquid’ highways along which goods travel across the world, and therefore play a strategic economic role – a global one.
Decrees issued during the state of emergency – including the practice of detaining journalists for their work and the abuse of pre-trial detention and Internet censorship – sound like measures adopted to restrict the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media, and to shout down dissenting voices. Any kind of pressure against journalists has an immediate consequence, not only on them but also on the public’s right to be informed. Media play a key role in providing important information to the public, and a pluralistic and vibrant media landscape is indispensable to any democratic society. Access to information and a free working environment are therefore essential and need to be ensured at all times, even under state of emergency. Authorities cannot invoke the state of emergency or national security as a motivation to suspend or limit fundamental human rights. The fight against COVID-19 can be a pretext for restricting civil liberties.
Space control is essential, given the heavy reliance on space systems and the rapidly increasing proliferation of missile technology and counterspace systems. Emerging disruptive technologies are game-changing and will determine the conflicts and the geopolitical scenario of next decades. Hypersonic weapons are changing the character of war, will play a huge role in the global power balance by undermining core pillars of geopolitics such as geography and technological power.
Like a time machine, global defense and security concerns take us back to the time of the Strategic Defense Initiative - known as "Star Wars Program" - the satellites and space-based missile system established by the U.S. on the eve of the end of the Cold War, intended to protect the country from attack by Soviet ballistic strategic nuclear weapons. This missile shield programme was designed to render nuclear weapons obsolete, but it appears to have failed. Space has been elevated by the U.S. and NATO to warfighting domain and has already been militarized by Russia and raising China. So far, the international community failed to reach a solution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Space war is no more a science-fiction scenario; it’s an emerging reality.
This presentation aims to shed light on the hazard of an outer space which is not governed by any rules and tackles the challenges coming from the militarization of this operational domain. The question is how to avoid a star war in Outer Space and to prevent a conflict on Earth from the above?
Well-established and reputable dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster, Britannica, Collins, Oxford, Cambridge, Longman, and Macmillan provide similar definitions of the term "security": safety; safety from attack, harm, or damage; freedom from danger or threat; freedom from fear or anxiety; being safe and free from worry; being protected or safe from harm. Security is the protection from, or resilience against, the potential harm caused by others by restricting one's freedom to act.
In addition to these definitions, some of which are more focused on the person and his concerns and fears, there is a more comprehensive idea that incorporates the term “defence”. The definitions given by several dictionaries in this respect are pertinent. Therefore, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, security is the "protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries". A similar definition is provided by the Oxford Dictionary: "the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage". On the same line, Longman says: "things that are done to keep a person, building, or country safe from danger or crime". These definitions show how the nature of the concept of security is changing, incorporating that of defence into much broader domains than the military realm.
The term "defence", is given as a synonym of "security" by the majority of these dictionaries (Merriam-Webster, Cambridge, Oxford, Collins), even though Britannica and Macmillan continue to be anchored to the dichotomy of defence/external and security/internal, respectively, by providing the words "national security" and "internal security", is evidence of this trend.
The evolving concept of security must be scrutinised, with special attention paid to the notion of human security, boosted by UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, and currently under investigation by the Exploratory Team of the NATO Science and Technology Organization.
Well-established and reputable dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster, Britannica, Collins, Oxford, Cambridge, Longman, and Macmillan provide similar definitions of the term "security": safety; safety from attack, harm, or damage; freedom from danger or threat; freedom from fear or anxiety; being safe and free from worry; being protected or safe from harm. Security is the protection from, or resilience against, the potential harm caused by others by restricting one's freedom to act.
In addition to these definitions, some of which are more focused on the person and his concerns and fears, there is a more comprehensive idea that incorporates the term “defence”. The definitions given by several dictionaries in this respect are pertinent. Therefore, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, security is the "protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries". A similar definition is provided by the Oxford Dictionary: "the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage". On the same line, Longman says: "things that are done to keep a person, building, or country safe from danger or crime". These definitions show how the nature of the concept of security is changing, incorporating that of defence into much broader domains than the military realm.
The term "defence", is given as a synonym of "security" by the majority of these dictionaries (Merriam-Webster, Cambridge, Oxford, Collins), even though Britannica and Macmillan continue to be anchored to the dichotomy of defence/external and security/internal, respectively, by providing the words "national security" and "internal security", is evidence of this trend.
