Papers by theodoros tsakiris
Last publication within the context of the FEUTURE Horizon 2020 research project on the Energy Ge... more Last publication within the context of the FEUTURE Horizon 2020 research project on the Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Very divergent views but important to appear in a synthetic -and at the same time- comparative structure. I authored Chapters 2 and 3.1, Chapter 4.1 titled "The Greek and Greek-Cypriot Perspective" and Chapter 5.3 on Regional Gas Export Options
The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on
their eastern and s... more The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on
their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived
as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is
exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the
Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same
strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining
principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through
the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its
strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an
unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and
uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military
developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about
them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess
how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives
the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of
perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.
The Turkey-Russia-EU energy triangle is a relationship of interdependence and strategic
compromis... more The Turkey-Russia-EU energy triangle is a relationship of interdependence and strategic
compromise. However, Russian support for secessionism and erosion of state autonomy in the
Caucasus and Eurasia has proven difficult to reconcile for western European states despite their
energy dependence. Yet, Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia,
augmenting its position and relevance in a strategic energy relationship with the EU. The
relationship between Ankara and Moscow is principally based on energy security and domestic
business interests, and has largely remained stable in times of regional turmoil. This paper
analyses the dynamics of Ankara-Moscow cooperation in order to understand which of the three
scenarios in EU–Turkey relations – conflict, cooperation or convergence – could be expected to
develop bearing in mind that the partnership between Turkey and Russia has become
unpredictable. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian regional
antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future
scenarios. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with
Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the
“triangle”.
Article Reference: https://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-abstract/28/1/29/1... more Article Reference: https://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article-abstract/28/1/29/1985/Cyprus-s-Natural-Gas-Strategy-Geopolitical-and?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Abstract
Optimism arose about the discovery of Cypriot and Israeli gas reserves and how they might help resolve the Cyprus question, but the prospective monetization of these reserves has not modified Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot behavior vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus, despite Greek-Cypriot hopes.
The gas discoveries were not the principal motivation behind the Greek and Greek-Cypriot attempts to establish a trilateral framework of structured cooperation with Israel and Egypt.
The export of Cypriot gas to Egyptian liquefied natural gas facilities, however, is the only realistic option available to Nicosia that could also have a positive geopolitical impact on the trilateral framework and help reduce European Union gas dependence on Russia, although the reduction would be quite limited in the short to medium term.
The revenues from the monetization of Cypriot gas reserves may be significant for the Cypriot economy, amounting to approximately 2 percent of its gross domestic product, but these direct benefits will materialize gradually over a period of fifteen years and will not be available in time to influence the ongoing talks for the resolution of the Cyprus question.
Article Reference: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15475778.2016.1192915
Article Vi... more Article Reference: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15475778.2016.1192915
Article Views: 62:
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Amid a plethora of reliable international and local literature, information, and data, the research analyzes and interprets theoretical, secondary, and primary data gathered on the generic and Cyprus-specific oil and gas industry.
The aim is to investigate the potential indirect effects of the industry on the Cyprus business/economy; and to preliminarily, provisionally, and predictively identify their individual elements and degree of consequence.
The value of the research lies in the fact that it is the first scientific Cyprus-specific research on the subject, and in its real-time approach to data gathering and analysis.
The findings predict the indirect economic/business effect to be substantial, albeit dependent on the actual reserves to be discovered, on certain thresholds being crossed, and on proper planning and implementation. Even so, the effect is estimated to be much lower than the expectations created by various industry actors over the past few years.
These findings are most important to high-end decision-making regarding this embryonic industry but bear also global significance as a paradigm for newly developed oil and gas industries.
Methodologically, this is purely exploratory research that rests upon wide theoretical and secondary data research, cemented and refined through an injection of primary qualitative work in the form of 20 expert and high-level interviews
This paper analyses the the dynamics and motivations behind the initial re-normalization of Turki... more This paper analyses the the dynamics and motivations behind the initial re-normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations and their potential repercussions on the developing trilateral geopolitical and energy cooperation between Israel, Cyprus and Greece
The paper focuses on the impact of the 5+1 Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Programme on internat... more The paper focuses on the impact of the 5+1 Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Programme on international oil markets
Abstract:
The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to... more Abstract:
The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy.
The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream
Article Reference: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060020
Article Views: 528 according to Taylor & Francis Online https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060020#metrics-content
The decision of Russia’s President to officially annex the Crimean Peninsular constituted an unne... more The decision of Russia’s President to officially annex the Crimean Peninsular constituted an unnecessary move of escalation on the part of Vladimir Putin that is galvanizing European support for the flinching interim Ukrainian government.
Putin could have offered the Crimea the same level of de jure integration to the Russian Federation it has extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2008 but the temptation proved too difficult for him to resist.
