Vorágine: Revista Interdisciplinaria by Rocco A Astore
Revista Vorágine, Sep 2019
ISSN 2452-5022
Papers by Rocco A Astore
A SUCCINCT POSITING OF PARMENIDEAN BEING OVER THE ONTOLOGY OFTIMEUS UN PLANTEAMIENTO SUCINTO DEL SER PARMENÍDEO SOBRE LA ONTOLOGÍA DEL TIMEO, 2022
As understood by the philosopher Parmenides, and as supported by Jaspers' interpretation, Being, ... more As understood by the philosopher Parmenides, and as supported by Jaspers' interpretation, Being, or the ontological grounding of all, establishes that there is always something rather than nothing. Accordingly, we readers would be right to claim that since there is always something rather than nothing, Parmenides' Being is exempt from causation. In other words, Being, as uncaused, is an integral principle of Parmenides' philosophy, and all that follows from Being is Being. Similarly, if we turn to Plato's Timaeus, we readers find that the crafter, or demiurge of our cosmos, is exempt from causation too; however, the universe is a product of causation, and thus is not eternal for its coming-to-be serves as evidence of its potential for demise. Yet, who are we to follow, and why, regarding the universe's ontological status as everlasting or able to decay, Parmenides, or Plato? First, this piece will describe Parmenides' metaphysics of Being along with the aid of Jaspers' writings on this Pre-Socratic. Next, this essay will then turn to Plato's treatment of ontology using key excerpts from Timaeus. Finally, this article will provide support for Parmenides' doctrine of Being over Plato's division between necessary being and the universe of becoming.
As found within Descartes's <em>Discourse on Method </em>and his <em>Princi... more As found within Descartes's <em>Discourse on Method </em>and his <em>Principles of Philosophy</em>, we readers meet the famed <em>cogito</em> utterance, or the "I think, therefore I am". Now, this article will commence by explicating how the <em>cogito</em> <em>ergo sum</em> arises in both of these Cartesian texts, and the results that follow from this key assertion of Cartesian philosophy. Next, this piece will challenge Descartes's findings issuing from these appearances of the <em>cogito ergo sum</em>, which will help to lead readers to be able to claim that neither the "I think, therefore I am" of the <em>Discourse on Method</em> nor that of the <em>Principles of Philosophy</em> amounts to be indubitable. Lastly, to achieve such an end, this present author will employ the <em>Objections and Replies</em> to Descartes's <em>Meditations o...
DESCARTES AND SPINOZA ON THE PERFECTION OF GOD: A CONTRAST, 2022
After repeatedly reading Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, what stills stands out most... more After repeatedly reading Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, what stills stands out most to this present essayist is Descartes's notion of God's perfection and how the perfection of the Divine includes the existence of the Almighty. Similarly, if we look to Spinoza's Ethics Book I and the beginnings of Book II, we find comparable claims; namely, that the Almighty's essence necessarily involves existence, and that this is a perfection of God alone. First, this article will detail how Descartes establishes God's existence via the argument from perfection, and how this perfection of God reinforces the existence of such a supreme entity. Next, this piece will treat Spinoza's understanding of God as that which must exist, and how this mandatory existence is solely of the perfection of God. Lastly, this paper will show that although Spinoza's understanding of God's perfection in his Ethics Book I and II may appear akin to Descartes, it would be incorrect to fully understand either philosopher's views on God's perfection as being entirely the same.
"Augustine's Treatment of the Problem of Evil", 2022
Inquiries Journal, 2018
ABSTRACT It is not often that one questions the nature of space, in fact, most people understand ... more ABSTRACT It is not often that one questions the nature of space, in fact, most people understand extension as independent of their mind as well as the objects that appear in their surrounding world. However, in a radical twist, fitting for the revolutionary epoch of the Enlightenment, Königsberg scholar, philosopher Immanuel Kant forwarded a strikingly new hypothesis. To Kant, although the representations of objects rely on space for their subsistence, minds are independent of it, since they alone impose space onto the world of appearance. Despite his view not being readily defendable by all his peers, this paper will secure Kant’s thesis of the transcendental ideality of space, as a pure form of intuition, against those of whom this author believes is its most formidable opponents, subjective idealists. First, this piece will outline Kant’s understanding of space as well as the subjective idealist theory of extension through its chief proponent, George Berkeley. Afterward, this piece will argue against Berkeley’s view of space, as free from needing objects or minds for its persistence, to help display why Kant’s epistemically driven idealism takes precedence over Berkeley’s ontological one. Lastly, to distinguish Kant’s transcendental idealism from charges of merely rehashing Berkeley’s theory, this essay will draw readers to Johann Feder’s challenges to the transcendental exposition of space, and while doing so further demonstrate why Kant’s treatment of space is more justifiable than Berkeley’s account.
