Articles by Dmitry A Uzlaner
ThéoRèmes, 2024
Dans cet article, nous établissons que le discours russe sur les valeurs traditionnelles doit une... more Dans cet article, nous établissons que le discours russe sur les valeurs traditionnelles doit une grande partie de son contenu et de sa formulation stratégique aux guerres culturelles mondiales. En remontant beaucoup plus loin que les récentes élaborations du Kremlin, nous examinons les origines des débats sur les valeurs publiques en Russie depuis la période de la perestroïka, lorsque les acteurs russes ont été socialisés à la réalité des guerres culturelles par des activistes occidentaux approchant les sociétés post-soviétiques avec un zèle missionnaire. L'article reconstruit l'émergence du discours sur les valeurs traditionnelles en Russie et souligne sa nature hybride en tant que mélange de notions sur la culture, la religion et l'histoire russes avec des idées de la droite chrétienne occidentale. Sur la base de documents, de la littérature et d'une recherche empirique qualitative avec des acteurs conservateurs en Russie et à l'extérieur, nous montrons que les valeurs traditionnelles autour desquelles les dirigeants russes ont construit leur doctrine de sécurité nationale anti-occidentale reflètent en fait la dynamique mondiale des guerres culturelles.
In this article, we link Russia’s discourse on traditional values with the global culture wars by showing that the Russian traditional values discourse owes much of its content and strategic formulation to the global culture wars. Going back much further than the recent elaborations of the Kremlin, we look at the origins of debates about public values inside Russia from the period of the perestroika, when Russian actors were socialized into the reality of culture wars by Western activists approaching post-soviet societies with a missionary zeal. The article reconstructs the emergence of the discourse of traditional values inside Russia and points out its hybrid nature as a mix of notions about Russian culture, religion and history and Western Christian Right ideas. Based on documents, literature and qualitative empirical research with moral conservative actors in and outside Russia, we show that the traditional values around which Russia’s leadership has built its anti-Western national security doctrine actually mirrors the global dynamics of the culture wars.
Open Theology, 2024
The focus of this article is a symbolic image often found in world mythologya giant snake or a dr... more The focus of this article is a symbolic image often found in world mythologya giant snake or a dragon biting its own tail. This image is usually denoted by the Greek word "ouroboros" (οὐροβόρος), which means literally "eating its own tail." This essay is devoted to an interpretation of this symbol, which the author sees as leading to the much broader topic of human unfreedom and the forms that this unfreedom takes. The first section deals with the unique features of Gnosticism which have made it appealing in extremely varied times and situations. Gnosticism will be the basis for my considerations about ouroboros. The author's reflections start from understanding the Gnostic worldview as an expression of apprehensiveness about the radical otherworldliness of the human spirit and its alienation from the universe. The second section deals with the symbolism of the ouroboros and its place in Gnostic conceptual schemes as a reference to the closed cycle of nature that enslaves the human spirit. The third section attempts to decipher layer by layer the Gnostic conceptions associated with the ouroboros. Various levels of interpretation are identified: literal, mythological-magical, psychological-ascetic, and sociopolitical. In the fourth section, the author connects Gnostic ideas with Christianity by interpreting St. Paul's Epistles, particularly his ideas concerning rulers and authorities. The place occupied by the ouroboros in the Christian universe is analyzed. The last section relies on the ideas of René Girard, Jacques Lacan, and Alain Badiou to illustrate the manifestations of the ouroboros in different dimensions of human existence, both individual and collective, with special emphasis on human desire and its futile circlings.
Global Secularity. A Sourcebook. Volume I. Mapping the Academic Debate, 2024
The text below is a summary of part of Uzlaner’s research on the history of secularisation theory... more The text below is a summary of part of Uzlaner’s research on the history of secularisation theory, namely an analytical overview of the Soviet approach to “secularisation.” It is an external perspective, which attempts to objectively pinpoint the differences between the Western and Soviet models of secularisation in the 1960s and 1970s, and their repercussions for the discussion of the term today. The text was published in one of the main Russian journals of sociology, called Sociological Research.
Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 2020
This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. "Russia in the transnational cult... more This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. "Russia in the transnational culture wars. Part 2" [Rossiia v transnatsional'nykh kul'turnykh voinakh. Chast' 2], Neprikosnovennyi zapas. 2020. 132 (4): 158-184.
Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 2020
This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. "Russia in the transnational cult... more This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. "Russia in the transnational culture wars. Part 1" [Rossiia v transnatsional'nykh kul'turnykh voinakh. Chast' 1], Neprikosnovennyi zapas. 2020. 131 (3): 100-120.
Gosudarstvo, religija, Cerkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom, 2012
This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. From secular modernity to 'multip... more This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. From secular modernity to 'multiple': Social theory on the relations between religion and modernity [Ot sekuljarnoj sovremennosti k «mnozhestvennym»: social'naja teorija o sootnoshenii religii i sovremennosti] // Gosudarstvo, religija, Cerkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom. 2012. № 1. S. 8-32.
Otechestvennye zapiski, 2013
This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. Cartography of the postsecular [K... more This article was originally published in Russian as: Uzlaner D. Cartography of the postsecular [Kartografija postsekuljarnogo] // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2013. № 1. S. 175-192.
Journal of Illiberalism Studies, 2023
The article is devoted to identifying and describing the phantasmic dimension of the culture wars... more The article is devoted to identifying and describing the phantasmic dimension of the culture wars, in particular the phantasmic dimension of one side of this confrontation—social conservatism. The notion of “phantasm” is used on the basis of the Lacanian tradition of social and political theory. A phantasm is understood as stereotypical, repetitive images or visions that structure the position of “culture warriors” and are the foundation on which other levels (rational, legal, etc.) are superimposed. Conservative phantasms are actualized at the moment when society undergoes a process of radical transformation, which breaks the usual systems of differentiation; it is this process that triggers culture wars. Empirical material to illustrate these ideas is the case of Russian social conservatism.
Contribution in: Postsecular Conflicts: Debates from Russia and the United States / Ed. by Kristina Stoeckl and Dmitry Uzlaner. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2020
Postsecular Conflicts non-religious people could lead to better mutual understanding and thus to ... more Postsecular Conflicts non-religious people could lead to better mutual understanding and thus to a better quality of the democratic process. Against Habermas, one could argue that there already exists a sociological model that conceptualizes the moral and religious diversity of modern societies, only in less consensual terms: the model of culture wars described by James D. Hunter. 10 In the United States this concept denotes the conflict between representatives of a culture holding on to traditional teachings, values, and life plans on the one hand, and the representatives of a culture of change and individual freedom on the other. Where Habermas's idea of postsecular society highlights consensus, the culture wars model highlights conflict. Both operate under the assumption that pluralism is the default condition of modern societies, but they come to different conclusions. Habermas's conclusion is optimistic, Hunter's is pessimistic. Culture wars, Hunter writes, precede shooting wars. 11 This introduction is not the place to settle the question whether conflicts over values in modern pluralistic societies always take the form of a postsecular consensus or a culture war. Instead, what this introduction, this edited volume, and in general the whole Postsecular Conflicts research project 12 tries to do, is to define in greater detail the conditions of these conflicts. By "conditions" we mean what actors, what political dynamics, and what ideas and intellectual genealogies are at play in today's postsecular conflicts? 13 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America
Contribution in: Schneider, Christoph (ed.) Theology and Philosophy in Eastern Orthodoxy: Essays on Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Thought. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Feb 15, 2019
Contribution in: The Routledge Handbook of Postsecularity / Ed. by Justin Beaumont. London: Routledge, 2018
Contribution in: Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, Paradoxes, and Perspectives / Ed. by Mikhail Suslov & Dmitry Uzlaner Leiden: Brill, 2019
Uzlaner D. “The Logic of Scapegoating in Contemporary Russian Moral Conservatism”, in Contemporar... more Uzlaner D. “The Logic of Scapegoating in Contemporary Russian Moral Conservatism”, in Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, Paradoxes, and Perspectives / Ed. by Mikhail Suslov and Dmitry Uzlaner Leiden: Brill, 2019. P. 103-127.