Voices in favor of Russia’s diplomatic isolation from the international scene and the belief that the freezing of Russia’s participation in the G-8 organization would convince the Russian President to withdraw from Crimea are indicative of a severe absence of analytical comprehension regarding Putin’s motives and methods.
Although sanctions against Russia are inevitable in both the EU and US level, the important questions we need to answer now are (1) what Europe can do to dissuade Russia from correcting other “historical mistakes” Mr. Putin may find in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Ukraine? Can it use its financial resources to boost Ukraine’s economy and redirect its trade towards Europe so as to increase its ability to resist Russian aggression? (2) how feasibile are the proposed economic sanctions against Russia, especially those pertaining to the energy sector, and (3) what is their potential backlash effect on Europe?
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy via Gree... more Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy via Greece and Albania, will contribute to European energy security as well as providing a major boost for Greece’s economy, regional standing and ability to emerge as a leading transit hub on a Southern-Northern Axis. This will be accomplished by the combination of TAP with a series of interconnecting pipelines linking the Aegean with
the Baltic Sea, starting with Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB)
This summer the EU island-state of Cyprus is “holding its breath” for a second time in less than ... more This summer the EU island-state of Cyprus is “holding its breath” for a second time in less than six months. This time the anxiety is not related to its ability to avoid bankruptcy and pay salaries or pensions. This time the anticipation will not be provoked by fear generated by the unprecedented loss of hard-earned deposits that were used to bail-in
Cyprus and partially guarantee the long-term viability of its sovereign debt.
This time Cypriots are holding their breath in anticipation of hope as the company Noble & Delek will conduct the appraisal drilling on the “Aphrodite” gas field. The drilling will last for three months. Unless a second appraisal drilling is required, by the end of this summer or at
the latest around Christmas-time, the Republic of Cyprus and the Noble-Delek consortium will know the exact quantity, quality and commercial exploitability of Aphrodite’s reserves which are estimated to contain 196 bcm (billion cubic meters).
What is also necessary though for the successful development of Cypriot hydrocarbons is to drill through several layers of misperceptions that either grossly over-estimate the current potential of Cypriot hydrocarbons or drastically underestimate the significance of the Aphrodite discovery for Cyprus, the EU, and the evolution of regional geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean
The increased political instability in the MENA
region over the recent years raises the important... more The increased political instability in the MENA
region over the recent years raises the important
question of security of European energy supplies
which the EU will need to address.
ELIAMEP Occasional Paper Series # 17 (February 2012)
Executive Summary
The question of European... more ELIAMEP Occasional Paper Series # 17 (February 2012)
Executive Summary
The question of European energy security has brought attention to the strategic significance of Southeastern Europe as a transport hub of natural gas and a key region for European energy security. To meet increasing natural gas demand and reduce energy dependency on Russia, European authorities need to promote the realization of projects contributing to the diversification of natural gas supply, alongside improving Europe‟s relationship with Russia by diversifying its import routes, two targets which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The principal targets of this study are
(a) to illustrate the major geopolitical parameters of the European Union‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy which aspires to diversify the Union‟s natural gas import sources while strengthening the political and economic independence of hydrocarbon-rich former Soviet States
(b) to present the general framework and key strategic objectives of Greek foreign policy, and the role Greece‟s energy policies are expected to play and
(c) to evaluate through a strategic lens Europe‟s options for the Southern Gas Corridor.
Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish an additional route of supply diversification. Any meaningful discussion on the feasibility of the three remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco, BP‟s South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of (initially) Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will –to a large extent- determine their eventual implementation.
The study analyzes the geopolitical rationale behind Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy by focusing on the reasons which have led to the weakening of the rather “pharaonic” Nabucco pipeline project compared to its two smaller and more cost-efficient (even when taking into consideration the scaled-down version presented in the last few days by the Nabucco consortium) competitors TAP and ITGI. Understanding why Nabucco has lost significant ground is crucial for securing Greece‟s role in the Southern Gas Corridor.
A special reference is also made to BP‟s SEEP project, a rather nebulous latecomer in the Shah Deniz-II race and the way its implementation may influence Greek policy and interests. The study then evaluates the likely impact of each project‟s implementation on Greece‟s foreign policy.
SAM-Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan- (Baku: 2012)
... more SAM-Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan- (Baku: 2012)
Abstract:
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish a fourth route of supply diversification following Russia, Norway and Northern Africa.
The European Commission has recognized as potential sources of supply for the Southern Gas Corridor not only Caspian (Azerbaijan) and Central Asian (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and primarily Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s and even Egypt’s future production.