The evolving concept of security must be scrutinised, with special attention paid to the notion of human security, boosted by UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, and currently under investigation by the Exploratory Team of the NATO Science and Technology Organization.
The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in police forces; supplementary responsibility is vested by statute in specific agencies other than the Ministry of Defense. Military forces may be used to support law enforcement agencies. In emergency situations, the Parliament may authorize the use of the military as a police force on home soil.
Police departments are much larger in major metropolitan areas and much smaller than the average in rural areas, but in catastrophic attacks that affect large areas in several states simultaneously, there will not be enough police officers to do what has to be done. Since lateral reinforcement is not feasible when all adjacent areas are involved, the only source of augmentation for local departments will be from the Armed Forces.
Subsidiary operations of the Amy in support to civil authorities – e.g. military aid in the event of a catastrophe – are one of the ordinary duties of the Army, whose main mission is to ensure security and defense of the territory. Although the readiness of use for the defense of the territory is reduced, the maintenance and development of this important primary mission is to guard the long-term, in anticipation of events imponderables in the military and security policy.
In Western liberal-democracies the executive power is limited in the use of the military in domestic security operations because of legal norms. Police is in charge of internal security, with the Army acting as ‘reinforcing force’ only in conjunction with the first. Subsidiary operations of the Army in the field of homeland security have increased over the past few years and in many countries is currently underway a political debate to evaluate the allocation of the Army direct powers in policing. It is a political decision, which must take into account both the changing environment in which the Armed Forces operate and the threat of international terrorism manifested in disruptive manner at the beginning of the new millennium. Legislative and cultural obstacles should be overcome to achieve this goal.
1) Westphalian Sovereignty
Result of: Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648) Catholic states v. Protestant states in western and central Europe
Based on: Peace of Westphalia (Treaties of Osnabruck and Munster).
2) Concert of Europe (Vienna System)
Result of: Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815).
Based on: Congress of Vienna (1815).
3) Versailles-Washington System
Result of: World War I (1914-1918).
Based on: Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919) and Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922).
4) Yalta-Potsdam World Order
Result of: World War II (1939-1945).
Based on: Yalta Conference (February 1945) and Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945).
5) Modern System of International Relations
Result of: Cold War’s end and dissolution of USSR and Warsaw Pact (1991).
Since the cyber has been recognized by NATO as a domain of operations (July 2016), and the Alliance has approved the first-ever space policy (June 2019) – a step towards the acknowledgment of space as a warfighting domain, as President Trump has officially characterized it (August 2019) – the doctrine has speeded the integration of all domains (Marsili, 2019a).
The concept of cross-domain operations is not new, but multi-domain has increased in popularity over the past decade as military services, those of the US, inter alia, have sought to codify their approach to warfare beyond the traditional confines of land, sea, and air (Marsili, 2019; Reilly, 2019, p. 16). What they are committed to are converging military capabilities across the joint force with continuous integration across multiple domains (Marsili, 2019a; Townsend, 2019, p. 29).
The discussion about ‘Multi-Domain Operations’ (MDO), i.e. how operations are conducted in time and space with synchronization of the other domains, has been stimulated since new domains such as the cyber and space have emerged next to the traditional domains of air, land and sea — emerging and disruptive technologies have further complicated the operational environment (OE).
We then moved quickly from a concept of cross-domain to multi-domain (Marsili, 2019), without the time to define any of the new domains — neither of the classic domains. Rather, the doctrine does not provide us with any definition of the basic term ‘domain’, and this further complicates the scenario. Before coming to a definition of ‘Multi-Domain Operations’, it is necessary to define, not only the correlation between domains, but also the same non-traditional domains (Marsili, 2019).
The battlefield has become undefined, and virtually unlimited (Marsili, 2019b, p. 191). The high-tech evolution of warfare – artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), lethal and non-lethal unmanned systems, lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), quantum computing and big data, to name a few – imposes the need to operate across all domains (Marsili, 2019). Not yet defined the basic term ‘domain’, as well as the new domains added to the traditional ones, we are asking what’s after joint. It is like making a double somersault pike with screwing immediately after learning leapfrogging.
While the doctrine can define more or less easily these concepts, the question of their legal definition it has yet to be addressed and fixed (Marsili, 2019ab). It is no small matter, as it comes to adapting the doctrine to current public international law, or to modify the latter to fit the first — in this case, the problem would be very difficult to solve.Positive and customary international law – multilateral and bilateral treaties, the law of war, international humanitarian law (IHL) – are put to the test in this challenge (Marsili, 2018).