Contribution in: Suslov M. and Uzlaner D. (eds) Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, Paradoxes, and Perspectives. Leiden: Brill, 2019
Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 17 (May), 2019
The religious discourse is pushing other debates—national, ethnic, etc.—aside harder than ever li... more The religious discourse is pushing other debates—national, ethnic, etc.—aside harder than ever literally in front of our eyes. In Europe, and partly in Russia, the problem of Syrian, Turkish, Algerian, Uzbek, and Tajik immigrants has transformed, at least in mass media, into the issue of Islam. Not only has the religious factor not disappeared, but it has overpowered everything else. Interethnic and even interstate confrontations have once again become religious as they were in the 17th century; maybe not in substance but, at a minimum, in the public conscience. Given the crisis of secular ideologies and outlooks, there is no reason to believe that religion, like the genie, can once against be put back into the bottle where it was trapped for the last couple of centuries. So it is not a question of religion or no religion that gains significance, including political, in this context, but what kind of religion: more rational or less rational, more democratic or less democratic, more peaceful or less peaceful, more tolerant or less tolerant? This will immediately increase the importance of theology and theological discussions. The struggle for the soul of religious traditions is underway, and its outcome is becoming increasingly crucial for peace on the planet Earth.
Contribution in: Koellner, Tobias (Hrsg.) Orthodox Religion and Politics in Contemporary Eastern Europe: On Multiple Secularisms and Entanglements. London; New York: Routledge, Nov 27, 2018
In their famous study of cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) list 'religious vs secular' as one o... more In their famous study of cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) list 'religious vs secular' as one of the key lines that historically divide modern national societies. Opposition between secular and religious groups is an important dimension of political confrontation. Although the logic of this argument is solid, post-Soviet Russia has heretofore been a curious exception in this respect. Religion did not become socially insignificant and irrelevant as a result of the process of Soviet secularisation. On the contrary, after the fall of the USSR, religion attracted much attention, but with little confrontation or tension. There are, of course, disagreements among different religious organisations or even within them (Kostiuk 2002). There are 'cult controversies', including a significant debate concerning so-called sects and new religious movements (Shterin 2012). And the long and difficult struggle against militant Islamism continues. But religion in generalat least in its traditional formhas largely been a matter of consensus, not cleavage, for Russian society. This peculiar post-Soviet, or 'post-atheist', situation is called the 'pro-Orthodox', or sometimes the 'pro-religious', consensus in academic literature. In this chapter, I will analyse this peculiar consensus, which I argue is now falling apart. We are witnessing a slow but dramatic break-up of this pro-Orthodox consensus. What is the pro-Orthodox (pro-religious) consensus? Before discussing the pro-Orthodox consensus in detail, I will make certain theoretical clarifications. Following Karel Dobbelaere (2002; 2004: 230), I consider secularisation and desecularisation to be multi-dimensional concepts. These processes can happen on three distinct levels: the macro-level (Dobbelaere 2002: 29-35; the level of social structure or societal secularisation/desecularisation), the meso-level (Dobbelaere 2002: 35-38; the level where society and the individual meet, such as a community or an organisation) and the micro-level (Dobbelaere 2002: 38-43; the individual level or the level of personal beliefs and practices). I refer to the meso-level not only in the sense of organisational secularisation/ desecularisation, as Dobbelaere implied, nor merely in the sense of 'change occurring in the posture of religious organizations … in matters of belief, morals
Journal of Contemporary Religion, 2019
This article analyses the configurations of belief, critique, and religious freedom in Russia sin... more This article analyses the configurations of belief, critique, and religious freedom in Russia since the performance of the Russian group Pussy Riot in 2012. The ‘punk prayer’ and its legal and political aftermath are interpreted as an incidence of the contestation of the boundary between the secular and the religious in the Russian legal and social sphere. The authors show that the outcome of this contestation has had a decisive impact on the way in which religion, critique, and the human right of religious freedom have been defined in the present Russian context. In response to Pussy Riot, the Russian legislator turned offending religious feelings into a crime. The article investigates two more recent cases where offended feelings of believers were involved, the opera “Tannhäuser” in Ekaterinburg in 2015 and the movie Matilda in 2017, and analyses how the initial power-conforming configuration that emerged as a reply to the ‘punk prayer’ has revealed a ‘power-disturbing’ potential as conservative Orthodox groups have started to challenge the authority of the State and the Church leadership. The article is based on primary sources from Russian debates surrounding Pussy Riot, Matilda, and “Tannhäuser” and on theoretical literature on the religious–secular boundary and human rights.