Any serious discussion on the feasibility of the two remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco West and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of
Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will, along with competing corporate strategies, determine the optimal option for SOCAR and its Shah Deniz (SD) partners
Foreign Affairs, Hellenic Edition, December 2011 - January 2012
Σύνοψη:
Η απρόσμενη ανατροπή το... more Foreign Affairs, Hellenic Edition, December 2011 - January 2012
Σύνοψη:
Η απρόσμενη ανατροπή του καθεστώτος Μουμπάρακ στην Αίγυπτο σε συνδυασμό με τις δραματικές προκλήσεις της μεταπολεμικής ανασυγκρότησης της Λιβύης και τη δομική αποσταθεροποίηση του Μπαχρέιν, της Υεμένης και της Συρίας, έχουν δημιουργήσει έναν εντελώς νέο παράγοντα πολιτικού ρίσκου αναφορικά με την παραγωγή και εξαγωγή υδρογονανθράκων στην πιο ασταθή και ενεργειακά πλούσια περιοχή του κόσμου• μια περιοχή η οποία τυχαίνει να περιέχει περίπου τα 2/3 των βεβαιωμένων παγκόσμιων αποθεμάτων πετρελαίου και περίπου το 50% των εγνωσμένων αποθεμάτων φυσικού αερίου του πλανήτη.
Μολονότι υπάρχουν ακόμη πολλοί άγνωστοι παράγοντες σχετικά με το βάθος και τη διάρκεια της λεγόμενης «Αραβικής Άνοιξης», «Αραβικής Εξέγερσης» ή «Αραβικής Αναγέννησης» - ανάλογα με την εκάστοτε υποκειμενική θεώρηση των πραγμάτων- έχει καταστεί σαφές ότι υπάρχει σημαντική διαφορά μεταξύ των μορφών των πολιτικών ανακατατάξεων που εκδηλώθηκαν στο εσωτερικό των αραβικών καθεστώτων και το επίπεδο της αντίστοιχης τρωτότητας των καθεστώτων αυτών στις εγχώριες εξεγέρσεις.
Οι μοναρχίες του Αραβικού Κόλπου έχουν μέχρι σήμερα επιδείξει μια πολύ μεγαλύτερη ικανότητα να κατευνάζουν αποτελεσματικά, να εξουδετερώνουν πολιτικά και εάν αυτό καταστεί απαραίτητο να υποτάσσουν με τη βία τις εστίες πιθανών εξεγέρσεων, οι οποίες, στην περίπτωσή τους, κατά κύριο λόγο προέρχονται από μια βαθιά θρησκευτική και συνεπαγόμενα πολιτική διαίρεση μεταξύ σημαντικών σε μέγεθος Σιιτικών μειονοτήτων (Σαουδική Αραβία, Κατάρ, Κουβέιτ, Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα) και της κυβερνώσας Σουνιτικής ελίτ.
Η Βόρεια Αφρική, αν και λιγότερο σημαντική για το παγκόσμιο ενεργειακό σύστημα συγκριτικά με την περιοχή του Κόλπου, αποτελεί μια ζώνη πρωτεύουσας σπουδαιότητας για την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης δεδομένου ότι (α) το 35% του συνόλου των ευρωπαϊκών εισαγωγών πετρελαίου διέρχεται μέσω του Σουέζ, (β) η Αλγερία και η Λιβυή αναλογούν στο 14% του συνόλου των πετρελαϊκών εισαγωγών της Ε.Ε. για το 2010 και (γ) η Αλγερία, η Αίγυπτος και η Λιβυή αποτελούν συνδυαστικά τη μεγαλύτερη –μετά τη Ρωσία- πηγή εισαγωγής φυσικού αερίου για την Ευρώπη, αναλογώντας το 2010 περίπου στο 17% της ευρωπαϊκής ζήτησης αερίου
Ως εκ τούτου επιβάλλεται να αναλύσουμε κατά προτεραιότητα τις δύο σημαντικότερες πηγές αυτής της συνεχιζόμενης αστάθειας στη περιοχή της Μεσογείου, (i) την μετα-Μουμπάρακ Αίγυπτο και τις επιπτώσεις της στην Ισραηλινή ενεργειακή πολιτική ασφάλειας και (ii) την επιτακτική ανάγκη για τη μεταπολεμική ανασυγκρότηση της Λιβύης.
ELIAMEP Policy Paper# 21 (November 2012)
Synopsis:
The paper offers a detailed overview of Gre... more ELIAMEP Policy Paper# 21 (November 2012)
Synopsis:
The paper offers a detailed overview of Greek Energy policy challenges, the country's energy mix and the ways those challenges affect the planning and execution of Greek Foreign Policy.
Teaching Documents by theodoros tsakiris
Books by theodoros tsakiris
This paper in Greek analyzes the general context of Greek-Russian relations since the end of the... more This paper in Greek analyzes the general context of Greek-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War by giving particular emphasis on the diplomatic, military and energy aspects of bilateral cooperation.
This paper in Greek analyzes the parameters of EU-Russian natural gas relations and Greece's adju... more This paper in Greek analyzes the parameters of EU-Russian natural gas relations and Greece's adjustment to the events of the two major EU-Russian energy/transit crisis of 2006 and 2009. In this context the South Stream, ITGI and TAP pipeline projects are analyzed to illustrate the various policy scenarios of the time.