Given the complexity of modern warfare, the field of hybrid and asymmetric conflicts expands dramatically, and it should be limited by setting a threshold (Väljataga, 2018; Marsili, 2019a). Rules are necessary to impose legal limits on the use of lethal force, to avoid an escalation, and to protect civilians (Marsili, 2019a; 2019b). Moreover, while the space domain involves only the states, given the necessary capabilities, other domains – e.g., the cyber, the information, and the EMS –are accessible also to non-state entities, such as insurgents and terrorist groups, and this poses further ethical and legal questions that should be timely addressed by the international community (Marsili, 2019a; 2019b).
New concepts of operation, fuelled by technological advances, have facilitated interconnectivity across different domains of warfare (Marsili 2019; Canovas, 2019, p. 47). It’s not only the capacity to integrate and operate in all domains simultaneously to get the greatest advantage possible against adversaries. The two camps – the western one of the US-led NATO, and that of the adversaries, firstly China and Russia – seek to derive mutual benefit from the absence of standards and legally binding norms.
The North Atlantic Alliance is also focused on developments in the field of automation, in the integration of AI and the design of unmanned vehicles capable of operating in multiple domains, and in technological convergence, i.e. the integration of multiple research fields in the identification of the solution to a technological challenge (Marsili, 2019). Therefore, domain integration is an exceptionally tricky issue that poses challenges on several layers: technological, legal, political, military, operational, strategic, tactical (Marsili, 2019).
The purpose of this contribution is not to address the strategic and/or tactical implications of these concepts to the battlespace, which this paper does not provide any, rather than turning on a light on the risks posed by the lack of standard definitions (Marsili, 2019ab).
This also calls into question the traditional division between civil and military, that is between combatants and non-combatants, and the consequent application of international law (Marsili, 2018; 2019a; 2019b). Therefore, it’s not only a holistic view of the OE, that should be explored, but also the ethical and legal implications should be taken into account (Marsili, 2018; 2019a; 2019b).
Political and military leaders are mainly focuses on the development of strategic and tactical concepts, and they neglect the importance of a binding legal framework — this leaves hands free. The liaison between political and operational levels in decision-making process requires that the norms be well defined, also to ensure accountability (Marsili, 2019a). This paper aims to raise questions that could be useful to policymakers and military leaders to open up political space to get deals done.
The EU represents one in a series of efforts to integrate Europe since World War II, and to achieve, inter alia, diplomatic stability and military security. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), that was renamed European Communities (EC) by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. A series of further international treaties and treaty revisions based largely on this model led eventually to the creation of the EU.
In the early 1970s the European Political Cooperation (EPC; renamed the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Maastricht Treaty), consisting of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of each country, was established to coordinate foreign policy.
As part of the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, members undertook to define and implement common foreign and security policies. Members agreed that, where possible, they would adopt common defense policies, which would be implemented through the Western European Union (WEU), a security organization that included many EU members.
The WEU, that run from 1955 until 2011, was made up of 10countries, and operated as a forum for the coordination of matters of European security and defense. The WEU became the primary defense institution of the EU in the 1990s, though it gave up that role in 2001. The assembly of the WEU consisted of the delegates of the member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). The Council of Europe (CoE) is an older and wider circle of nations than the 28-member European Union —it includes, for example, Russia and Turkey among its member states.
The WEU contributed to the creation of the NATO and worked in cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance. NATO and the EU currently have 22 member countries in common. Relations between NATO and the EU were institutionalized in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defense matters. The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP) set out the political principles underlying the relationship and reaffirmed EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for the EU’s own military operations.
Finally, in 2007 the Lisbon Treaty consolidatedforeign policy representation for the EU. Since the LisbonTreaty entered into force in 2009, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the chiefcoordinatorand representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and ex officio a Vice-President of the European Commission.
Presenting the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, then Secretary-General of the Council of the EU/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, stated: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”. No statement was more wrong.
All EU member states are at the same time participating States of the Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization, established in 1973 as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and renamed OSCE in 1995. Since the beginning, the EC, and, since 1993, the EU have played a vital role in the work of the OSCE. Over the years, the scope of co-operation between the OSCE and the EU has both broadened and deepened, following development of the CFSP, and the launch of the first EU crisis management operations under the European Security and DefencePolicy (CSDP), the EU course of action in the fields of defense and crisis management, and a main component of the CFSP.