Journal of Classical Sociology, 2018
This article examines the legacy of Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968), a Harvard sociologist from th... more This article examines the legacy of Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968), a Harvard sociologist from the Russian emigration. The authors scrutinise Sorokin as one of the nodal points for today’s moral conservatism. As a scholar, Sorokin has been relegated to the margins of his discipline, but his legacy as a public intellectual has persisted in the United States and has soared in Russia over the last three decades. This article examines Sorokin’s reception in these two nations, some of whose citizens have facilitated the burgeoning transnational phenomenon of twenty-first-century moral conservatism. Four aspects of Sorokin’s legacy are especially relevant in this context: his emphasis on values, his notion of the ‘sensate culture’, his ideas about the family, and his vision for moral revival. The authors conclude that Sorokin functions as a nodal point that binds together individual actors and ideas across national, cultural and linguistic barriers. The article is based on a firsthand analysis of moral conservative discourse and documents, on qualitative interviews and on scholarly literature.
International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 2017
This essay investigates the phenomenon of the selfie. The author is interested in what this pheno... more This essay investigates the phenomenon of the selfie. The author is interested in what this phenomenon is able to say about the human subject and its constitution. Jacques Lacan's theory of the subject is used as a fulcrum to investigate, in particular, his reflections on the gaze and the role it plays in the process of constituting human subjectivity. The author takes one specific “mirror selfie” and consistently examines various aspects of the gaze in relation to it: the gaze as it constitutes the identity of the subject; the ideological dimension of the gaze and “ideological visual interpellation”; the gaze as the object-cause of desire; the unbearable inevitability of the gaze; and the monstrous Real dimension of the gaze. The author concludes that new technology, in particular, the new possibilities for self-representation they provide, do not distort the nature of man, but on the contrary only more clearly reveal it.
Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 2016
This article analyzes Russia’s ‘‘conservative turn’’, which occurred in 2012
when Vladimir Putin... more This article analyzes Russia’s ‘‘conservative turn’’, which occurred in 2012
when Vladimir Putin was elected President for a third time. An overview of this turn –
incorporating anti-Westernism, an emphasis on tradition, the protection of symbols of
purity, and the persecution of symbols of impurity – opens the article. The author then
explains the concept of ‘‘perverse conservatism’’ and elaborates its basic pattern with
reference to such Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts as subjectification, perversion,
disavowal, and what he calls the ‘‘defensive fetish’’. Finally, this pattern and its subpatterns of fetishism and sadism are applied to an explanation of certain aspects of
Russia’s domestic policy. The author concludes that the discourse on traditional values,
at least in some respects, is subordinated to the pattern of perversion.
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 2017
Jacques Lacan’s theory of the subject is put forward in order to correct what the author calls “t... more Jacques Lacan’s theory of the subject is put forward in order to correct what the author calls “the naïve theory of the subject,” which sociologists of religion tend to utilize by default in numerous quantitative sociological studies based on mass surveys and oriented towards obtaining exact, scientific, positivistic knowledge. This article applies Lacan’s three registers—Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real—to the religious sphere and demonstrates their potential implications for the sociological analysis of religion. An analysis of the empirical research on Russia’s post-Soviet religious situation reinforces the author’s argument that an uncritical theory of the subject attends only to the superficial layers of the subject, which end up being devoid of actual subjectivity, according to Lacanian logic. The more fundamental layers of the subject, capable of making it “the subject” in the full sense of the word, seem to be completely outside of sociologists’ current field of vision. This critique directs the reader’s attention to the shortcomings of sociological surveys, and the author argues that a more robust understanding of the subject could enrich the sociology of religion, particularly by further developing certain conceptions, such as Grace Davie’s “vicarious religion.”