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Papers by theodoros tsakiris
their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived
as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is
exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the
Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same
strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining
principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through
the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its
strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an
unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and
uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military
developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about
them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess
how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives
the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of
perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.
compromise. However, Russian support for secessionism and erosion of state autonomy in the
Caucasus and Eurasia has proven difficult to reconcile for western European states despite their
energy dependence. Yet, Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia,
augmenting its position and relevance in a strategic energy relationship with the EU. The
relationship between Ankara and Moscow is principally based on energy security and domestic
business interests, and has largely remained stable in times of regional turmoil. This paper
analyses the dynamics of Ankara-Moscow cooperation in order to understand which of the three
scenarios in EU–Turkey relations – conflict, cooperation or convergence – could be expected to
develop bearing in mind that the partnership between Turkey and Russia has become
unpredictable. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian regional
antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future
scenarios. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with
Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the
“triangle”.
Abstract
Optimism arose about the discovery of Cypriot and Israeli gas reserves and how they might help resolve the Cyprus question, but the prospective monetization of these reserves has not modified Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot behavior vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus, despite Greek-Cypriot hopes.
The gas discoveries were not the principal motivation behind the Greek and Greek-Cypriot attempts to establish a trilateral framework of structured cooperation with Israel and Egypt.
The export of Cypriot gas to Egyptian liquefied natural gas facilities, however, is the only realistic option available to Nicosia that could also have a positive geopolitical impact on the trilateral framework and help reduce European Union gas dependence on Russia, although the reduction would be quite limited in the short to medium term.
The revenues from the monetization of Cypriot gas reserves may be significant for the Cypriot economy, amounting to approximately 2 percent of its gross domestic product, but these direct benefits will materialize gradually over a period of fifteen years and will not be available in time to influence the ongoing talks for the resolution of the Cyprus question.
Article Views: 62:
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Amid a plethora of reliable international and local literature, information, and data, the research analyzes and interprets theoretical, secondary, and primary data gathered on the generic and Cyprus-specific oil and gas industry.
The aim is to investigate the potential indirect effects of the industry on the Cyprus business/economy; and to preliminarily, provisionally, and predictively identify their individual elements and degree of consequence.
The value of the research lies in the fact that it is the first scientific Cyprus-specific research on the subject, and in its real-time approach to data gathering and analysis.
The findings predict the indirect economic/business effect to be substantial, albeit dependent on the actual reserves to be discovered, on certain thresholds being crossed, and on proper planning and implementation. Even so, the effect is estimated to be much lower than the expectations created by various industry actors over the past few years.
These findings are most important to high-end decision-making regarding this embryonic industry but bear also global significance as a paradigm for newly developed oil and gas industries.
Methodologically, this is purely exploratory research that rests upon wide theoretical and secondary data research, cemented and refined through an injection of primary qualitative work in the form of 20 expert and high-level interviews
The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy.
The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream
Article Reference: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060020
Article Views: 528 according to Taylor & Francis Online https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060020#metrics-content
Putin could have offered the Crimea the same level of de jure integration to the Russian Federation it has extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2008 but the temptation proved too difficult for him to resist.
Voices in favor of Russia’s diplomatic isolation from the international scene and the belief that the freezing of Russia’s participation in the G-8 organization would convince the Russian President to withdraw from Crimea are indicative of a severe absence of analytical comprehension regarding Putin’s motives and methods.
Although sanctions against Russia are inevitable in both the EU and US level, the important questions we need to answer now are (1) what Europe can do to dissuade Russia from correcting other “historical mistakes” Mr. Putin may find in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Ukraine? Can it use its financial resources to boost Ukraine’s economy and redirect its trade towards Europe so as to increase its ability to resist Russian aggression? (2) how feasibile are the proposed economic sanctions against Russia, especially those pertaining to the energy sector, and (3) what is their potential backlash effect on Europe?
the Baltic Sea, starting with Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB)
Cyprus and partially guarantee the long-term viability of its sovereign debt.
This time Cypriots are holding their breath in anticipation of hope as the company Noble & Delek will conduct the appraisal drilling on the “Aphrodite” gas field. The drilling will last for three months. Unless a second appraisal drilling is required, by the end of this summer or at
the latest around Christmas-time, the Republic of Cyprus and the Noble-Delek consortium will know the exact quantity, quality and commercial exploitability of Aphrodite’s reserves which are estimated to contain 196 bcm (billion cubic meters).
What is also necessary though for the successful development of Cypriot hydrocarbons is to drill through several layers of misperceptions that either grossly over-estimate the current potential of Cypriot hydrocarbons or drastically underestimate the significance of the Aphrodite discovery for Cyprus, the EU, and the evolution of regional geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean
region over the recent years raises the important
question of security of European energy supplies
which the EU will need to address.
