Huihua Nie

Renmin University of China, School of Economics, Faculty Member

Renmin University of China, National Academy of Development and Strategy, Deputy Dean

Renmin University of China, Center for Firms and Organizations Studies, Deputy Director

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Address: 59 Zhongguancun St, Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China

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Remo Caponi

University of Cologne

Mindy ChenWishart

University of Oxford

Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

Kerry Brown

King's College London

Peter G Klein

Baylor University

Tamas Matura

Corvinus University of Budapest

Mauro Grondona

University of Genova

Heidi Jane Smith

Universidad Iberoamericana - Mexico

André Bueno

UERJ - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Rio de Janeiro State University

Suman Paul

Presidency University, Bengaluru

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Papers by Huihua Nie

Customer Concentration and Stock Price Crash Risk

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

We investigate whether the presence of major corporate customers, one of the most important firm ... more We investigate whether the presence of major corporate customers, one of the most important firm stakeholders, affect firm stock price crash risk. Using data on a large sample of U.S. firms from 1979 to 2014, we find that customer concentration is significantly and positively associated with future stock price crash risk. The results hold in various robustness checks and endogeneity tests. This positive association is primarily driven by suppliers in the durable goods sector and is attenuated among firms that report high R&D expenses. Finally, we find that firms with a higher degree of customer concentration are more likely to disclose unexpected very bad news. Overall, our findings suggest that the presence of major customers imposes performance pressure on managers, which induces them to hoard bad news. Once a tipping point has been reached, the bad news is released all at once, leading to a stock price crash.

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Subjective perception of economic policy uncertainty and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

International Review of Financial Analysis

Changes in the Theory of Incomplete Contract

Teaching and Research, 2011

The paper generalized three defects of the first version of the incomplete contract theory,namely... more The paper generalized three defects of the first version of the incomplete contract theory,namely,not well-grounded theoretical foundation,too much reliance on specific investment,and inability to explain authorization.The controversies among the academics in the world over the theoretical foundation of the incomplete contract theory were introduced.The paper pointed out that these controversial views had led to the induction of elements of behavior economics and experimental economics.Thus,the second version of the theory was established on the basis of the reference point effect.At the end of the paper,research topics concerning this theory were suggested and application prospects of this theory in China were predicted.

Team Production,Collective Reputation and Sharing Rule

China Economic Quarterly, 2010

Collective action is one of the core issues in the theory of contract and organization,but the pr... more Collective action is one of the core issues in the theory of contract and organization,but the problem of free-riding or moral hazard in team has no easy solution. This paper offers a new approach to solve the moral hazard problem in team. In order to send out a good signal in the market,a team will choose a higher level of joint effort than in a static game,which improves the collective reputation. The gain from the collective reputation reimburses the team for the efficient loss due to free-riding problem,and thus alleviates the conflict between balanced budget constraint and incentive compatibility constraint. This paper shows that when the rent from collective reputation is large enough,different kinds of teams may cooperate to some extent,as long as there is a proper interior sharing rule or ownership arrangement.

Collusions between Governments and Firms and Economic Development

China Economic Quarterly, 2007

We argue that it is the collusion between local governments and firms that leads to both high rat... more

The Optimal Agricultural Contracts and the Models of Agricultural Industrialization in China

China Economic Quarterly, 2013

Within a unified framework of relational contracts, this article compares the allocation efficien... more Within a unified framework of relational contracts, this article compares the allocation efficiency of three industrialization models ("farmers in market", "leading firms plus farmers", and "leading firms plus farms") and their derivatives under one or multiple periods. It also analyzes the effects of ownership, reputation, pledge, and risk attitude on optimal agricultural contracts. It is shown that under one-period contracts all the models cannot achieve the first-best efficiency due to contractual completeness and hold-up effect. Under relational contracts both "leading firm plus farmer" and "leading firm plus farm" models can achieve the first-best efficiency if the discount factor is high enough. "Leading firms plus farms" is better than "leading firms plus farmers" if the market prices are highly fluctuating. This article also discusses the influence of farmers' resale costs on contractual efficiency.

Amalgamation of the Firm and the Market

China Industrial Economy, 2004

The new trend of modern economic organization is that the firm and the market amalgamate each oth... more The new trend of modern economic organization is that the firm and the market amalgamate each other. On the one hand, the firm absorbs the comparative advantage of the market by substituting hierarchy with market mechanism at the level of operation and substituting administrative coordination with integration of modularity at the level of strategy, which is the amalgamation of authority and price mechanism; on the other hand, the market absorbs the comparative advantage of the firm, inducting hierarchy in management to improve transaction efficiency.In a word, the firm and the market incorporate each other and they are the networks based on modularity.

The Divarication and Amalgamation of Incomplete Contracting Theory of New Institutional Economics

Journal of Renmin University of China, 2005

This paper summarizes Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Property Rights Theory (PRT) which bot... more This paper summarizes Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Property Rights Theory (PRT) which both are branches of Incomplete Contracting Theory of New Institutional Economics. TCE and PRT share the common base in bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity, but have distinct difference in emphasis and method to solve the contractual incompleteness. TCE mainly attributes the transaction cost of contractual incompleteness to ex post disorder, hence emphasize ex post adaptive governance; con-trarily, PRT mainly attributes to ex ante inadequate incentive of specific investment and therefore ex ante incentive mechanism. In future, TCE and PRT will be well amalgamated if there is the model based on bounded rationality.