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Articles by Dmitry A Uzlaner
In this article, we link Russia’s discourse on traditional values with the global culture wars by showing that the Russian traditional values discourse owes much of its content and strategic formulation to the global culture wars. Going back much further than the recent elaborations of the Kremlin, we look at the origins of debates about public values inside Russia from the period of the perestroika, when Russian actors were socialized into the reality of culture wars by Western activists approaching post-soviet societies with a missionary zeal. The article reconstructs the emergence of the discourse of traditional values inside Russia and points out its hybrid nature as a mix of notions about Russian culture, religion and history and Western Christian Right ideas. Based on documents, literature and qualitative empirical research with moral conservative actors in and outside Russia, we show that the traditional values around which Russia’s leadership has built its anti-Western national security doctrine actually mirrors the global dynamics of the culture wars.
when Vladimir Putin was elected President for a third time. An overview of this turn –
incorporating anti-Westernism, an emphasis on tradition, the protection of symbols of
purity, and the persecution of symbols of impurity – opens the article. The author then
explains the concept of ‘‘perverse conservatism’’ and elaborates its basic pattern with
reference to such Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts as subjectification, perversion,
disavowal, and what he calls the ‘‘defensive fetish’’. Finally, this pattern and its subpatterns of fetishism and sadism are applied to an explanation of certain aspects of
Russia’s domestic policy. The author concludes that the discourse on traditional values,
at least in some respects, is subordinated to the pattern of perversion.
In this article, we link Russia’s discourse on traditional values with the global culture wars by showing that the Russian traditional values discourse owes much of its content and strategic formulation to the global culture wars. Going back much further than the recent elaborations of the Kremlin, we look at the origins of debates about public values inside Russia from the period of the perestroika, when Russian actors were socialized into the reality of culture wars by Western activists approaching post-soviet societies with a missionary zeal. The article reconstructs the emergence of the discourse of traditional values inside Russia and points out its hybrid nature as a mix of notions about Russian culture, religion and history and Western Christian Right ideas. Based on documents, literature and qualitative empirical research with moral conservative actors in and outside Russia, we show that the traditional values around which Russia’s leadership has built its anti-Western national security doctrine actually mirrors the global dynamics of the culture wars.
when Vladimir Putin was elected President for a third time. An overview of this turn –
incorporating anti-Westernism, an emphasis on tradition, the protection of symbols of
purity, and the persecution of symbols of impurity – opens the article. The author then
explains the concept of ‘‘perverse conservatism’’ and elaborates its basic pattern with
reference to such Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts as subjectification, perversion,
disavowal, and what he calls the ‘‘defensive fetish’’. Finally, this pattern and its subpatterns of fetishism and sadism are applied to an explanation of certain aspects of
Russia’s domestic policy. The author concludes that the discourse on traditional values,
at least in some respects, is subordinated to the pattern of perversion.
The Moralist International continues a line of research on the globalization of the culture wars that challenges the widespread perception that it is only progressive actors who use the international human rights regime to achieve their goals by demonstrating that conservative actors do the same. The book offers a new, original perspective that firmly embeds the conservative turn of post-Soviet Russia in the transnational dynamics of the global culture wars.
Данная работа основана на лекционном курсе «Введение во вселенную Жака Лакана (1901–1981)», который был создан в 2020 г. и который читался автором в ряде высших учебных заведений Москвы — в частности, Высшая школа
экономики, Институт психоанализа на Чистых прудах.
«Жак Лакан: введение» поможет читателю прийти к базовому пониманию лакановских теорий, проследить основной ход его мысли.
Для широкого круга читателей.
Th e book is intended for anyone interested in contemporary psychoanalysis,
as well as in the philosophy of mind and human subjectivity.
Главная тема книги — человек как субъект. В ней раскрывается данный феномен и исследуются структуры человеческой субъективности и интерсубъективности. В качестве основы для анализа используется психоаналитическая теория, при этом она помещается в контекст современных дискуссий о соотношении мозга и психической реальности в свете такого междисциплинарного направления, как нейропсихоанализ. От критического разбора нейропсихоанализа автор переходит непосредственно к рассмотрению структур субъективности и вводит ключевое для данной работы понятие объективной субъективности. В последних главах детально разбирается теория субъекта Жака Лакана, элементы которой иллюстрируют ключевые для этой работы интуиции, касающиеся анатомии человеческого субъекта, — в субъективном и интерсубъективном контекстах.