Executive Summary
The question of European energy security has brought attention to the strategic significance of Southeastern Europe as a transport hub of natural gas and a key region for European energy security. To meet increasing natural gas demand and reduce energy dependency on Russia, European authorities need to promote the realization of projects contributing to the diversification of natural gas supply, alongside improving Europe‟s relationship with Russia by diversifying its import routes, two targets which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The principal targets of this study are
(a) to illustrate the major geopolitical parameters of the European Union‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy which aspires to diversify the Union‟s natural gas import sources while strengthening the political and economic independence of hydrocarbon-rich former Soviet States
(b) to present the general framework and key strategic objectives of Greek foreign policy, and the role Greece‟s energy policies are expected to play and
(c) to evaluate through a strategic lens Europe‟s options for the Southern Gas Corridor.
Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish an additional route of supply diversification. Any meaningful discussion on the feasibility of the three remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco, BP‟s South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of (initially) Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will –to a large extent- determine their eventual implementation.
The study analyzes the geopolitical rationale behind Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy by focusing on the reasons which have led to the weakening of the rather “pharaonic” Nabucco pipeline project compared to its two smaller and more cost-efficient (even when taking into consideration the scaled-down version presented in the last few days by the Nabucco consortium) competitors TAP and ITGI. Understanding why Nabucco has lost significant ground is crucial for securing Greece‟s role in the Southern Gas Corridor.
A special reference is also made to BP‟s SEEP project, a rather nebulous latecomer in the Shah Deniz-II race and the way its implementation may influence Greek policy and interests. The study then evaluates the likely impact of each project‟s implementation on Greece‟s foreign policy.
Abstract:
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish a fourth route of supply diversification following Russia, Norway and Northern Africa.
The European Commission has recognized as potential sources of supply for the Southern Gas Corridor not only Caspian (Azerbaijan) and Central Asian (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and primarily Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s and even Egypt’s future production.
Any serious discussion on the feasibility of the two remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco West and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of
Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will, along with competing corporate strategies, determine the optimal option for SOCAR and its Shah Deniz (SD) partners
Σύνοψη:
Η απρόσμενη ανατροπή του καθεστώτος Μουμπάρακ στην Αίγυπτο σε συνδυασμό με τις δραματικές προκλήσεις της μεταπολεμικής ανασυγκρότησης της Λιβύης και τη δομική αποσταθεροποίηση του Μπαχρέιν, της Υεμένης και της Συρίας, έχουν δημιουργήσει έναν εντελώς νέο παράγοντα πολιτικού ρίσκου αναφορικά με την παραγωγή και εξαγωγή υδρογονανθράκων στην πιο ασταθή και ενεργειακά πλούσια περιοχή του κόσμου• μια περιοχή η οποία τυχαίνει να περιέχει περίπου τα 2/3 των βεβαιωμένων παγκόσμιων αποθεμάτων πετρελαίου και περίπου το 50% των εγνωσμένων αποθεμάτων φυσικού αερίου του πλανήτη.
Μολονότι υπάρχουν ακόμη πολλοί άγνωστοι παράγοντες σχετικά με το βάθος και τη διάρκεια της λεγόμενης «Αραβικής Άνοιξης», «Αραβικής Εξέγερσης» ή «Αραβικής Αναγέννησης» - ανάλογα με την εκάστοτε υποκειμενική θεώρηση των πραγμάτων- έχει καταστεί σαφές ότι υπάρχει σημαντική διαφορά μεταξύ των μορφών των πολιτικών ανακατατάξεων που εκδηλώθηκαν στο εσωτερικό των αραβικών καθεστώτων και το επίπεδο της αντίστοιχης τρωτότητας των καθεστώτων αυτών στις εγχώριες εξεγέρσεις.
Οι μοναρχίες του Αραβικού Κόλπου έχουν μέχρι σήμερα επιδείξει μια πολύ μεγαλύτερη ικανότητα να κατευνάζουν αποτελεσματικά, να εξουδετερώνουν πολιτικά και εάν αυτό καταστεί απαραίτητο να υποτάσσουν με τη βία τις εστίες πιθανών εξεγέρσεων, οι οποίες, στην περίπτωσή τους, κατά κύριο λόγο προέρχονται από μια βαθιά θρησκευτική και συνεπαγόμενα πολιτική διαίρεση μεταξύ σημαντικών σε μέγεθος Σιιτικών μειονοτήτων (Σαουδική Αραβία, Κατάρ, Κουβέιτ, Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα) και της κυβερνώσας Σουνιτικής ελίτ.