Through the European NeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP), that applies to Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine, the EU aims to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of all. The ENP includes ten Mediterranean countries, six post-Soviet states, and Western Balkan countries.
European Border Conflicts Timeline
Regional conflicts that occurred at the doors of the EU since the end of WorldWar II:
Israeli–Palestinian conflict (1948-present)
Cyprus conflict(1974-present)
Post-Soviet conflicts— Georgia, Armenia, and Russia (1990-present)
Post-Soviet ‘FrozenConflicts’— Transnistria (Moldova), Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossethia( Georgia) (1991-present)
Yugoslav Wars— Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo(1991-2001)
Chechen Wars (1994-1996; 1999-2000)
Kosovo War (1998-1999)
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia(1999)
Turkey’s authoritarian turn (2002-present)
War in Ingushetia (2007-2015)
Independence of Kosovo (2008)
Russian-GeorgianWar (2008)
Insurgency in the North Caucasus (2009-2017)
Arab Springs (2010-2012)
Libyan Civil War (2011-present)
Syria Civil War (2011-present)
Egyptian coup d'état (2013)
Donbass Conflict in East Ukraine (2014-present)
Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation (2014)
The EU: a Global or a Vain and Weak-Willed Actor?
Alongside non-international and international conflicts, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflicts which involve state and non-state actors such as insurgents and terrorists. Unconventional conflicts are among the trend topics of defense and security, and they pose a threat to the stability of international order. Hybrid conflicts, involving state and non-state actors, characterize the post ColdWar era. These conflicts challenge the ability of international organizations to address them, and so far the EU was unable to settle them.
Afterthe breakup of Yugoslavia(1990-1992) NATO started a military campaign in Kosovo and bombed Yugoslavia(1999). The independence of Kosovo is not recognized by all EU members: to date, 23 of the 28 member states recognize the authority of Pristina.13Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece do not recognize Kosovo's independence, and, as a result, the EU itself refers only to ‘Kosovo’.
In 1992 The OSCE established the Minsk Group to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine (Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the OSCE) is seeking he peaceful settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine (i.e.,the Donbass).
Conclusions
Since it was created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU is facing difficulties in addressing and settle crisis. So far, the EU proved unable to solve alone the conflicts that have arisen at its doors, with the long time running Israeli–Palestinian and Cyprus issue still unfixed.
Other international organizations –i.e., NATO and OSCE–intervened to resolve some of these conflicts. Despite the overlap of some of these organizations, that share theirs members with the EU, the Union is not able to achieve an ownership in the field of peace, stability and security at its borders, and and his claim to be a global actor proves weak-willed.
It would be useful to investigate the reasons for this incapacity: lack of a real and exclusive autonomy in matters of foreign policy; lack of a European army; subjection to US-led NATO; national interest of EU member states.
The issue is how current international law applies or can be adapted to these conflicts. There are some questions to be fixed. First, we should find whether new rules are required to deal with situations of hybrid conflict, or if current rules are still valid and can be used/adapted. Secondly, we should determine whether IHL applies in transnational armed conflict against non-state groups, and if their members cease to be targetable during a pause in their active involvement, and whether there can be a non-international armed conflict which has no finite territorial boundaries with a non-state armed group operating transnationally. Lastly, we should assess whether attacks carried out by a transnational organisations and its affiliates meet the criteria of qualifying as a state of armed conflict under IHL.
Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy.
After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS.
Well-established and reputable dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster, Britannica, Collins, Oxford, Cambridge, Longman, and Macmillan provide similar definitions of the term "security": safety; safety from attack, harm, or damage; freedom from danger or threat; freedom from fear or anxiety; being safe and free from worry; being protected or safe from harm. Security is the protection from, or resilience against, the potential harm caused by others by restricting one's freedom to act.
In addition to these definitions, some of which are more focused on the person and his concerns and fears, there is a more comprehensive idea that incorporates the term “defence”. The definitions given by several dictionaries in this respect are pertinent. Therefore, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, security is the "protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries". A similar definition is provided by the Oxford Dictionary: "the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage". On the same line, Longman says: "things that are done to keep a person, building, or country safe from danger or crime". These definitions show how the nature of the concept of security is changing, incorporating that of defence into much broader domains than the military realm.