Постсекулярность – это не только новая социальная реальность, характеризующаяся возвращением религии в самых причудливых и порой невероятных формах, это еще и кризис общепринятых моделей репрезентации религиозных / секулярных явлений. Постсекулярный поворот – это поворот к осмыслению этих новых форм, это движение в сторону нового языка, новой оптики, способной ухватить возникающую на наших глазах картину, являющуюся как постсекулярной, так и пострелигиозной, если смотреть на нее с точки зрения привычных представлений о религии и секулярном. Тексты, собранные в данной книге, – это результат более чем десятилетней рефлексии, попытки осмысления постсекулярности с каждой из обозначенных выше сторон: и как новой социальной реальности, и как новой модели репрезентации, нового языка, призванного эту реальность осмыслить и описать.
Монография посвящена истории дискуссий о месте религии в современном обществе, которые шли в социологии и социальной теории начиная с конца XIX века. В центре внимания автора — история теории секуляризации, долгое время доминировавшей в социологии религии и провозглашавшей тезис о несовместимости современного общества и религии. Согласно этому тезису, религия обречена на неизбежную утрату своей социальной значимости. В книге детально разбираются идеи ключевых теоретиков секуляризации — Толкотта Парсонса, Питера Бергера, Брайана Уилсона, Томаса Лукмана, Дэвида Мартина и др. Анализируются принципы, на которых выстраивалась данная теория, и критика, которой она подвергалась начиная с конца 1970-х годов. Обсуждаются попытки обновления теории в 80-х — 90-х годах ХХ века. Суммируются причины, которые привели к кризису данной теории и ее постепенному умиранию в начале 2000-х. Отдельно рассматривается теория секуляризации, развивавшаяся в советской социологии.
Contributors include: Katharina Bluhm, Per-Arne Bodin, Alicja Curanović, Ekaterina Grishaeva, Caroline Hill, Irina Karlsohn, Marlene Laruelle, Mikhail N. Lukianov, Kåre Johan Mjør, Alexander Pavlov, Susanna Rabow-Edling, Andrey Shishkov, Victor Shnirelman, Mikhail Suslov, and Dmitry Uzlaner.
In the globalizing culture wars of the twenty-first century, Americans are discovering Russia as a new haven of traditionalism and Russian conservatives are re-inventing themselves as the traditionalist leaders of the world. While American and Russian conservatives reach out to each other, liberal critics and moderate Orthodox put this new alliance into question and reclaim tradition from the traditionalists. This edited volume gathers interviews and original essays for a confrontational debate about the meaning of religion, tradition, and liberalism in Russia and in the United States.
transnatsional'nykh kul'turnykh voinakh. Chast' 2], Neprikosnovennyi zapas.
2020. 132 (4): 158-184. In Russian.
transnatsional'nykh kul'turnykh voinakh. Chast' 1], Neprikosnovennyi zapas.
2020. 131 (3): 100-120. In Russian.
Neprikosnovennyj zapas. 2017. № 114 (4). S. 244-263
[https://www.nlobooks.ru/magazines/neprikosnovennyy_zapas/114_nz_4_2017/article/12658/].
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The article is devoted to the phenomenon of the proOrthodox consensus that has developed in Russia by the beginning of the XXI century and its gradual destruction in the 2010s. Russian Orthodoxy is gradually turning from a factor of national consensus into a factor of conflict that is splitting Russian society. This process is illustrated by a number of cases starting with the Pussy Riot case: the emergence of “former believers” in public space, the formation of a new Russian atheism, conflicts around museums, exhibitions, films, the rhetoric of “information warfare” against the Church, etc. The author explains the end of the pro-Orthodox consensus as a consequence of the contradiction that arises between the macro- and meso-level of this consensus.
attention to the fact that neurosciences — and neuropsychoanalysis is no exception here — are already initially interwoven into social and cultural space, making them easy victims of contemporary— sometimes implicit — ideological attitudes. The article concludes with a call for greater reflexivity regarding neuropsychoanalysis on the part of both interested parties — psychoanalysts and neuroscientists.