Η Βόρεια Αφρική, αν και λιγότερο σημαντική για το παγκόσμιο ενεργειακό σύστημα συγκριτικά με την περιοχή του Κόλπου, αποτελεί μια ζώνη πρωτεύουσας σπουδαιότητας για την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης δεδομένου ότι (α) το 35% του συνόλου των ευρωπαϊκών εισαγωγών πετρελαίου διέρχεται μέσω του Σουέζ, (β) η Αλγερία και η Λιβυή αναλογούν στο 14% του συνόλου των πετρελαϊκών εισαγωγών της Ε.Ε. για το 2010 και (γ) η Αλγερία, η Αίγυπτος και η Λιβυή αποτελούν συνδυαστικά τη μεγαλύτερη –μετά τη Ρωσία- πηγή εισαγωγής φυσικού αερίου για την Ευρώπη, αναλογώντας το 2010 περίπου στο 17% της ευρωπαϊκής ζήτησης αερίου
Ως εκ τούτου επιβάλλεται να αναλύσουμε κατά προτεραιότητα τις δύο σημαντικότερες πηγές αυτής της συνεχιζόμενης αστάθειας στη περιοχή της Μεσογείου, (i) την μετα-Μουμπάρακ Αίγυπτο και τις επιπτώσεις της στην Ισραηλινή ενεργειακή πολιτική ασφάλειας και (ii) την επιτακτική ανάγκη για τη μεταπολεμική ανασυγκρότηση της Λιβύης.
Synopsis:
The paper offers a detailed overview of Greek Energy policy challenges, the country's energy mix and the ways those challenges affect the planning and execution of Greek Foreign Policy.
Teaching Documents by theodoros tsakiris
Books by theodoros tsakiris
their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived
as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is
exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the
Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same
strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining
principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through
the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its
strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an
unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and
uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military
developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about
them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess
how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives
the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of
perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.
compromise. However, Russian support for secessionism and erosion of state autonomy in the
Caucasus and Eurasia has proven difficult to reconcile for western European states despite their
energy dependence. Yet, Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia,
augmenting its position and relevance in a strategic energy relationship with the EU. The
relationship between Ankara and Moscow is principally based on energy security and domestic
business interests, and has largely remained stable in times of regional turmoil. This paper
analyses the dynamics of Ankara-Moscow cooperation in order to understand which of the three
scenarios in EU–Turkey relations – conflict, cooperation or convergence – could be expected to
develop bearing in mind that the partnership between Turkey and Russia has become
unpredictable. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian regional
antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future
scenarios. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with
Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the
“triangle”.
Abstract
Optimism arose about the discovery of Cypriot and Israeli gas reserves and how they might help resolve the Cyprus question, but the prospective monetization of these reserves has not modified Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot behavior vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus, despite Greek-Cypriot hopes.
The gas discoveries were not the principal motivation behind the Greek and Greek-Cypriot attempts to establish a trilateral framework of structured cooperation with Israel and Egypt.
The export of Cypriot gas to Egyptian liquefied natural gas facilities, however, is the only realistic option available to Nicosia that could also have a positive geopolitical impact on the trilateral framework and help reduce European Union gas dependence on Russia, although the reduction would be quite limited in the short to medium term.
The revenues from the monetization of Cypriot gas reserves may be significant for the Cypriot economy, amounting to approximately 2 percent of its gross domestic product, but these direct benefits will materialize gradually over a period of fifteen years and will not be available in time to influence the ongoing talks for the resolution of the Cyprus question.
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Amid a plethora of reliable international and local literature, information, and data, the research analyzes and interprets theoretical, secondary, and primary data gathered on the generic and Cyprus-specific oil and gas industry.
The aim is to investigate the potential indirect effects of the industry on the Cyprus business/economy; and to preliminarily, provisionally, and predictively identify their individual elements and degree of consequence.
The value of the research lies in the fact that it is the first scientific Cyprus-specific research on the subject, and in its real-time approach to data gathering and analysis.
The findings predict the indirect economic/business effect to be substantial, albeit dependent on the actual reserves to be discovered, on certain thresholds being crossed, and on proper planning and implementation. Even so, the effect is estimated to be much lower than the expectations created by various industry actors over the past few years.
These findings are most important to high-end decision-making regarding this embryonic industry but bear also global significance as a paradigm for newly developed oil and gas industries.
Methodologically, this is purely exploratory research that rests upon wide theoretical and secondary data research, cemented and refined through an injection of primary qualitative work in the form of 20 expert and high-level interviews
The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy.
The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream
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Putin could have offered the Crimea the same level of de jure integration to the Russian Federation it has extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2008 but the temptation proved too difficult for him to resist.
Voices in favor of Russia’s diplomatic isolation from the international scene and the belief that the freezing of Russia’s participation in the G-8 organization would convince the Russian President to withdraw from Crimea are indicative of a severe absence of analytical comprehension regarding Putin’s motives and methods.
Although sanctions against Russia are inevitable in both the EU and US level, the important questions we need to answer now are (1) what Europe can do to dissuade Russia from correcting other “historical mistakes” Mr. Putin may find in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Ukraine? Can it use its financial resources to boost Ukraine’s economy and redirect its trade towards Europe so as to increase its ability to resist Russian aggression? (2) how feasibile are the proposed economic sanctions against Russia, especially those pertaining to the energy sector, and (3) what is their potential backlash effect on Europe?
the Baltic Sea, starting with Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB)
Cyprus and partially guarantee the long-term viability of its sovereign debt.