The term "defence", is given as a synonym of "security" by the majority of these dictionaries (Merriam-Webster, Cambridge, Oxford, Collins), even though Britannica and Macmillan continue to be anchored to the dichotomy of defence/external and security/internal, respectively, by providing the words "national security" and "internal security", is evidence of this trend.
The evolving concept of security must be scrutinised, with special attention paid to the notion of human security, boosted by UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, and currently under investigation by the Exploratory Team of the NATO Science and Technology Organization.
To avoid the militarization of space and celestial bodies, and to guarantee their exploration and use for peaceful purposes to all countries, in 1967 the US, the U.K. and the Soviet Union opened for signature the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which has become customary international law (White, 2000). The Outer Space Treaty forbids from placing in Earth orbit weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, or otherwise stationing them in outer space, but does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons, and thus some highly destructive attack strategies such as kinetic bombardment are still potentially allowable (Bourbonniere & Lee, 2007).
Since 1984, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body established by the UN General, has considered proposals, including draft treaties, aimed at preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. In 1998 Russia and China proposed a Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). An amended text drafted in 2014 was rejected by the US because it failed to address a series of relevant issues: it did not provide a definition of "outer space" neither of what constitutes a "weapon in outer space", and it did not ban terrestrially-based ASAT systems launched from the ground (CD, 2014; UNGA GA/DIS/3591; Plath, 2018).
The US refused to negotiate a Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) treaty as an international legally binding instrument in the CD, as Washington gathers that it simply mirrored the PPWT, including its failures. Therefore, the US voted against the Russian's No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (NFP) resolution (UNGA, A/C.1/72/L.53). So far, the international community failed to reach a solution to prevent an arms race in outer space. Space war is no more a science-fiction scenario; it’s an emerging reality.
Although Russia is well-known for its information capabilities—whether propaganda, disinformation, or counter-information—the Kremlin appears to have overestimated its ability to wage effective information operations or underestimated the impact of Western brainwashing on public opinion. In addition, the Ukrainian leadership has effectively managed to counter the grounds on which the Russian government has supported its "special military operation." Ukrainian President Zelensky gained the trust, sympathy, and solidarity of Western leaders, the media, and public opinion, presenting his country as the victim of an unjustified aggression. On the other hand, Russian President Putin, excluded from the public debate due to the European Union ban on Russian media, was perceived by the same audience as a gangster. Is this the whole truth, or is there something more beyond the mainstream narrative? This paper aims to offer a factual analysis and a different perspective from the mainstream narrative supported and spread by Western governments and biased media outlets.
The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in police forces; supplementary responsibility is vested by statute in specific agencies other than the Ministry of Defense. Military forces may be used to support law enforcement agencies. In emergency situations, the Parliament may authorize the use of the military as a police force on home soil.
Police departments are much larger in major metropolitan areas and much smaller than the average in rural areas, but in catastrophic attacks that affect large areas in several states simultaneously, there will not be enough police officers to do what has to be done. Since lateral reinforcement is not feasible when all adjacent areas are involved, the only source of augmentation for local departments will be from the Armed Forces.
Subsidiary operations of the Amy in support to civil authorities – e.g. military aid in the event of a catastrophe – are one of the ordinary duties of the Army, whose main mission is to ensure security and defense of the territory. Although the readiness of use for the defense of the territory is reduced, the maintenance and development of this important primary mission is to guard the long-term, in anticipation of events imponderables in the military and security policy.
In Western liberal-democracies the executive power is limited in the use of the military in domestic security operations because of legal norms. Police is in charge of internal security, with the Army acting as ‘reinforcing force’ only in conjunction with the first. Subsidiary operations of the Army in the field of homeland security have increased over the past few years and in many countries is currently underway a political debate to evaluate the allocation of the Army direct powers in policing. It is a political decision, which must take into account both the changing environment in which the Armed Forces operate and the threat of international terrorism manifested in disruptive manner at the beginning of the new millennium. Legislative and cultural obstacles should be overcome to achieve this goal.
The Rome treaty, which essentially codifies customary jus cogens war crimes, allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party countries if the crime is committed in the territory of a party country. The U.S., which inspired the ICC, signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, and therefore has no legal obligations arising from such signature. Since 1998, the U.S. has declined to join the ICC because its broad powers could pursue "politically motivated prosecutions of Americans", thus posing a threat to U.S. sovereignty.