Inquiries Journal, 2016
As a founder of sociology, Max Weber influenced the social sciences immensely. In his “Politics a... more As a founder of sociology, Max Weber influenced the social sciences immensely. In his “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber claims that one of the definitions of the state is its ability to employ legitimate violence as a means of control in a given territory.1 He also claims that one can define the state as being a human community where people struggle with one another for what is ultimately a greater share of the power to apply legitimate force.2 But, should one only support Weber’s claims despite the fact that states also employ knowledge as a means to preserve their power?3 This paper will first describe Weber’s views on legitimacy, his definitions of the state, and the forms of legitimation which he claims justifies his definitions. Next, by drawing from the works of Foucault I will suggest that there are other forms of power that states&#39; use to assert their authority. Lastly, I will argue that the power the state has, through the use of institutions, to employ and perpetuate knowledge as a means of coercion, can be understood to be another essential piece in defining the concept of the state, which I believe Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” seems to miss.
Flaws of the Cogito Ergo Sum and its Consequences on Descartes's Philosophy, 2021
As found within Descartes’s Discourse on Method and his Principles of Philosophy, we readers meet... more As found within Descartes’s Discourse on Method and his Principles of Philosophy, we readers meet the famed cogito utterance, or the “I think, therefore I am”. Now, this article will commence by explicating how the cogito ergo sum arises in both of these Cartesian texts, and the results that follow from this key assertion of Cartesian philosophy. Next, this piece will challenge Descartes’s findings issuing from these appearances of the cogito ergo sum, which will help to lead readers to be able to claim that neither the “I think, therefore I am” of the Discourse on Method nor that of the Principles of Philosophy amounts to be indubitable. Lastly, to achieve such an end, this present author will employ the Objections and Replies to Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, to effectively doubt the “I think, therefore I am,” the self, or mind, or soul, its existence as a thinking thing, God and its existence, and the reality of the corporeal, as similarly found in both the Discourse and Principles.
With or Without the Self? Arguments in Favor of the Hindu Concept of the Atman over the Buddhist Understanding of the Anatman, 2021
As found in the Upanishads, readers come to encounter many ideas regarding the “Self” as opposed ... more As found in the Upanishads, readers come to encounter many ideas regarding the “Self” as opposed to the “self,” or the Atman versus the atman. Now, complicating matters further readers encounter the antithetical concept, of the Atman and atman, or the Buddhists understanding of the anatman as found in the Dhammapada. First, this piece will unpack the idea of both the “Self” and the “self,” or the Atman and the atman, as understood in Hindu philosophy and theology. Next, this essay will then describe the Buddhists understanding of anatman, or the absence, or emptiness of the self, or the nullification of the self, or the atman as well as even of the Self, or the Atman. Finally, this piece will resolve by arguing in favor of the Self, or the Atman as well as the self, or atman over the Buddha’s notion of the anatman.
Academia Letters, 2021
A well-known definition of time, given by Plato, in the Timaeus, is that it is a "moving likeness... more A well-known definition of time, given by Plato, in the Timaeus, is that it is a "moving likeness of eternity," or that time is the product of Plato's demiurge patterning the movement of the cosmos, forged from pre-existing matter, to be as near to the neverending sequence of time in complete oneness, that is eternity itself. 1 However, if we enter Aristotle's Physics Book IV Chapter 11, we find another take on time; namely, that time must be a signifier, or "number" of some sort, dependent on our souls which are able to register and quantify something such as motion, by use of time. 2 Accordingly, which of these two philosophical titans should we readers embrace regarding time: Plato or Aristotle? I. A Brief Summary of Plato's View of Time in the Timaeus Now, regarding Plato's take on time, we readers need only start by entering 37c-37d of the Timaeus. That is because as found in this section of this Platonic work, we locate the character Timaeus's assertion that following the artificing of all that is, to be alive and in motion, by the hand of a demiurge, that demiurge saw it most pleasing if it were to fashion its orderly universe, to resemble the eternal frame by which it arranged all that is. 3 However, because 1 Plato. Robin Waterfield trans., Timaeus and Critias (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2008)., 37d-37e. 2 Aristotle. Terence Irwin & Gail Fine trans., Physics as found in Selections
In Book I and II of his Ethics, Spinoza asserts that there is only one substance, idealized Natur... more In Book I and II of his Ethics, Spinoza asserts that there is only one substance, idealized Nature, or God as well as materialized God, or Nature. That is, Spinoza equates God to Nature and Nature to God, in an attempt to maintain that there is indeed a physical, or mechanical system of Nature twinning an intelligible reality of ideas. However, if we take the philosopher Berkeley, we find that problems of having to equate so-called matter to conceptual reality appear nil, for Berkeley reduces “Nature” to a system of ideas alone, ultimately sustained by one immaterial God. That is, is Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura genuinely advantageous to Berkeley’s view of the ultimate substance, God, as being strictly incorporeal, rendering reality and all existence to be the same? Simply asserted, this present author will agree with Berkeley and reply “no” to Spinoza. Lastly, to achieve this end, this present essayist will cast light on why it is that Berkeley’s immaterial God outshines the Spinozist view of God, or Nature, effectively doubting the surety of Spinoza’s system.