This time Cypriots are holding their breath in anticipation of hope as the company Noble & Delek will conduct the appraisal drilling on the “Aphrodite” gas field. The drilling will last for three months. Unless a second appraisal drilling is required, by the end of this summer or at
the latest around Christmas-time, the Republic of Cyprus and the Noble-Delek consortium will know the exact quantity, quality and commercial exploitability of Aphrodite’s reserves which are estimated to contain 196 bcm (billion cubic meters).
What is also necessary though for the successful development of Cypriot hydrocarbons is to drill through several layers of misperceptions that either grossly over-estimate the current potential of Cypriot hydrocarbons or drastically underestimate the significance of the Aphrodite discovery for Cyprus, the EU, and the evolution of regional geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean
region over the recent years raises the important
question of security of European energy supplies
which the EU will need to address.
Executive Summary
The question of European energy security has brought attention to the strategic significance of Southeastern Europe as a transport hub of natural gas and a key region for European energy security. To meet increasing natural gas demand and reduce energy dependency on Russia, European authorities need to promote the realization of projects contributing to the diversification of natural gas supply, alongside improving Europe‟s relationship with Russia by diversifying its import routes, two targets which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The principal targets of this study are
(a) to illustrate the major geopolitical parameters of the European Union‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy which aspires to diversify the Union‟s natural gas import sources while strengthening the political and economic independence of hydrocarbon-rich former Soviet States
(b) to present the general framework and key strategic objectives of Greek foreign policy, and the role Greece‟s energy policies are expected to play and
(c) to evaluate through a strategic lens Europe‟s options for the Southern Gas Corridor.
Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish an additional route of supply diversification. Any meaningful discussion on the feasibility of the three remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco, BP‟s South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of (initially) Azeri gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will –to a large extent- determine their eventual implementation.
The study analyzes the geopolitical rationale behind Europe‟s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy by focusing on the reasons which have led to the weakening of the rather “pharaonic” Nabucco pipeline project compared to its two smaller and more cost-efficient (even when taking into consideration the scaled-down version presented in the last few days by the Nabucco consortium) competitors TAP and ITGI. Understanding why Nabucco has lost significant ground is crucial for securing Greece‟s role in the Southern Gas Corridor.
A special reference is also made to BP‟s SEEP project, a rather nebulous latecomer in the Shah Deniz-II race and the way its implementation may influence Greek policy and interests. The study then evaluates the likely impact of each project‟s implementation on Greece‟s foreign policy.
Abstract:
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish a fourth route of supply diversification following Russia, Norway and Northern Africa.
The European Commission has recognized as potential sources of supply for the Southern Gas Corridor not only Caspian (Azerbaijan) and Central Asian (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and primarily Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s and even Egypt’s future production.
Any serious discussion on the feasibility of the two remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco West and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of
Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will, along with competing corporate strategies, determine the optimal option for SOCAR and its Shah Deniz (SD) partners
Σύνοψη:
Η απρόσμενη ανατροπή του καθεστώτος Μουμπάρακ στην Αίγυπτο σε συνδυασμό με τις δραματικές προκλήσεις της μεταπολεμικής ανασυγκρότησης της Λιβύης και τη δομική αποσταθεροποίηση του Μπαχρέιν, της Υεμένης και της Συρίας, έχουν δημιουργήσει έναν εντελώς νέο παράγοντα πολιτικού ρίσκου αναφορικά με την παραγωγή και εξαγωγή υδρογονανθράκων στην πιο ασταθή και ενεργειακά πλούσια περιοχή του κόσμου• μια περιοχή η οποία τυχαίνει να περιέχει περίπου τα 2/3 των βεβαιωμένων παγκόσμιων αποθεμάτων πετρελαίου και περίπου το 50% των εγνωσμένων αποθεμάτων φυσικού αερίου του πλανήτη.
Μολονότι υπάρχουν ακόμη πολλοί άγνωστοι παράγοντες σχετικά με το βάθος και τη διάρκεια της λεγόμενης «Αραβικής Άνοιξης», «Αραβικής Εξέγερσης» ή «Αραβικής Αναγέννησης» - ανάλογα με την εκάστοτε υποκειμενική θεώρηση των πραγμάτων- έχει καταστεί σαφές ότι υπάρχει σημαντική διαφορά μεταξύ των μορφών των πολιτικών ανακατατάξεων που εκδηλώθηκαν στο εσωτερικό των αραβικών καθεστώτων και το επίπεδο της αντίστοιχης τρωτότητας των καθεστώτων αυτών στις εγχώριες εξεγέρσεις.