When in January 2015, after the State of Palestine accessed the Rome Statute, the ICC opened an investigation for alleged war crimes committed by Israel – which is not a member of ICC – the U.S. sided with the government of Tel Aviv and began undermining the credibility of the Court. In fall 2016 South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia withdrew from the ICC, accusing it to be an instrument of political pressure of Western powers – The Gambia and South Africa revoked their decision in 2017. In November 2016 Russia, which has never ratified the Statute, withdrew all support for the ICC after its prosecutors said Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol “amounts to an ongoing state of occupation”. When, in November 2017, the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor opened an investigation on alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan by U.S. military and civilian personnel, the U.S. stepped up efforts to de-legitimize the ICC. The U.S. stated that it wants to continue to exercise domestic jurisdiction over its nationals charged by the ICC for war crimes, thus removing them from international justice. Finally, the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute in March 2018, soon after the ICC began investigating whether President Rodrigo Duterte committed crimes against humanity in his drug crackdown.
By weakening international justice institutions such as the ICC, we will return to a multilateral justice, or to the law of the strongest. Justice and law, to become universal values, must be applied anytime and everywhere without being bent to the interests of the strongest. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
The impact of information and communication on civilian/military maritime operations should be addressed in a social and political perspective.
The success of communication, both indoor and outdoor, is essential for achieving goals. A fully informed and favorable outdoor and indoor environment supports and facilitates the achievement of military objectives.
Communication must be multimedia, multiplatform and multilevel.
Communication to be strength, must represent information in a simply and clear way through short text elements integrated with interactive visual representations: they capture at best the audience attention, without compromising the efficacy of the information content to be transmitted.
Online availability through user-friendly and intuitive interface, enabling a positive user experience, is strongly recommended. Language should be natural for not military audience, and glossary should be available. Information should be manually categorized for not military audience.
Communication results should be measured through a validation and verification process.
The lines between conventional and unconventional conflicts become blurred. Alongside non-international and international conflicts, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflicts which involve state and non-state actors whose legal status and classification is disputed.[1] While it’s a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian; conventional and unconventional. Hybrid warfare was linked almost exclusively with non-state actors. Afterwards the concept of hybrid warfare developed in a way that is now commonly accepted to describe the interplay between conventional and unconventional means used also by governments and regular armies.
For such emerging conflicts/warfare there is no legal definition, therefore leaving room for interpretation and applicable law. International law (IL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) – in particular the law of war (Geneva and Hague law) – apply in case of armed conflict. The law of war, a branch of public international law, sets the acceptable justifications to engage in war (jus ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello). The law of war regulates inter alia: declaration of war; acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality; and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering.
Research problem and question investigated
The research aims to investigate whether and how current international customary[2] and treaty law applies to unconventional conflicts that characterize the 21st century. The study investigates whether new rules are required, or if current rules are still valid and can be used/adapted.
The research aims to check whether and to what extent states abide IL/IHL in dealing with unconventional conflicts, or if, through their course of conduct, states are attempting to create new customary law, or to adapt the existing instruments to the challenges that unconventional conflicts pose. The study investigates also whether these conducts abide customary IL and peremptory norms (jus cogens), that are not consent-based, but still are obligatory upon state and non-state actors.
The research has the purpose to contribute to develop solutions for the global challenges of today and tomorrow by understanding the present and imaging future scenarios.
Basic design of the study, including sources and methods
The research topic involves main cross-cutting issues (the rule of law, fundamental human rights and ethical principles) and therefore requires an interdisciplinary approach: history, political science, political philosophy, sociology, law, ethics.
The research requires an empirical, positivist framework that rests on qualitative data analysis.[3] Although in complicated legal systems no ultimate distinction can be made between legal and moral standards, as positivism insists, socio-legal theory offers a contrasting/complementary perspective that will be useful in a global study like this. The research is conducted applying the concept of triangulation, which combines different methods (exploratory, descriptive and analytical) and fits to qualitative studies.
The specific nature of the methodology employed in this study is reflected in its structure, which is divided into two principal parts. The first part considers the theoretical elements, definitions and current research. The second part analyzes the legal aspects of some case studies and nests them within the broader discussion on the applicable law, starting from an analysis based on three pillars: historical, theoretical-conceptual and legal (in the light of IL/IHL).
To answer the starting question, the research moves from a historical-documentary analysis, then takes into consideration the literature and eventually focuses on some case studies of the post Cold War era: NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999); Gulf War (1990); Iraq War (2003); invasion of Afghanistan (2001); Syrian conflict (2011); the War on Terror (2001).