A New Economic Interpretation of the High Housing Price in China ——From the Perspective of "Collusion between Local Governments and Enterprises

This paper proposes a new political economics view on the high housing price in China.The authors... more This paper proposes a new political economics view on the high housing price in China.The authors argue that under the pressure of performance evaluation and fiscal expenditure,China's local governments collude with real estate enterprises to push housing price up by controlling land supply and raising house demand with the purpose of obtaining land transfer fees,achieving economic growth,and creating promotion opportunities.The paper refers to the data of housing price in 31 provincial regions in China from 2001 to 2010 as the criteria for measuring the collusion between local governments and real estate enterprises.The data cover the ratio of land transfer fees over public fiscal expenditure,state capital in the real estate industry,and investment on low-income housing.Major affective factors on the housing price are also inspected by considering demand and supply factors.A significant positive correlation is found between the ratio of land transfer fees over public fiscal exp...

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Apr 1, 2012

Institutional Environment of Collusion

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

This chapter attempts to make a research on the institutional environment of collusion so that we... more

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

Can enterprise digitization improve ESG performance?

Economic Modelling

Data from: Public health insurance and pharmaceutical innovation: Evidence from China

The zip file includes datasets and code used for the paper "Public health insurance and phar... more

Collusion and Coalmine Accidents

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

By analyzing the data collected from the Chinese coal industry, this chapter mainly validates tha... more

Reform Prospects of the China Model

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

As the concluding part of the book, this chapter echoes with the initial chapter and discusses th... more As the concluding part of the book, this chapter echoes with the initial chapter and discusses the prospects and outlets for the China model. Section 10.1 insists that the China Model is a synthesis motivated by collusion, benefited by demographic dividend, navigated by export substitution, and expressed by extensive economic growth.

The Impact of Collusion on Social Development

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

This chapter is mainly concerned about the impact of collusion on social development. Our major f... more This chapter is mainly concerned about the impact of collusion on social development. Our major findings are: collusion does harm to supervision by public opinion, immobilizes residential income distribution pattern, hinders the development of social organizations, and increases aggregate cost of reform. Section 8.1 analyzes the relationship between collusion and public supervision; Sect. 8.2 discusses the impact of collusion on residential income distribution; Sect. 8.3 attempts to delve into the relationship between collusion and the development of social organizations; Sect. 8.4 discusses the impact of collusion on the costs of reform; Sect. 8.5 is a summary.

Collusion and House Prices

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

This chapter is mainly concerned with measuring collusion with three measurement indicators: the ... more

The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment

In this chapter and Chaps. 7 and 8, we will discuss various types of social cost (expressed as \(... more In this chapter and Chaps. 7 and 8, we will discuss various types of social cost (expressed as \( {\text{C}} \), see the discussion of collusion model in Chap. 2) as a result of collusion. It is not that we deny possible gains, but that we feel it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of negative costs of various forms of collusion. Undeniably, an analysis of collusion on corporate and governmental behaviors and on social development is conducive to helping the central government make an objective comparison between gains and costs.

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据 [The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China]

Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs)... more Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of these leaders increases with their economic performance measured as growth rate of operating revenue, while the likelihood of demotion decreases with their economic performance; (2) these leaders with CCP central committee member have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (3) these leaders with Ph.D. degree have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (4) compared to growth rate of operating revenue, growth rate of maintaining and increasing the value of state capital has no significant effect on promotion; (5) the compensation linked to position in CSOEs has no impact on leaders’ promotion, which indicates that leaders in CSOEs look more likely government officia...

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Customer Concentration and Stock Price Crash Risk

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

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Subjective perception of economic policy uncertainty and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

International Review of Financial Analysis

Changes in the Theory of Incomplete Contract

Teaching and Research, 2011

Team Production,Collective Reputation and Sharing Rule

China Economic Quarterly, 2010

Collusions between Governments and Firms and Economic Development

China Economic Quarterly, 2007

We argue that it is the collusion between local governments and firms that leads to both high rat... more

The Optimal Agricultural Contracts and the Models of Agricultural Industrialization in China

China Economic Quarterly, 2013

Amalgamation of the Firm and the Market

China Industrial Economy, 2004

The Divarication and Amalgamation of Incomplete Contracting Theory of New Institutional Economics

Journal of Renmin University of China, 2005

A New Economic Interpretation of the High Housing Price in China ——From the Perspective of "Collusion between Local Governments and Enterprises

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Apr 1, 2012

Institutional Environment of Collusion

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

This chapter attempts to make a research on the institutional environment of collusion so that we... more

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

Can enterprise digitization improve ESG performance?

Economic Modelling

Data from: Public health insurance and pharmaceutical innovation: Evidence from China

The zip file includes datasets and code used for the paper "Public health insurance and phar... more

Collusion and Coalmine Accidents

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

By analyzing the data collected from the Chinese coal industry, this chapter mainly validates tha... more

Reform Prospects of the China Model

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

The Impact of Collusion on Social Development

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

Collusion and House Prices

Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China, 2017

This chapter is mainly concerned with measuring collusion with three measurement indicators: the ... more

The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment

“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据 [The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China]

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Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China: A Reflection on the China Model

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and en... more By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production ― a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions ― so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.

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