Οι μοναρχίες του Αραβικού Κόλπου έχουν μέχρι σήμερα επιδείξει μια πολύ μεγαλύτερη ικανότητα να κατευνάζουν αποτελεσματικά, να εξουδετερώνουν πολιτικά και εάν αυτό καταστεί απαραίτητο να υποτάσσουν με τη βία τις εστίες πιθανών εξεγέρσεων, οι οποίες, στην περίπτωσή τους, κατά κύριο λόγο προέρχονται από μια βαθιά θρησκευτική και συνεπαγόμενα πολιτική διαίρεση μεταξύ σημαντικών σε μέγεθος Σιιτικών μειονοτήτων (Σαουδική Αραβία, Κατάρ, Κουβέιτ, Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα) και της κυβερνώσας Σουνιτικής ελίτ.
Η Βόρεια Αφρική, αν και λιγότερο σημαντική για το παγκόσμιο ενεργειακό σύστημα συγκριτικά με την περιοχή του Κόλπου, αποτελεί μια ζώνη πρωτεύουσας σπουδαιότητας για την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης δεδομένου ότι (α) το 35% του συνόλου των ευρωπαϊκών εισαγωγών πετρελαίου διέρχεται μέσω του Σουέζ, (β) η Αλγερία και η Λιβυή αναλογούν στο 14% του συνόλου των πετρελαϊκών εισαγωγών της Ε.Ε. για το 2010 και (γ) η Αλγερία, η Αίγυπτος και η Λιβυή αποτελούν συνδυαστικά τη μεγαλύτερη –μετά τη Ρωσία- πηγή εισαγωγής φυσικού αερίου για την Ευρώπη, αναλογώντας το 2010 περίπου στο 17% της ευρωπαϊκής ζήτησης αερίου
Ως εκ τούτου επιβάλλεται να αναλύσουμε κατά προτεραιότητα τις δύο σημαντικότερες πηγές αυτής της συνεχιζόμενης αστάθειας στη περιοχή της Μεσογείου, (i) την μετα-Μουμπάρακ Αίγυπτο και τις επιπτώσεις της στην Ισραηλινή ενεργειακή πολιτική ασφάλειας και (ii) την επιτακτική ανάγκη για τη μεταπολεμική ανασυγκρότηση της Λιβύης.
Synopsis:
The paper offers a detailed overview of Greek Energy policy challenges, the country's energy mix and the ways those challenges affect the planning and execution of Greek Foreign Policy.
Cypriot hydrocarbons should be exploited for the benefit of the island’s entire population with or without resolution of the Cypriot problem,
since Turkish Cypriots living in the Turkish occupied North of the island can still take advantage of Cypriot gas by either buying it or bartering it (against water or electricity, for example) from the RoC.
This essay will first explain the reasons behind the current state
of pessimism over Cypriot gas developments and then analyze them.
Subsequently, it will assess the status quo of the Cypriot upstream sector by evaluating its reserves potential, review the reactions of Turkey and the so called TRNC, and weigh the realistic export options available to Cyprus for the monetization of Aphrodite’s probable reserves
The fall of the Mubarak and Qaddafi regimes and the continued civil war in Syria are reshaping the modern Middle East in ways which are apparently more important than the falling-out between the region’s two most important U.S. allies.
Within so volatile and unstable an environment, where geopolitical alignments seem to shift faster than the desert’s sands, one could discard the importance of the Turkish-Israeli “divorce” as a temporary phenomenon
Although Turkish-Israeli relations would most likely renormalize, the possibility of their return to a state of close or systematic cooperation is minimal. It may be true that the geopolitical bridge connecting Turkey to Israel is not broken, but it is certainly approaching the point of collapse and cannot be easily repaired.
A Turkish-Israeli rapprochement may stop it from collapsing but it is not likely that it will reverse the strategic divergence that has distanced Tel Aviv from Ankara.
The reasons for this chasm are not temporary and do not only relate with the affair of the Mavi Marmara. They do relate though with the rise of Reccep Tayip Erdogan to power in Turkey and the gradual shifting of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East from a secular to a pro-Islamic direction that is increasingly becoming more ideologically driven
This research paper will focus on the development of Turkish-Israeli relations after the Mavi Marmara and especially after the apparent beginning of a rapprochement in early 2013. It will argue that the divergence has grown too big for anyone to bridge as long as AKP’s ideologically driven foreign policy continues to support the revival of the Muslim Brotherhood parties throughout the modern Middle East.
The paper will then examine the way Greece reacted to the Turkish-Israeli “divorce” while detailing the goals, aspirations and tangible results of what has become a period of unprecedented Greek-Israeli cooperation.
This examination would be placed within the wider historical context of Greek-Israeli relations since the recognition of the State of Israel from Greece in 1990. Although the post-Mavi Marmara “rapprochement” is the third time since 1990 that Athens and Tel Aviv tried to “mend fences” and develop a greater cooperative agenda, the quality and dynamism of the synergies developed during 2010-2013 have turned this “rapprochement” into a comprehensive alignment.