At first stage the study explores the theoretical elements: literature and legal framework. The legal framework consists of customary IL/IHL; international instruments (conventions and treaties); documents produced by relevant UN international agencies, bodies and entities; rulings of relevant supranational courts and international tribunals. Then an empirical analysis based on these tools checks the compliance of some case studies with current IL/IHL. Under most circumstances, an analysis of this type requires an empirical, positivist framework that rests on either a qualitative or quantitative data analysis.
Major findings
The approach to warfare in political and legal discourse changed dramatically over the last fifty years and left significant room for free interpretation by policymakers and military leaders. Current rules are applied partially (and with difficulty) in situations that go beyond the rigid classifications established by international conventions and customary law. International law, in particular IHL, is good as long as it dealt with conventional conflict, or with civil war within a single country, but it shows its limits when faced with hybrid conflict. However, current rules may be sufficient to manage unconventional conflicts, but must be strictly respected and applied by all actors. Some governments and international organizations such as the NATO face difficulty using the tools currently available and therefore attempt to overtake IL/IHL by adopting a course of conduct to change de facto current legal framework through customary law. The nature and the scope of IL makes it easy for states to escape from their obligations, in the absence of mandatory constraints and of an effective sanctioning mechanism.
Lastly, lexicon and definition of terms are essential, and the international community should find common, undisputed and unambiguous legal formulations for terms such as: conventional/unconventional; traditional/non-traditional; kinetic/non-kinetic; lethal/non-lethal.
Interpretations and conclusions
This research does not rest on pre-defined hypotheses, but rather relies on the ability to divulge meaning from different elements of research without being bound by pre-existing limitations. While this presents a serious challenge, it does open much room for possible explorations of new fields of research without necessitating a fixed point of departure – or arrival. Findings and conclusions are to be considered provisional.
Acknowledgment
This study received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018. The participation in this conference was funded by the Military University Institute (IUM), Armed Forces General Staff (EMGFA), Ministry of National Defence (MDN), Portugal.
Disclaimer
This abstract is published open access under the CC BY 4.0 license in the FNDU institutional repository "Doria"at with URN http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2020110489302 at https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/178092.
[1] For a definition of the term hybrid conflict, see: Gray, C.S. (2005). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
[2] For a discussion, see: Bederman, D.J. (2004). International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge University Press.
[3] For a definition of research methods cited: Given, L.M. (ed.) (2008). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods Vol. 1&2. Los Angeles/London: SAGE.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, non-state actors and hybrid threats emerged as the major challenges to international security. NATO is evolving in response to new strategic reality, and terrorism and weak states are among the most pressing challenges the Alliance faces. NATO is playing an increasingly important role in crisis management and peacekeeping.
Since the African Union was established in 2001 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity, it faces difficulties in achieving the African ownership in peace and security. The chronic lack of funding and of appropriate military resources, makes the African Union depending on external aid – NATO provides military support, while the EU provides money. NATO cooperates with the AU since 2005, and all NATO-AU activities are coordinated with the EU.
The NATO-EU partnership is complementar and mutual, and is based on common values and strategic interests, and should be strengthened to secure the European southern border, and to guarantee security in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, stronger and permanent NATO-EU partnership in Africa would be desirable. This brief paper investigates the ties between these three organizations, and suggests some recommendations to improve the 'trilateral' relationship to ensure security to their member states.
The impact of conflicts on the civil population is the authors' greatest concern. Civilians have always been the innocent victims of every war, but, although protected by the Geneva Conventions, they have become the subject of indiscriminate attacks since 1945 (e.g. the allied bombing of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
At the core of this work, there is the change in the type of warfare. It is a thorny issue, which would require a discussion of what is meant by terrorism and whether and when guerrilla warfare is to be considered a legitimate tactic by insurgents – guerrilla was categorized as "terrorism" from a certain point in time. Today everything from political opponents to hybrid conflicts and even organized crime is "terrorism".
Originally, terrorism was an offshoot guerrilla military tactic employed by resistance groups. Early examples of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare can be traced back to the Túpac Amaru indigenous uprising in highland Peru against Spanish control in the 1780s and in the Caste War in the Yucatán peninsula of Mexico in the 1840s and 1850s (Castro, 1999).
