Papers by Gustavo de Azevedo
SKÉPSIS, 2017
My idea here is to offer a version of epistemic contextualism which could be able to answer the s... more My idea here is to offer a version of epistemic contextualism which could be able to answer the skeptical doubts. More precisely, we believe we can combine the theories of DeRose (1992) and Feldman (1988, 2004) in order to invert the burden of proof for the skeptical side. That is, what I call rule of reasonableness requires that the skeptic has to provide reasons why we should take their doubt into account, what I am calling here 'relevant alternative'. Thus, I claim that two clauses need to be reached, in order to such doubt be taken into account, namely, (i) S has evidence to believe R; and (ii) given the contextual standards of justification to which S is submitted, it is required that the possibility of R occurs remains excluded.
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Papers by Gustavo de Azevedo