Mind Over Matter: Denying Cavendish's Materialism through Nagarjuna and Berkeley, 2018
From armies of ants marching in uniformity to the harmony displayed by the movements of the heave... more From armies of ants marching in uniformity to the harmony displayed by the movements of the heavenly bodies above, few would deny that Nature displays at least some order. However, the nature of this order, a central question to many Early-Modern philosophers in the West, continues to creep its head into modern academic debates in the humanities and sciences. One inquiry, especially puzzling to these theorists of old, was whether Nature’s nature was immaterial or material. This article will begin to explore this topic by focusing the reader on the works of Margaret Cavendish, who declares that all features of Nature, from the rational to the sensible are, alas, material. Following this explication of Cavendish’s philosophy, this piece will then explicate George Berkeley’s immaterialist vision of existence. Lastly, this article will close with Karl Jaspers’ interpretation of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika Buddhism, in conjunction with Berkeley’s understanding of the natural order, and by doing so help deny Cavendish’s view that Nature’s nature is ultimately material.
A Brief Commentary on the Problem of Theodicy in Hegel's Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 2017
One puzzle arising from Hegel’s appraisal of history, is how can it be that Geist, or Spirit, is ... more One puzzle arising from Hegel’s appraisal of history, is how can it be that Geist, or Spirit, is exempt from being culpable for times of chaos, crisis or distress found throughout its record. Indeed, Hegel himself asserts that peace constitutes the blank pages of history and that Geist, as keenly rational, acts as a “slaughter-bench.” However, this problem of theodicy, or how Geist is immune from flaw or error, and thus unblameable for the tragic events humanity inevitably faces, is central to understanding Hegel’s historical project. First, this piece will explain Hegel’s philosophy of Geist, to familiarize the reader with his account of how history is the unfolding, or evolution of Spirit, as recorded in the earthly realm. Afterward, this essay will illuminate challenges to Hegel’s thesis of Geist’s perfection. Lastly, this piece will support Hegel’s idea that Geist is pristine, regardless of the history, or recorded actions taken by humankind to objectify this Spirit’s Freedom.
As understood by the philosopher Spinoza there is only one substance, Deus sive Natura, God, or N... more As understood by the philosopher Spinoza there is only one substance, Deus sive Natura, God, or Nature. Antithetically appears the philosopher Descartes, who we may claim ascribed to the view that there were at least three substances, God, mind, and the body. First, this brief essay will reflect on both the Spinozist and Cartesian view of substance, as found in Spinoza's Ethics and Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy. Finally, this concise article will close by asserting Spinoza's view of substance over that of Descartes; for, Spinoza's understanding of substance avoids unnecessary problems arising from the Cartesian system's assertions regarding the same.
Arguments Contrary to Spinoza's View of Time and Free-Will through the Philosophy of Henri Bergson, 2019
ssues of Time and free-will appear to be staples in philosophical literature throughout the ages.... more ssues of Time and free-will appear to be staples in philosophical literature throughout the ages. As understood by Spinoza, because Time’s fixity is not due to people, or modifications of God, or Nature, and since God, or Nature is solely determinant, and also eternal, what people colloquially understand by Time, and free-will, are, in fact, farcical. Opposingly appears the philosophy of Henri Bergson, whose intuitive approach to the problem of Time, and critiques of determinists and those who ultimately treat Time statically, like Spinoza, helps to make room for the possibility of free-will. This essay will begin by exploring some central aspects of Spinoza’s God, or Nature, his understanding of temporality, and the problem of free-will arising from his comprehension of Time. Afterward, this essay will explicate Bergson’s assertions regarding intuition and analysis, varieties of Time, the fallacies of determinism, and lastly arguments in support of Bergson’s take on Time and free-will over Spinoza’s account.
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Vorágine: Revista Interdisciplinaria by Rocco A Astore
Papers by Rocco A Astore
This paper will first describe Weber’s views on legitimacy, his definitions of the state, and the forms of legitimation which he claims justifies his definitions. Next, by drawing from the works of Foucault I will suggest that there are other forms of power that states' use to assert their authority. Lastly, I will argue that the power the state has, through the use of institutions, to employ and perpetuate knowledge as a means of coercion, can be understood to be another essential piece in defining the concept of the state, which I believe Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” seems to miss.