Данная статья посвящена критическому рассмотрению нейропсихоанализа - междисциплинарного направления, сложившегося в конце XX века и поставившего перед собой задачу объединения нейронаук с психоаналитическим подходом. Автор обращает внимание на концептуальные пробелы этого амбициозного начинания. Главный из них - недостаточное внимание к психофизической проблеме (проблема сознание - тело или mind-body problem), что приводит к игнорированию принципиальной разницы между мозгом и психикой и попыткам вывести принципы функционирования последней из наблюдений за мозговой активностью. Это в свою очередь ведет к дальнейшим проблемам: проблеме перевода и поиска соответствия между психоаналитической теорией, основанной на насыщенном наблюдении за психической активностью субъекта, и концептуальным инструментарием нейронаук. Какой процент потери смысла при этом переводе может быть признан приемлемым и что остается от психоанализа в результате такой процедуры? Еще одна проблема связана с интерсубъективной символической природой человеческого желания, которая не может быть выведена из наблюдений за физиологией мозга. Наконец, автор обращает внимание на то, что сами нейронауки - и нейропсихоанализ тут не исключение - уже изначально вплетены в социально-культурное пространство, что делает их легкой жертвой современных, порой имплицитных, идеологических установок. Статья заканчивается призывом к большей рефлексивности относительно нейропсихоанализа со стороны обеих заинтересованных сторон - как со стороны психоаналитиков, так и со стороны нейроученых.
Данная статья посвящена критическому рассмотрению нейропсихоанализа как проекта обновления психоанализа. Автор рассматривает контекст возникновения нейропсихоанализа, его обещания по радикальному реформированию психоанализа, проблемы с этими обещаниями. Далее автор анализирует решение проблемы «сознание – тело», предложенное в рамках нейропсихоанализа. Наконец, в последней части работы разбирается последняя книга Марка Солмса, суммирующая его взгляды на сегодняшний день. В заключение делается вывод о том, что нейропсихоанализ за 20 лет своего существования превратился в еще одну школу в рамках психоанализа. Представленные в статье аргументы продолжают линию размышления, начатую автором ранее – в статье «Концептуальные проблемы нейропсихоанализа» (Узланер, 2020).
This article is devoted to the formation of the neoclassical model of secularization in the western sociology of religion in the second half of the 20th century. Two stages are marked out in that formation. The first stage starts in the 1960-s, when T. Parsons, B. Wilson, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, basing on the concepts of K. Marx, M. Weber, E. Durkheim, F. Tonnies, elaborated their own theories aimed at explaining the fate of religion in the modern society. Though those theories differ in many aspects there inner unity is demonstrated. In the late 1970-s D. Martin and R. Fenn made important contributions to those theories. The second stage, when the unity of those theories was realized and they were synthesized in one model (called here neoclassical), starts in the 1980-s as a response to the severe criticism to which the notion «secularization» was at that period subjected and lasts till early 1990-s. Main figures at that stage are K. Dobbelaere and B. Wilson.
Под постсекулярным принято понимать социологическую и политическую проблему. Однако данная статья посвящена анализу философского измерения постсекулярного, без которого никакие общественные или политические дискуссии о постсекулярном не имели бы под собой никакого основания. В статье рассматривается происходящий в современном интеллектуальном пространстве двойной поворот: теологический поворот в философии и философский поворот в теологии. Далее анализируется значение понятия «секулярное», а также то, какие трансформации претерпевает философия религии на постсекулярном этапе. В конце предлагается набросок того, что бы могла собой представлять постсекулярная философия и постсекулярная парадигма мышления
In this article the author traces the evolution of C.G. Jung's views on Christianity. This evolution consists of three periods: 1875-1900, 1900-1939, 1939-1961. Main attention is devoted to the second period, when Jung didn't spend much time on Christianity and his overall attitude to this religion was obviously negative. Such attitude is in sharp contrast with Jung's excessive attention to Christianity and respect to it during the third period. The author tries to follow Jung's inner logic, which led him to such radical conversion. The phenomenon of national-socialism is considered as a clue to solve this riddle. In conclusion the author states that Jung is neither an antichristian thinker, nor a Christian one. Rather the attitude of Jung to Christianity may be compared with the attitude of Christianity itself to Judaism.
Статья посвящена рассмотрению представлений о соотношении религии и современности в социальной теории XX – XXI вв. Анализируются теории секуляризации, постулировавшие несовместимость религии и современности, затем обозначаются факторы, поколебавшие позиции сторонников секуляризации. Наконец, всесторонне изучается тот вклад в интересующую
дискуссию, который делает концепция множественных современностей Шмуэля Эйзенштадта, позволяющая смягчить и нюансировать выводы теоретиков секуляризации.