From the fifties onwards, in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, insurgency in Latin America was grounded on Marxist-Leninist ideology, and characterized by the use of a variety of violent and nonviolent tactics, including terror, to overthrow governments with guerrilla warfare (Debray, 1967). This phenomenon, previously classified as "insurgency" and/or "guerrilla", was then rebranded "terrorism".
The meaning of terrorism has changed over time. Since the early sixties the term has often been used in a political sense to label national liberation movements in Africa and later in Latin America. It took hold as an instrument in political struggles against governments in the U.S. and Europe, and finally has been identified with the Islamic world.
Any violence can be terrorism, or anti-terrorism. Legitimate defence or aggressive attacks are semantics that depend on the arbitrary judgment of the involved parties. This, by definition, defeats the concept of justice and legality. Terrorism is an effective method of conflict because it is limited in scope, targeted against civilians, and almost impossible to eradicate. This isolates it from the traditional military applications, and by extension, from the same legal and judicial argumentation. However, there are cases where terrorists were those who defended their land from invaders, and the invaders were the ones who marked them as terrorists. There needs to be a clear division between what is and what is not terrorism, and only then will it be possible to clearly define the terms and the scope of conflict against those who are terrorists.
The words "terrorist" and "terrorism" became fluid terms, easy to be manipulated. Today everything, from political opponents to hybrid conflicts and even organized crime, can be construed as terrorism. The very concept of terrorism has changed since the word has a political meaning. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish ‘true’ terrorists from those who are political opponents or just common criminals. Terrorism has become an umbrella term encompassing criminals and political opponents. It seems that the problem in labelling acts as terrorism is not what is done, but who does it. Klabbers (2003, p. 300-1) argues that "today's terrorist is tomorrow's freedom fighter", due to the "state-centric nature of international law" and to the "sheer supremacy of politics over law".
The authors correctly frame the international, transnational and hybrid nature of terrorism, as well as its various purposes, whether purely criminal, or political. The limitation of this approach is that the hypothesis that terrorism can also have a state matrix, as demonstrated by several parts, is not taken into consideration at all – this is especially true regarding the recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, undertaken in the name of the "War on Terror".
There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, none of them tackle the problem of state terrorism. Currently the term ‘terrorism’ is commonly used to describe acts committed by non-state or subnational entities, thereby excluding acts committed by lawful governments – it allows those who determine the merit of inclusion the ultimate decision-making power, and there is no accountability, and no oversight of these decisions. Those who pursue these tactics are not persecuted, nor are their methods questioned thoroughly. It would be appropriate to develop a definition of terrorism that would encompass the possibility of a pseudo-state led by terrorists, and the appropriate response in case of a conflict with such a state (e.g. ISIS).
Bockstette (2008, p. 8) wrote that terrorism is "political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimisation and destruction of non-combatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols)". Deeming that terror acts are performed by "an illicit clandestine organisation", he excludes their being carried out by a government or its agents. In his definition we perceive Bockstette's typically military vision, which makes a distinction between tactics ("short-and midterm political goals") and strategy ("desired long-term end states").
Through the ten chapters of this book, are analysed conflicts that occurred in the last twenty years in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and in the Philippines, establishing a relationship between rebels, governments and civilians. The authors conclude that ‘conventional military methods’ might succeed but undermine lasting peace.
In my opinion, the difference between conventional/unconventional – both legally undefined terms – seems to be outdated. A knife, a broken bottle neck (if it cuts your jugular), even a fork, a hammer, a baseball bat, or a stone – according to the biblical story David kills Goliath by hurling a stone from his sling and hitting him in the centre of forehead – are all unconventional and potentially lethal weapons. Nevertheless, distinguishing between weapons, their effect and consequence, is necessary in order to avoid a cascade effect and undesirable outcomes (i.e., civil casualties).
Practitioners and researchers will find this publication useful, as it provides a comprehensive case study of the main conflicts that have occurred in the last twenty years. Small Wars, Big Data does not come to general conclusions, but it’s instead a compilation of stories and lessons learned, that could be useful to policymakers and military leaders to ‘open up political space to get deals done’; this is the strong point of the book.
The law of war or international (humanitarian) law, i.e. theGeneva and Hague Conventions, is a branch of public international law that sets the acceptable justifications to engage in war (ius ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (ius in bello). Some principles of customary law became peremptorynorms of jus cogens, a "formal" source of internationallaw that apply erga omnes. Any existing treaty which isin conflict with these norms becomes void and terminates.